American Studies 2004 - 2005

2005-04-25T21:55:00.000-07:00

- DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: THE PRIVATE AND THE PUBLIC
Lecturer: Eduard van de Bilt

This was the last one, guys! Prof. van de Bilt asked us --as he usually does-- our opinion about the course and the reading list. In accordance with my self-imposed silence policy (I talk too much), I didn't utter a word (*). I think some of the pieces --Freud and Nancy in particular-- have nothing to with democracy in America. Still, I'm glad they were on the list.

The reason is simple: I was forced to think hard about what my Left-wing oriented friends think and read. For that I am grateful. Even if Nancy's paper is IMHO a total waste of time and energy, it gave me valuable information on why people would bother to read it. (See below my comments on Nancy.)

So, once again, I leave completely satisfied. Soon --too soon-- we will go back to the real life, and we will remember with great pleasure our American Studies at UvA!

(*) Just before the start of Monday's session, I overheard a conversation between two of my Dutch colleagues, visibly unaware of my status as a Dutch language student at the "Advanced Level". So I understood everything. These colleagues complained about a number of students who were "too eager to present their case", and too enthusiastic, both on the Left and on the Right (that would be me, I guess). They do have a point. But I will say this: it is among those who expressed "passionate political views" that we find the best book presentations of the course.

2005-04-20T18:16:00.000-07:00

CORPORATE SCANDALS. Insatiable Greed at the Top?
. William Buckley Jr.: "Capitalism's Boil", NRO

William Buckley, the conservative writer and founder of National Review, blasts the three top managers at Viacom for awarding themselves between $52 and $56 million each as "compensation" for their work during 2004. The corporate scandals that began to emerge in 2000-2001 were generally attributed to "the imperial CEO", that is to say, to the lack of checks and balances at the (top) management level.

In a widely quoted speech before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate (July 16, 2002), Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan asked himself rhetorically: "Why did corporate governance checks and balances that served us reasonably well in the past break down?" And he answered immediately:

At root was the rapid enlargement of stock market capitalizations in the latter part of the 1990s that arguably engendered an outsized increase in opportunities for avarice.

Buckley provides a wonderful illustration of John Adams's views about human nature: "unchecked passions" will always bring about corruption and bad management -- in business, in church, and in government (*). Adams also believed that passion intensifies and increases exponentially as one rises in the world, which is exactly what Greenspan is aluding to.

The words used by Buckley and Greenspan --rivalry, aggrandizement, humilitation, avarice-- were very familiar to Adams 200 years ago. Some things never change!

(*) In his notes on the Abbé de Mably's De la législation, taken in 1791, Adams wrote: "Avarice and ambition unchecked will work ruin everywhere." (See the excellent compilation by Zoltán Haraszti John Adams & The Prophets of Progress. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1952, p. 133).

2005-04-16T18:55:00.000-07:00

- THE INOPERATIVE Mr. NANCY: A Daunting Piece of Meaningless Mumbo-Jumbo. Agustin's Comments on Jean-Luc Nancy: "The Inoperative Community".

On April 11 Carla undertook with remarkable courage the task of reviewing what a I consider a worthless piece of charabia, the French word for gibberish: Mr. Nancy's "The Inoperative Community." (Privately, most of the students I talked to were in agreement with me on that one.) Consider the following sentence:

"The absolute must be the absolute of its own absolutness, or not be at all. In other words: to be absolutely alone, it is not enough that I be so; I must also be alone being alone -- and this of course is contradictory" (p. 4)

And it gets worse:

"This rupture (analogous, if not indentical, to Heidegger's distinction between the ontical and the ontological) defines a relation to the absolute, imposing on the absolute a relation to its own Being instead of making this Being immanent to the absolute totality of beings ... Ecstasy answers --if it is properly speaking an "answer" -- to the impossibilty of the absolutness of the absolute, or to the 'absolute' impossibility of complete immanence." (p. 6)

I could go on and on like this -- in fact, I must have understood only a couple of sentences in more than 40 pages of madness. What's going on here? I wish I knew (*). Carla admitted that she spent some time "looking for books that teach how to read this book." One hypothesis is that the use of charabia creates a strategically important sense of awe. The reader, bewildered by the complexity of the language, submits to the writer: "If he says such complicated things, he must be a learned man, a savant."

Once the sense of awe has been created, the author drops a bomb from time to time, in a language that --surprisingly-- becomes very plain. Thus, "our liberal societies inflict no less intolerable forms of suffering" (compared with communism). Nice try, Mr. Knows-it-all! But you know what? I just don't buy that phenomenal absurdity.

Mr. Nancy does not produce any piece of evidence to prove his point. There are no comparative statistics of income per capita; there is no mention of the freedom of the press and religion and --I almost forgot-- no mention of a slight detail: the number of innocents massacred in Gulags, cultural revolutions, killing fields, deportations, etc.

But readers are so impressed with Mr. Nancy's empty talk about "immanence", "operative immortality", "being-ecstasic of Being", etc, that they proceed to uncritically "buy" his nonsene wholesale. Carla herself appeared to succumb to the Frenchman's literary charme, when she said that "the US are now implementing oppression in Irak."

Yes, yes, that's what she said. The first free elections ever to take place in an Arab country? Women voting? That's oppression, man, don't you see? Once again, the butcher of Baghdad --a sunni dictator who really oppressed the shiite majority, and who used chemical weapons against his own people-- is not even mentioned. New evidence shows that "at least 290 grave sites containing the remains of some 300,000 people have been found since the American invasion two years ago" (**). But it's the American oppressors, stupid!

The bottom line, in my opinion, is that Mr. Nancy's paper is a fraud, a hoax, a chimère. That's not unusual: a group of MIT students has just written a piece of computer-generated gibberish that was accepted for presentation at the World Multi-Conference on Systemics, Cybernetics and Informatics (WMSCI), scheduled to be held July 10-13 in Orlando, Florida.

The paper bears the very nancyesque title "Rooter: A Methodology for the Typical Unification of Access Points and Redundancy." Charabia!

(*) For more info on gibberish and the "post-modern" school, see Alan Sokal: "Why I wrote my parody", and John Miller & Mark Molesky: "Jacques Derrida, R.I.P. The legacy of deconstruction", NRO, October 13, 2004.

(**) Robert F. Worth: "Iraqis Find Graves Thought to Hold Hussein's Victims", New York Times, April 15, 2005.

2005-04-15T20:33:00.000-07:00

JOHN ADAMS. A Magnificent Website!
. The Massachusetts Historical Society: Adams Family Papers, An Electronic Archive.

This is truly a fantastic webiste. You will find the correspondence between John and Abigail Adams, John Adams's journal and John Adams' autobiography. There's an excellent search engine. Wonderful news for researchers!

2005-04-15T19:17:00.000-07:00

PUBLIC OPINION. Information Markets Betting on the New Pope!
. John Tierney: "The Smart Money", New York Times.

When Jennifer and I reviewed Walter Lippmann's Public Opinion (February 28), we mentioned the "libertarian critique" and the role of information markets in gauging public opinion (by the way, I posted the contents of our presentation here, but then I erased it by mistake! I'll post it again soon.)

Now they're betting on the new pope.

2005-04-11T14:25:00.000-07:00

- William & João Respond.
[William, João, & Gejo: "Rough Comparison Between Post-Lenin USSR and Post-Lewinsky USA: Soviet Union & United States of America", April 4; Agustin: "The Trouble with American Studies", April 7]

. Agustin. On March 21, following the presentation of Betty Friedan's The Feminine Mystique, our self-styled "anarcho-syndicalist" and "communist" colleagues made a number of comments that struck me as disgraceful. Children? They are "fuck--g children". Marriage? It's like "rape, and a concentration camp." And get this: American women were "thrown out" of factories when soldiers came back from the war in 1945!

. William & João. Well, as anyone who has read about post-WW2 history will know, "At the end of World War Two, those women who had found alternate employment from the normal for women, lost their jobs." (1)

. A. Then, on April 4, the panel presenting Jürgen Habermas' The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere handed out a comparison between Neoconservatives and ... Stalinism. That these guys know as much about history as I know about nuclear fusion is beside the point. After all, they can read Anne Appelbaum's Gulag: A History (New York: Random House, 2003), where the number of victims is estimated at well over 18 million (between 1929 and 1953.)

. W & J. Actually, we have read Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's, The Gulag Archipelago, the book that brought the notion of gulag to the Western World. It may be interesting to point out that Solzhenitsyn was a major supporter of fascism both in Spain and Portugal, bemoaning the liberation of Portugal's colonies in 1974.

. A. Is it about the sour taste of (electoral) defeat? In a sense, yes. My liberal friends are very fond of democracy -- only when they win. When they lose, America is not such a democratic nation after all.

. W & J. True, your "liberal" friends ARE very fond of democracy. Defining democracy as "everyone being able to vote and to having their vote count", as opposed to both the 2000 and 2004 Presidential elections, in which people where prevented from voting and voting results were manipulated by companies that provided the voting machines (not to mention that the head of a company [Walden O'Dell, chief executive of Diebold Inc.] vying to sell voting machines in Ohio told Republicans in a recent fund-raising letter that he is "committed to helping Ohio deliver its electoral votes to the president next year."] (2) If the Diebold election episode isn't enough to convince you, perhaps you would like to know that "it is impossible that the discrepancies between predicted and actual vote counts in the three critical battleground states [Ohio, Florida, and Pennsylvania] of the 2004 election could have been due to chance or random error." The odds of those exit poll statistical anomalies occurring by chance are, according to [Dr. Steven F.] Freeman, "250,000,000 to one." That's 250 MILLION to ONE. (3)

. A. Interesting. But the problem, I'm afraid, runs deeper than that. I am beginning to suspect that the so-called "post-modern" culture is making destructive inroads into the minds of some of my younger colleagues.

. W & J. Possibly true. The culture that is provided by media outlets nowadays truly does tend to promote ignorance. Worth noting is the fact that this culture is provided by 5 major corporations that are owned by major contributors to the Republican Party. The "filth" in entertainment that people over at Fox News complain about all the time is spewed out constantly by Fox TV. Interesting.

. A. If every opinion is a "construction" that can be "deconstructed", then there is little room for moral absolutes.

. W & J. We would define our philosophical edifice as being the result of reason. Reason breeds principles. But if you want to frame this according to "moral absolutes", then we'll say that we uphold an absolute respect for "justice" and "life", which means that everyone is entitled to the pursuit of happiness within the framework of (international) law. For us, everything is based on principle, not on number or convenience. The relativism lies with the people that want the rule of law when it prevents gay marriage but will brush legislation aside when detaining and interrogating random human beings (In another transcript [from the trials of the Guantanamo detainees], the unidentified president of a U.S. military tribunal bursts out: "I don't care about international law. I don't want to hear the words 'international law' again. We are not concerned with international law." (4) The relativism lies with people who define as "less tragic" the death of some thousand innocent people from Iraq and Afghanistan as compared to millions in Russia. Our "moral absolute" defines both situations as equally tragic.

. A. Everything is relative. Anything compares with anything. Neo-conservatives, a group of brilliant, hard-working, honest intellectuals are thus compared to history's bloodiest mass-murderer. The death of one terrorist who plots to massacre thousands of civilians equals the destruction of eigtheen million innocent citizens. Et voilà!

. W & J. Neocons can be either brilliant or honest. They can't be both. If they are honest, then Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld, Cheney and Rice truly did believe the WMDs justification, the "ties to Al-Qaeda" rationale and the proposition that it would take less troops and less money to occupy Iraq than to liberate it. That means they're not brilliant, they're incompetent at best, retarded at worst. If they truly are brilliant, then all of this is an intricate manipulative plot to justify a war with a profit motivation. Does this strike you as honest? Taking into account the track record of these people during the Nixon, Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations, as well as their ties to oil and energy industries, we're more inclined to believe the "brilliant" hypothesis. Intellectuals? Probably not. Engineers of destruction? Sounds about right.

. A. The fact that neo-conservatives were instrumental in promoting democracy in Afghanistan and Irak --with revolutionary ripple effects around the world, from Lebanon to Kyrgyzstan-- leaves my liberal colleagues completely indifferent.

. W & J. Supporting democracy would mean not supporting dictatorial rule to start with. The George W. Bush administration's support for the Taliban up until 9/11 and the arms sales to Iraq by both the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations (that allowed the gassing of Kurds during Saddam's al-Anfal Campaign from 1986 to 1989) demolish the argument that neocons have tried to promote democracy anywhere. If you add the cases of Nicaragua's Contras, the Santa Cruz massacre in East Timor in 1991 under Suharto's occupation and the convenient overlook of totalitarian and brutal regimes in Saudi Arabia, Kazakhstan or Chile (to name a few), it's pretty obvious that democracy is not even a faint concern for these people. There is a whiff of ethno-centrism here, not to mention the "ripple effects" logical Fallacy of the Undistributed Middle ("Oaks are trees. Pines as trees. Therefore, pines are oaks." – "We invaded Iraq, a country in the middle East. Lebanon, a country in the Middle East, is in turmoil. Therefore, Lebanon is in turmoil because we invaded Iraq.")

. A. There is a whiff of ethno-centrism here, as if democracy in regions far from our civilized world should not be a concern to us.

. W & J. Coming from someone who dubs people from non-westernized civilizations "savages who don't even have toilet paper" (in class discussion, March 21st), that's a really valid insult.

. A. But let's tell it like it is: anti-democracy liberals are reactionaries; neo-cons are revolutionaries.

. W & J. After all we have said, your point has by now been rendered moot.

. A. To sum up: the "fuck--g children" episode and the comparison "Stalin-Neocons" do worry me, because I have developed a sincere affection for UvA's American Studies Program. The risk is that the program becomes irrelevant. If the competition reads Huntington instead of Freud, my guess is that students will choose the competition.

. W & J. To sum up: the "fucking chil--en" episode doesn't really worry us, because we truly do believe in free speech. The comparison "Stalin-Neocons", that started off as an attempt to create a passionate discussion, has actually grown into a frighteningly valid point: "lawyer-author Edwin Vieira told the gathering [of Conservative leaders meeting in Washington] that [Supreme Court Justice] Kennedy should be impeached because his philosophy, evidenced in his opinion striking down an anti-sodomy statute, 'upholds Marxist, Leninist, satanic principles drawn from foreign law.' Ominously, Vieira continued by saying his "bottom line" for dealing with the Supreme Court comes from Joseph Stalin. "He had a slogan, and it worked very well for him, whenever he ran into difficulty: 'no man, no problem,' " Vieira said. The full Stalin quote, for those who don't recognize it, is "Death solves all problems: no man, no problem." (5)

(1) See "Women and World War Two"

(2) Julie Carr Smyth: "Voting Machine Controversy", Cleveland Plain Dealer, August 28, 2003.

(3) "The Unexplained Exit Poll Discrepancy", BuzzFlash.com, November 11, 2004.

(4) Pete Yost & Matt Kelley: "Records Give Voice to Guantanamo Detainees", Associated Press, April 9, 2005.

(5) Danda Milbank: "And the Verdict on Justice Kennedy Is: Guilty", Washington Post, April 9, 2005.

2005-04-07T19:13:00.000-07:00

- The Trouble With American Studies -- Reflections on the last two Presentations. By Agustin.

On March 21, following the presentation of Betty Friedan's The Feminine Mystique, our self-styled "anarcho-syndicalist" and "communist" colleagues made a number of comments that struck me as disgraceful. Children? They are "fuck--g children". Marriage? It's like "rape, and a concentration camp." And get this: American women were "thrown out" of factories when soldiers came back from the war in 1945!

Then, on April 4, the panel presenting Jürgen Habermas' The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere handed out a comparison between Neoconservatives and ... Stalinism. That these guys know as much about history as I know about nuclear fusion is beside the point. After all, they can read Anne Appelbaum's Gulag: A History (New York: Random House, 2003), where the number of victims is estimated at well over 18 million (between 1929 and 1953.)

Is it about the sour taste of (electoral) defeat? In a sense, yes. My liberal friends are very fond of democracy -- only when they win. When they lose, America is not such a democratic nation after all. Interesting. But the problem, I'm afraid, runs deeper than that. I am beginning to suspect that the so-called "post-modern" culture is making destructive inroads into the minds of some of my younger colleagues.

If every opinion is a "construction" that can be "deconstructed", then there is little room for moral absolutes. Everything is relative. Anything compares with anything. Neo-conservatives, a group of brilliant, hard-working, honest intellectuals (**) are thus compared to history's bloodiest mass-murderer. The death of one terrorist who plots to massacre thousands of civilians equals the destruction of eigtheen million innocent citizens. Et voilà!

The fact that neo-conservatives were instrumental in promoting democracy in Afghanistan and Irak --with revolutionary ripple effects around the world, from Lebanon to Kyrgyzstan-- leaves my liberal colleagues completely indifferent. There is a whiff of ethno-centrism here, as if democracy in regions far from our civilized world should not be a concern to us. But let's tell it like it is: anti-democracy liberals are reactionaries; neo-cons are revolutionaries.

To sum up: the "fuck--g children" episode and the comparison "Stalin-Neocons" do worry me, because I have developed a sincere affection for UvA's American Studies Program. The risk is that the program becomes irrelevant. If the competition reads Huntington instead of Freud, my guess is that students will choose the competition.

(*) You can read the introduction here. Warning: this is not for the faint-hearted.

(**) The epithet "honest" does not apply, I am afraid, to Bill Clinton's friend Sandy Burglar.

2005-04-05T18:33:00.000-07:00

THE NETHERLANDS. The End of Multiculturalism? (Again).
- The Economist: Living with Islam. The new Dutch model?

Interesting article from The Economist. Me? I'm no fan of "multiculturalism".

2005-04-04T19:30:00.000-07:00

- The John Adams Year UvA lecture series. FIRST LECTURE SERIES: John Adams and the Early Republic.

Eduard van de Bilt, Universiteit van Amsterdam. John Adams' Political Thought: Towards a "government of laws not of men".

In the seventh lecture of the John Adams Year 2005 Celebration Series, Mr. van de Bilt discussed John Adams' political thought within the framework of his most important remark, which comes up in several places: Americans have a "government of laws, and not of men."

What follows are some of the notes I took during the presentation.

. Contemporaries were not too kind about John Adams. Historians, more or less, have adopted the same, and largely negative, view.

. John Adams' career is usually seen as consisting of two parts: a revolutionary period, and a more conservative period, the latter resulting from his 10-year long stay in aristocratical Europe. Because of its "conservative" turn, his political thought became less relevant -- and people started to pay more attention to his excentricities.

. A quote from Bernard Bailyn's Faces of the Revolution (I will post it next week.)

. Major Works. Prof. van de Bilt briefly presented Adams' major works: "A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law" (1765), "Thoughts on Government" (1776), A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America (1787), and the Discourses on Davila (1791). Prof. van de Bilt strongly suggested to read Adams's diary and his letters to Thomas Jefferson.

. The Defense and the Discourses. The Defense, arguably Adams's most important work, resulted from his discussions with Dutch Patriots and from his readings in French pre-revolutionary pamphets and books. Dutch Patriots in particular urged him to write his thoughts on how to write constitutions in a free republic. The Discourses contain rather bleak remarks about human being -- a trace of his Calvinistic upbringing.

. Constitutional issues. In order to thrive, a republic needs an impersonal, a written document to safeguard the liberties of the people. John Adams helped to institutionalize the tradition of the division of powers, and that was one of his major contributions to political thought. The idea itself was not not new; what was new was its institutionalization through a written constitution. It came to Adams from his extensive readings in history.

. The Private & the Political. The other building bloc of Adams' political ideas came not from history but from ... psychology. Mixed ideas about himself were somehow turned into a political system that contained all the forces inside his own psyche. If either the mind or the government is dominated by a single force, problems will surface. In politics, that means a strong executive power, always ready to act as a counterweight against an all-powerful legislature.

. A Freudian avant la lettre? Passions are useful, but they have to be checked by other forces. By the same token, aristocrats are needed -- but they too can be dangerous. (By élites, Adams meant something like a "meritocracy", that is to say, he did not favor European-sytle élites.)

2005-04-04T14:54:00.000-07:00

- DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: THE PRIVATE AND THE PUBLIC
Lecturer: Eduard van de Bilt

Rough Comparison Between Post-Lenin USSR and Post-Lewinsky USA: Soviet Union & United States of America

By William, João, & Gejo

. Stalinism & Elections. From 1917 to 1990, people voted in elections but it was actually a pro forma. In reality, a leader was appointed by the members of a Supreme Soviet, members that followed the policy lines of the Politburo bureaucrats that had placed them there.

. Neoconservatives & Elections. In 2000, people voted in elections but it was actually a pro forma. In reality, a leader was appointed by the members of a Supreme Court, members that followed the policy lines of the Administration bureaucrats that had placed them there.

. Stalinism & the Geneva Conventions. From 1934 to 1987, those that were considered "counterrevolutionaries" were, without regard for the Geneva Conventions, placed in concentration camps in remote locations (Siberia, Kazakhstan, Mongolia) where they were tortured, abused and killed.

. Neoconservatives & the Geneva Conventions. From 2001 onwards, those that are considered "unlawful combatants" have been, without regard for the Geneva Conventions, placed in concentration camps in remote locations (Guantanamo, Iraq, Egypt) where they are tortured, abused and killed.

. Stalinism & Foreign Policy. The Brezhnev Doctrine defines that a country harboring forces that threaten socialist interests is a justified target for a preemptive attack because “it becomes not only a problem of the country concerned, but a common problem and concern of all socialist countries." The invasions of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan were justified according to this doctrine. The underlying rationale is dialectics that command: "Each man must choose between joining our side or the other side." (V.I. Lenin)

. Neoconservatives & Foreign Policy. The Bush Doctrine defines that a country harboring forces that threaten American interests is a justified target for a preemptive attack because "any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime [and] we will […] exercise our right of selfdefense by acting preemptively against such terrorists." The invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan were justified according to this doctrine. The underlying rationale is dialectics that command: "You're either with us or against us." (G.W. Bush)

2005-03-30T19:26:00.000-08:00

- Beerd Beukenhorst: "Metternich, Kissinger and the Balance of Power". Summary of "Kissinger and Metternich: is the historical parallel valid?", Presentation at LANDELIJKE AMERIKANISTENDAG", Netherlands American Studies Association (NASA), March 18, 2005 (*)

Henry Kissinger has always been very aware of history in shaping his policies. In his academic work at Harvard, before his political life, he became interested in the ideas and policies of Prince Metternich, the great Austrian statesman of the 19th century who shaped the international order in Europe after Napoleon. Metternich became an historical example for Kissinger, and his ideas were influential to him in several ways.

In my presentation I pointed to three realms of influence. First, there is the definition and scope of diplomacy. Second, there is the Metternichean conservatism and ideas about order and revolution which influenced Kissinger. Third, there is the concept of Balance of Power. In this web-summary I would like to emphasise only the third realm, Balance of Power.

In Metternich's world-view there existed a holy concept of order, which could be applied to the relations between states. Each nation should have their ‘natural’ realm of influence, in which it could satisfy its need for power without endangering their neighbours. A vital part of this order was a realistic approach of international relations, where contesting ideologies should be kept out.

Metternich demonstrated this by his approach towards France, which had brought devastating war to Europe after the Revolution. He insisted on handling France as an equal partner during the construction of the peace Treaty of Vienna. Only by shaping an order in which no parties felt resentment or injustice could there be peace in Europe. The century of relative peace after the Treaty of Vienna proved him right.

For Metternich, disruption of the balance of power would mean catastrophe, since it was against the holy order of nature. For Kissinger, preserving the balance was of equal importance, but for a different reason. In his world, a disruption of the balance would mean nuclear war and the end of civilization. It is a good example of how an historical concept isn’t only applicable 150 years later, but can even gain in importance.

Like Metternich, Kissinger tried to approach other nations without the burden of ideology. It was his idea to ‘open up’ China after decades of diplomatic frost, since China should be considered as a ‘normal nation’. He represented the realist school in American international relations, and his realism was European in fundament.

Kissinger's interpretation of détente has two strong Metternichean elements in it. First, by leaving ideology out of the international political arena, a large obstacle between the two fronts in the Cold War was removed. It made the goal of bringing both sides closer together easier. Second, Kissinger believed that the principle of Balance of Power could help détente. Talking with China should result in a more balanced system in Asia, just as talking in Europe should have the same effect there, according to Kissinger.

Was Kissingers historical example useful? That is a question we can never answer, since we don’t know how his policies would be if he didn’t have Metternich as an example. The successes of détente are questioned nowadays, but this discussion is of course heavily influenced by subsequent events, like the Reagan period and the end of the Cold War.

Without judging the value of historical examples, it is a fact that the ideas of Metternich were very helpful for Kissinger in shaping his vision on international relations and he used them for policy-making purposes. And in uncertain times, like during the Cold War, the man with a vision has an advantage.

beerdensas@zonnet.nl

(*) Many thanks to Mr. Beukenhorst, who wrote this piece especially for our site.

2005-03-18T20:47:00.000-08:00

- Seminar: "LANDELIJKE AMERIKANISTENDAG", Netherlands American Studies Association (NASA). Organized by UvA.

I atttended the following events: the keynote lecture (see the program below), workshop II, workshop IV and the final discussion panel. These sessions were all chaired by Prof. Ruud Janssens. Workshop II started with an excellent presentation by Sandor Loeffen (RU) on "Guantánamo Bay Detainees: International and US Law in the Age of Terrorism."

Sandor gave a legal perspective on the issue; he presented the United States Supreme Court ruling of June 30, 2004, as a vivid illustration of the principle of the separation of powers (*). During the Q&A session, I asked him about the dismail failure of the same principle in early 1942, when more than a hundred-and- ten thousand Japanese-Americans were detained in concentration camps following the attack on Pearl Harbor (**).

Fleur Ravensbergen (RU) followed with an account of her participation in United Nations simulation program at Harvard University. Frans van Nijnatten closed the session with his very interesting comments on "Jimmy Carter, Politician".

Workshop IV included three well-conducted presentations: (a) "Dutch-American military and nuclear relations" by Rienk Terpstra (RSC/UU); (b) "Kissinger and Metternich: is the historical parallel valid?" by Beerd Beukenhorst (UvA); (c) "The Dutch envoy van Polanen and the Republican experiment in the United States, 1796-1802" by Lennart van Oudheudsen.

The seminar was conducted in Dutch. Although I had a hard time understading each and every point made by the speakers, I think I was able to capture the essence of the presentations. I asked Beerd about an interesting paradox involving Metternich, Kissinger and ... Charles de Gaulle (about whom I am writing my MA thesis). In the international arena, all of them proved extremely skillful at balancing foreign powers against each other. However, none of them welcomed any division of power ... at home! Arguably, this led (eventually) to their downfall.

(*) The rulings can be read here, here and here.

(**) See the description of the Japanese internment in Conrad Black. Roosevelt. Champion of Freedom. New York: Public Affairs, 2003.

2005-03-18T19:26:00.000-08:00

- Seminar: "LANDELIJKE AMERIKANISTENDAG", Netherlands American Studies Association.

This year's landelijke amerikanistendag ("nationwide American Studies day") was organized by UvA -- and what a success it was! Check out the info (mostly in Dutch) at the seminar's webiste. Here's the list of seminars and workshops:

10:00-11:00. Keynote lecture: prof. Robert Skloot on Arthur Miller (in English). Prof. Skloot is Professor of Theater and Drama, University of Wisconsin at Madison; he holds --this semester-- the Walt Whitman Chair at Universiteit van Utrecht.

11:00-12:30. Workshops I, II & III.

12:30-14:00. Lunch.

14:00-15:30. Workshops IV, V & VI.

15:30-16:00. Coffe & Tea.

16:00-17:30. Discussion Panel on "Integration and American Studies: European Immigration Policy & Federalism: A Comparative Perspective." Panel members: Kathalijne Buitenweg, European Parliament, Groen Links; Jaap Kooijman, professor of Media & Culture, UvA; Rob Kroes, Professor of American Studies, UvA. Moderator: Ruud Janssens, Professor of American Studies, UvA.

2005-03-14T20:33:00.000-08:00

- DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: THE PRIVATE AND THE PUBLIC
Lecturer: Eduard van de Bilt

Sigmund Freud. Civilization and Its Discontents. London: Penguin [1930].

Reviewed by Ieva, Sabrina and Wiebke.

Comments by Agustin: Sigmund Freud & Viagra.

Today, I will venture to defend a risky and surprising proposition. My point is that, thanks to the wonders of both Judeo-Christian morals and capitalism, there has never been --in terms of overall sexual satisfaction-- a happier time than today. Indeed, Dr. Freud would be very surprised!

In his remarks on "American civilization" in chapter 5, Freud mentions "the psychological misery of the mass" and --in the very next sentence-- the role played by "individuals of leadership." All in all, and making due allowance for the confusion that permeates the whole chapter, the outlook is pretty grim.

My point is that Freud's therapeutic methodolgy enabled him to see the trees, but not the forest. His focus on the individual, coupled with his lack of knowledge about the inherent vitality of the capitalist system, is at the root of a massive error of interpretation.

Bill Gates' Women -- or Woman?
Let me mention here a well-known American "individual of leadership". In its recently published ranking of billionaires, Forbes Magazine (once again) puts Bill Gates, Microsoft's founder, at the top. Now let me ask the following question: how many women does Mr. Gates have?

The answer is: one -- his wife. In terms of overall sexual gratification, this is a truly extraordinary fact. Here's my point: that an individual of Mr. Gates' standing, prestige, power and wealth should have only one woman is a remarkable accomplishment. Only our (much maligned) Western civilization makes it possible.

Thanks to Judeo-Christian morality, even very powerful men can accept the principle of monogamy. This acceptance has a massive consequence: it means that "non-alpha males" can have sex! Our civilization has democratized sex like no other! Let's very briefly review what happens in other civilizations. In his biography of Chairman Mao, Philipp Short acknowledges the positive role played by the Chinese Revolution in terms of the situation of women, especially in the countryside (*).

But if you read on, you will find that Chairman Mao did indeed have dozens and dozens of women at his disposal. Comrades would make sure that, even during his tournées out of the capital, the Chairman would spend a pleasant night in the company of at least one beautiful girl.

Or take the case of Saudi Arabia -- now. There are about five thousand princes of the royal family. Each of these (very wealthy) men has the legal right to marry four women. Given the equal proportion of girls and boys that are born every year, the consequence of such polygamy is impossible to hide: it means sexual starvation for the masses.

Now, the Christian paradise is a fairly spiritual affair: Samuel Johnson described it to his biographer James Boswell as a place where souls are "floating" somewhere in Heaven. The Muslim paradise, on the other hand, is a very sensual place. There's water, wine, food and --above all-- virgins. Lots of them. In other words: the price to pay for a place full of virgins in heaven is sexual starvation ... on earth (**).

ED, EE and DD
The other day, while watching CNBC, I was surprised by the sheer size of the market for the so-called "Life-Style Drugs" created to deal with symptoms such as ED (Erectile Dysfunction), EE (Early Ejaculation) and DD (Desire Dysfunction, for women with "persistent loss of libido".) Billions of dollars change hands annually for these products. That necessarily means that a sexual revolution is going on!

Here's a safe bet: the availabity of cheap medical treatments for ED, EE and DD (among a handfull of sex-related conditions) is putting psychoanalysts out of business ... by the thousands! (***). What a surprise, Dr. Freud! The unending vitality of the capitalist system, with its premium on innovation and risk-taking, is making a sizeable (no pun intended) contribution to the solution of humankind's sexual problems.

My conclusion is thus the following: Judeo-Christian morals and capitalism are creating --right here, right now-- the best period ever, in the history of civilization, in terms of overall sexual satisfaction. True, many individuals still suffer from ED, EE and DD. Presumably, that has always been the case, and that will forever be the case.

But, unlike Dr. Freud, let us not lose sight of the forest! This is indeed a very happy time. And the good news may not be over yet. One the one hand, the democratic tsunami that is currently engulfing much of the world can only bring good news for non-alpha males, especially in the Middle East. On the other hand, the process of business innovation continues unabated. What a wonderful world!

(*) Philipp Short. Mao. A Life. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2000.

(**) Lev Navrozov. "Islamic Suicidal Terrorism", NewsMax.com, April 29, 2004.

(***) During the discussion, Prof. van de Bilt agreed with me on this point. He mentioned the case of US insurance companies, which have sharply curtailed expenses on pyschoanalytical treatments in favor of ... the pills!

2005-03-07T15:23:00.000-08:00

- DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: THE PRIVATE AND THE PUBLIC
Lecturer: Eduard van de Bilt

John Dewey. The Public and its Problems (1927)

Reviewed by Rhonda & Martijn.

2005-02-21T21:55:00.000-08:00

- The John Adams Year UvA lecture series. FIRST LECTURE SERIES: John Adams and the Early Republic

Pauline Maier (*), Massachusetts Institute of Technology: The Founding Fathers' development of independence and drafting of the Declaration.

In the third lecture of the John Adams Year 2005 Celebration Series, Pauline Maier emphasized the role played by John Adams in the preparation of the Declaration of Independence. In a memorial delivered in Leyden on April 19, 1781 --that is, exactly five years after the start of the war against Britain-- Adams wrote:

"That memorable act ... immortal declaration ... not the effect of any passion ... maturely discussed ... adopted by Congress with the unanimous consent of the whole people ... never a law, edict, placard, or constitution was adopted with more thoughtfulness than the Declaration of Independence."

John Adams --who in the first part of his public career had defended the British soldiers who took part in the Boston Massacre (**)-- was the most vocal member of the Second Continental Congress in matters related to American independence. In early 1776, he drew up an agenda for Congress which included: the forming of alliances, the negotiation of commercial treaties, the issuance of coin and currency and ... the declaration of independence.

The problem was that several colonies --including Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Delaware and New York-- had given their delegates instructions precluding anything but reconciliation with Britain. Nevertheless, in the early spring Congress took several drastic steps. Silas Deane was sent on a mission to France, and envoys were sent to Canada. Congress also authorized privateers to attack British ships.

These measures involved many hours of intense negotiations. Adams had to be there, talking, arguing, persuading. This came naturally to him, says Pauline Maier, because as a lawyer he was used to speak to juries. She adds, however, that Adams found it very difficult to moderate himself. He was passionately involved with the American cause, and he had little patience with members of Congress who wanted to proceed more slowly.

An important breakthrough came when Adams and the Virginian Richard Henry Lee managed to get a unanimous assignment calling for all colonies to set up their own governments. On June 7, 1776, Congress adopted a resolution declaring that:

"These united colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent states; that they are absolved from all allegiance to the British crown; and that all political connexion between them and the state of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved."

Although Prof. Maier says she cannot prove it, she thinks that John Adams was happy about the fact that Thomas Jefferson was appointed to write the Declaration of Independence, even though his own name would not be directly linked to that venerable document. With Jefferson busy at his desk, Adams had more time to work behind the scenes, rallying public opinion to the cause of American independence.

Jefferson and Trial by Jury in the Declaration
I asked Prof. Maier (during the break) why Congress edited the reference to trial by jury. In Jefferson's original draft, one reads: "... for depriving us of the benefits of trial by jury." But Congress changed that passage to: "... for depriving us in many cases of the benefits of trial by jury."

Prof. Maier answered very simply: Jefferson wanted everything to look "universal"; besides, trials by jury were taking place all the time. (The original draft and Congress' changes can be seen here.)

(*) Her book on the Declaration is American Scripture: Making the Declaration of Independence. New York: Knopf, 1997. You can read a review here.

(**) Maier thinks that the decision to represent the British soldiers was taken with the consent of the "radicals", which included Adams' cousin Samuel Adams. They wanted to make the point that, in America, anybody could get a fair trial.

2005-02-21T16:33:00.000-08:00

- DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: THE PRIVATE AND THE PUBLIC
Lecturer: Eduard van de Bilt

Harriet Beecher Stowe. Uncle Tom's Cabin. Harvard Library Classics, 1853. Edited by Kenneth S. Lynne, 1962

(PART II) Aspects of the book related to the issue of the private & the public. Jaime: Ophelia is an interesting character, because she sums up what Northerners feel: they are very pro-equality in public, but still prejudiced in private. Carla: Ophelia is very much on her own. She is un-married, which was unusual at the time. She voices her opinions independently -- she does not reflect the voice of the church or of husbands.

Prof. van de Bilt: the way the issue of family life is presented, it looks as if Stowe conceives society as one large family. If family life were to break down, you could expect (according to Stowe) the public domain to be in trouble as well. Does the author go too far in that direction?

There are no "institutional" suggestions. To turn society into one large family: that is as far as Stowe is willing to go in terms of improving society. There are no other "institutional" proposals in Oncle Tom's Cabin. But there's a problem: the public sphere is not a mere extension of the private sphere. The two are in essence distinct from each other. Carla: religion, according to Stowe, is the way to unite the private and the public spheres.

Final comment: even if the book does not bring everything together, it offers --in odd ways-- many ideas about the relationship between the private and the public. In that respect, it provides the basic material of the course.

2005-02-14T22:17:00.000-08:00

- DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: THE PRIVATE AND THE PUBLIC
Lecturer: Eduard van de Bilt

Harriet Beecher Stowe. Uncle Tom's Cabin. Harvard Library Classics, 1853. Edited by Kenneth S. Lynne, 1962.

(Part I). Prof. van de Bilt led a very interesting debate on the book, with emphasis on chapter IX ("In Which It Appears That a Senator Is But a Man".) Slowly but surely, he managed to turn our attention to the fact that Harriet Beecher Stowe's book, more than an anti-slavery manifesto, was in fact one of the first major pro-women accounts in Western literature.

When Ms. Bird asks her husband --the Senator-- about "a law forbidding people to give meat and drink to those poor colored folks that come along", the dialogue that ensues introduces the reader into a feminine world "ruled more by entreaty and persuasion than by command or argument."

According to Prof. van de Bilt, the chapter is particularly interesting because it highlights the role played by women in what became the abolitionist movement. Initially, Mrs. Bird is seen as acting within the limited private world of her own:

The light of the cheerful fire shone on the rug and carpet of a cosey parlor, and glittered on the sides of the tea-cups and well-brightened tea-pot, as Senator Bird was drawing off his boots, preparatory to inserting his feet in a pair of new handsome slippers, which his wife had been working for him while away on his senatorial tour. Mrs. Bird, looking the very picture of delight, was superintending the arrangements of the table... Mr. Bird: "... a cup of your good hot tea, and some of our good home living, is what I want."

When she switches to politics, she unwittinlgy enters the public sphere. "Now, John" --says she-- "I don't know anything about politics, but I can read my Bible; and there I see that I must feed the hungry, clothe the naked, and comfort the desolate; and that Bible I mean to follow." Here, Mrs. Bird, in her very simple language, is making the crucial distinction between law and legislation.

A piece of legislation that contradicts the principles of Christianity in such a glaring way cannot be obeyed as law. And she is immediately proven right, as she and her husband take action to shelter a poor fugitive woman with her child. In Oncle Tom's Cabin, says Prof. van de Bilt, all major female characters (except Mrs. St Clare) are heroes.

Women should not remain in the private sphere. They have the power to create inter-personal bonds; they have emphaty, the ability to make people see that they are really equal (Prof. van de Bilt added that president Clinton possessed this ability in abundance.)

Prof. van de Bilt's conclusion: why not develop, why not institutionalize emphaty in order to create a more just social order? After all, good examples and an attitude of benevolence can be the engines of change. Women, it would appear, do everything better than men -- including managing financial affairs, as the example of Mrs. Shelby shows.

I thought this last point was a bit far-fetched. There is something that only men can do. Only men can wage war. And war, in my opinion, is the only realistic way to put an end to slavery. This is one of the paradoxes of Uncle Tom's Cabin. While Harriet Beecher Stowe appears to favor a non-violent solution, we all know what happened in the end. War on a massive scale was the remedy.

2005-02-11T09:17:00.000-08:00

- Hernando de Soto. The Peruvian economist, who favors well-defined property rights for the poor, was sharply criticized by John Gavois in Slate. Here's a comment on the dispute, together with some relevant links. (More info on De Soto here.)

2005-02-07T16:26:00.000-08:00

- DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: THE PRIVATE AND THE PUBLIC
Lecturer: Eduard van de Bilt

And it's back to the classroom! Prof. van de Bilt devoted the introduction of the course to the reading list. He repeatedly asked us not to take more than twenty minutes for each presentation. The emphasis should be on a discussion centered on the central questions raised by the book.

Presentations should include some background info on the author and on the historical context of the book. We should state any problems we had with the book, like things we don't understand. Here's the reading list:

. Week 2, February 14. Harriet Beecher Stowe. Uncle Tom's Cabin (1852)

. Week 3, February 21. Idem.

. Week 4, February 28. Walter Lippmann. Public Opinion (1922)

. Week 5, March 7. John Dewey. The Public and its Problems (1927)

. Week 6, March 14. Sigmund Freud. Civilization and its Discontents (1930)

. Week 7, March 21. Betty Friedan. The Feminine Mystique (1963)

. Week 8, March 28. No session

. Week 9, April 4. Jürgen Habermas. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1989)

. Week 10, April 11. Jean-Luc Nancy. The Inoperative Community (Essay 1) (1991)

. Week 12, April 18. Anonymous (Joe Klein). Primary Colors (1996)

. Week 12, April 25. Robert Putnam. Bowling Alone (2000)

. Week 13, May 2. No session.

. Week 14, May 9. Individual meetings.

2004-12-05T17:49:00.000-08:00

- SCHEDULE FOR WEEK DECEMBER 6 - 10. JANSSENS PAPER DEADLINE!

Monday 6
. US-EU RELATIONS. Deadline for paper presentation. Prof. Janssens will receive them at his office (room 641) until 17:00.
. MAJOR ISSUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY. No session. The course has ended.

Tuesday 7
. 11:00-13:00. THE US AS A CULTURAL PRESENCE IN EUROPE. Homework includes: (a) a 1 to 1 and 1/2 page essay on the documentary A Dreamscape: Gambling in America, by Bernie IJdis (see this review); (b) comments on Mel van Elteren: "John Mellencamps's Populist Rock: Folkish Small-Town Narratives and Collective Nostalgia in the Midwest"; (c) comments on Pierre Guerlain: "Americanization and globalization: the powers behind the words."

Thursday 9
. War games at the Royal Netherlands Naval College in Den Helder! (More details during the week.)

Friday 10
. 13:00-15:00. THE US AS A CULTURAL PRESENCE IN EUROPE. Orson Welles documentary.

2004-12-03T19:16:00.000-08:00

- MA Thesis Proposals. Profs. Janssens and van de Bilt guided today's discussions of MA Thesis proposals. We heard presentations by Carlein (the US and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict), Gejo (Berlin's role in Europe), William (Americanization and the war on terror) and Yi Quin (America's strategy in South East Asia.)

2004-11-30T17:40:00.000-08:00

- THE US AS A CULTURAL PRESENCE IN EUROPE
Lecturer: R. Kroes

We watched the documentary A Dreamscape: Gambling in America (1994), by Bernie IJdis. I found this review. Prof. Kroes asked us to write a one to one and a half page review of the film, with the following questions in mind: does gambling make America a land of dreams? Is it a "neutral" report on gambling? Is there a "construction" of America? Are Europeans different?

2004-11-29T17:03:00.000-08:00

- MAJOR ISSUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY
Lecturer: E.F van de Bilt

Walter Russell Mead: Special Providence. American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World. New York: Routledge, 2001.

Reviewed by Rie, Sabrina & Wiebke.

This interesting presentation emphasized Mead's well-known model centered on the four American foreign-policy types: Hamiltonian, Wilsonian, Jeffersonian and Jacksonian. Prof. van de Bilt guided the debate by asking a number of questions. How can we explain the success of America as the sole super-power? Is Mead a conservative?

Another interesting question: do we need a Jeffersonian streak whenever foreign policy becomes too tightly guided by one or the other three impulses? Prof. van de Bilt argued that it was the interaction between the four "schools" that created a hugely successful foreign policy over the years.

If US policy makers can keep this consensus, then there is little doubt that America will remain the "top dog" among nations. But he stressed the importance of the self-critical Jeffersonian voice that acts as a check on the impulses emanating from the other "schools."

About the course
Prof. van de Bilt asked our opinion about the course. There were some suggestions about the reading list and about the methodology. Should the lecturer take a more pro-active stance? Should we read about the Civil War? My comment: on the whole, I was very satisfied, especially because I had to review a very interesting book.

I added that, in my opinion, history is also --and perhaps mostly-- about wars, battles and leadership. That's why I thought that some of the issues covered over the past three months had more to do with sociology than with history. But I cannot complain! (Here's link-rich review of Mead's book by BrothersJudd.)

2004-11-25T18:09:00.000-08:00

- THE US AS A CULTURAL PRESENCE IN EUROPE
Lecturer: R. Kroes

We watched the 1986 documentary Big Fun in the Big Town by Bram van Splunteren (on rap music in New York City.) Prof. Kroes discussed chapter 8 of his book and a paper on Turkish-German rap music (Heinz Ickstadt: "Appropiating Difference: Turkish-German Rap", Kennedy Institute for Northamerican Studies, FU-Berlin.) Here are my comments:

- Ickstadt: Two "Cultural Chairs"? Or Maybe Just One! As he sums up his discussion of German-Turkish rap-groups and performers, Ickstadt mentions the "new generation of hyphenated citizens" who know "at least two cultures." He says that these performers sit between "two cultural chairs": they do not feel Turkish, yet they do not feel completely accepted by German society.

In my opinion, there is a massive confusion here between culture and language. All of the artists interviewed say they want to live in Germany. AMIGO even says that "... he very much wished he had been born in Berlin." All of them stress the fact that they enjoy in Germany "... a freedom their parents never had and that they can't imagine ever to have should they choose (or be forced) to go back to Turkey."

In other words, what defines culture here is freedom. And that's the culture these musicians care about. Only Germany offers it -- not Turkey. Language plays only a secondary role. In this sense there is no such thing as a "multicultural Germany." Germany's culture is the culture of freedom, and that freedom may be expressed in either language (which is exactly what these guys wish to exploit.)

- Kroes, Chapter 8: It Takes Two to Tango! The chapter begins with very interesting comments about mass, popular and vernacular culture, but I will discuss a different issue altogether. Throughout the chapter –and indeed, perhaps, throughout the book- it would seem that corporations are the "bad guys" that somehow force artists to sell their products in a determined way.

Thus, one reads here that "Jazz musicians and blues singers have been taken to the recording studios" (emphasis added.) Note the musicians' passivity! The studios are the only ones to act. Rap music itself, says Rob Kroes, "was picked up by the mass-culture industry, recorded, and distributed worldwide." Again, note the passivity of the musicians, and the active behavior of the studios.

This language, which emphasizes corporate activity and artistic passivity, is then contradicted by the assertion that "… the boys who were interviewed already had their dreams of recording studios and market success." So, is mass culture being "reappropiated", as Kroes suggests? I beg to disagree.

It takes two to tango. Artists sell their products willingly; corporate giants buy them in a free market transaction. The emphasis on corporations as know-it-all (and sometimes evil) manipulators hides the fact that artists are perfectly free to sell (or not) their creations.

Thus, corporations can easily be blamed for the "negative ring" associated with the notion of mass culture. From the free markets view that I tend to embrace, such a vision is highly biased. If popular culture is indeed "bad", it's also a matter of artists' personal responsibility.

2004-11-25T15:52:00.000-08:00

- US - EUROPEAN RELATIONS
Lecturer: Prof. dr. Ruud Janssens

Final Session: Discussion of future of transatlantic policies.

Prof. Janssens proposed a number of debate issues about the future of US-EU relations. What is the common ground between Europe and the United States? Why are so many European citizens upset about George W. Bush's "unilateralism"? Was Bush's choice of policy iniciatives logical?

A lively debate followed. I thought that Prof. Janssens' emphasis on "unilateralism" betrayed a Eurocentric view of the world. If the free world was the sum of Europe and the US (as it used to be), then breaking up the relationship would be tremendously costly indeed. But what if --and, admitedly, it's a big "if"-- the free world includes (before long) China, India, Russia and others?

In other words, in my view, Europe --while still hugely important-- is less relevant now than it was in the past. Then Prof. Janssens made some comments about the limits to military power, citing an article by Condoleeza Rice in Foreign Affairs in which she stated that military strength was the key indicator in terms of power.

But Prof. Janssens mentioned reports about a worsening food situation in Afghanistan as a proof that military solutions cannot do the trick by themselves (that situation, reportedly, has Bush talking about the need to get the Europeans more involved.) Then Janssens asked another interesting question: is Bush's "unilateralism" acting against the very idea of globalization that he is supposed to uphold?

About the course
Prof. Janssens then asked our opinions about the course itself. There were many interesting suggestions about the length of the presentations and about the choice of the topics to be discussed.

My comment: such concerns usually miss the big picture. And the big picture is a very positive one. It was only three months, and we covered a lot of ground. I'm pretty sure that we will remember these months as an incredibly rewarding experience, especially when we get back to the real life. Also, I told him that his course was a bit more disciplined than the others (especially Prof. Kroes.)

Acamedics and Politicians
Finally, Prof. Janssens closed the session with some comments about the interplay between academics and politicians. Policy makers, he said, usually do not take advice from academic types. They don't like to hear about historical backgrounds, analogies, etc.

Also, keep in mind that their goal is to be reelected and that means --among other things-- the attention of the press. Take, for example, the issue of the environment. Knowing how much the electorate cares about it, politicians are prepared to make costly decisions if they "smell" political dividends.

The recent upheaval in the CIA is another case in point. George W. Bush did not take its advice on the issue of WMD. Rather, to be seen by the world as the "toxic Texan" was thought to be a more attractive strategy in terms of the American electorate.

2004-11-23T20:33:00.000-08:00

- THE US AS A CULTURAL PRESENCE IN EUROPE
Lecturer: R. Kroes

Prof. Kroes discussed two pieces by Victoria de Grazia: "Mass Culture and Sovereignty: The American Challenge to European Cinemas, 1920-1960", Journal of Modern History, No. 61, March 1989, 53-87 and: "American Supermarkets - European Small Shops: Or how transnational capitalism crossed paths with the moral economy in 1960s Italy."

See more recent stuff by De Grazia here and here.

2004-11-23T18:34:00.000-08:00

- US - EUROPEAN RELATIONS
Lecturer: Prof. dr. Ruud Janssens

War on Terror: Options. Presentation by Jeniffer, Theresa, Diederik & Agustin.

(This is a version of my own comments.)

I will present the current US administration's view on the war on terror in a way that (I hope) many among you will find surprising, and in a way that illustrates one possible outcome of the war -- at least according to some writers.

The US administration's view is based on two types of assumptions. First, there is a heavy reliance on analogies. This is both a risky and a (potentially) rewarding methodology. We can discuss the risks later on, but the rewards are pretty clear: with the help of analogies, we can put current events into a framework that will be familiar to anyone who reads history.

The second assumption is that we are --right here, right now-- at war. Some even talk about World War IV, World War III being the Cold War (1). This war is fought between islamo-fascists (or global jihad, or militant Islam), on the one hand, and primarily the West, on the other hand. And within the West, the United States and Israel are the No.1 targets. But countries such as Russia, Thailand, and even China are involved as well.

The use of analogies in war provides a surprising perspective on the following issues: the war in Iraq, unilateralism v. multilateralism, and regime change in the Middle East. Let me tackle first the crucial issue of uni- and multilateralism.

Winston's Early Unilateral Stance
Here's our first analogy. Imagine that we are in 1939; there is a staunch, a fierce unilateralist out there. His name is Winston Spencer Churchill. Winston's unilateral stance is based upon the need to check the growth of the Nazi war machine. But what are the multilateralists doing? They are busy plotting the destruction of Central Europe!

On the one hand, the British are making deals with Hitler (with the approval of the French) about the Sudetenland, Austria, Checoslovakia, etc. One the other hand, Stalin is making deals with Hitler about the rape of Poland. And if this wasn't enough, the French are making their own deals with the Japanese about some possessions in East Asia (2).

In other words, ladies and gentlemen: multilateralists can be the bad guys; unilateralists can be the good guys, as was amply demonstrated in 1939. This is a key idea for the current US administration (3). But how did the situation evolve? By 1943, Winston's early unilateralism had shifted, had mutated, had been transformed into a new multilateral consensus.

This time, however, the consensus was not based on the appeasement of totalitarian regimes, but on their utter destruction. The appeasement of totalitarian regimes is sometimes referred to as dysfunctional multilateralism by people close to the current administration (4).

The Current War on Terror
How does the current war on terror fit into this scheme? The key event here is Belsan, in early September 2004, when jihadists killed more than 300 Russian children. This will likely be seen in the future as the turning point in the war on terror. After Beslan, Russia decidedly embraced the Bush doctrine. Beslan was Russia's September 11; it might become the jihadists' Stalingrad (5).

A couple of days after Beslan, jihadists bombed the Australian embassy in Jakarta, killing 8 people. It was another colossal blunder. That week saw a flurry of diplomatic activity, with Pakistan announcing a security deal with Russia, and Australia offering to cooperate with ... Russia.

Now, Australia cooperates -in security matters- with America, which cooperates with Pakistan. In other words, we've come full circle! It doesn't make any sense to talk about a unilateral approach anymore. If we add the situation in Thailand (with its ongoing war in the south against Islamic militants) and the recent events in China (the state of emergency in a westward, mostly Muslim province), things could soon change in a dramatic way.

In fact, we may be about to witness -- not tomorrow, not next week, but perhaps in the next couple of months or years-- the birth of a new gigantic multilateral animal, much like the one that emerged in 1943. This, by the way, would fit nicely into Thomas Barnett's view on the war on terror.

Barnett, the author of The Pentagon's New Map, envisages a situation in which the US cooperates with Russia, China, Australia and with many other players to provide both security and economic development to the Middle East (6).

The War in Iraq
Let me finish my comments with some analogies that may help place the war in Iraq in a surprising context. What was the first country invaded by Franklin Delano Roosevelt after Pearl Harbor? It was Tunisia. The invasion of Tunisia was carried out against international law (7). And Tunisia had nothing to do with Pearl Harbor, or with Japan.

However, Roosevelt thought that the occupation of North Africa was very important from a strategic point of view, because it would ultimately weaken the position of totalitarian regimes in Italy, Germany and eventually Japan. A similar approach was taken with Iraq in 2003. By occupying Iraq --and by turning it into a successful, normal country-- the appeal of jihadists in the Middle East will be fatally weakened.

One more comment, this time about the issue of weapons of mass destruction. Here's another World War II analogy: in December 1945, a massive intelligence failure was uncovered in the US. As it turned out, Hitler was far from being in a position to produce the atomic bomb.

In early 1945, however, Roosevelt faced the following dilemma: should he bomb a quarter of Germany --killing thousands of innocent German citizens-- in order to avoid even a slight risk of letting a mad man play with an atomic bomb? Roosevelt's decision was: yes. And George W. Bush made a similar decision (8).

Finally, let me anticipate a question that will surely come up in the discussion. People tell me that a muscular approach to the war on terror creates more, not less, terrorists. My answer is: yes, probably so. But again, what happened in 1939-1940 when the first SS soldiers were being killed? Did that create more imitators throughout the Western world? Quite possibly. Was it wrong to target them anyway? I don't think so.
_________________

(1) Norman Podhoretz: "World War IV: How It Started, What It Means, And Why We Have to Win", Commentary, September 2004.

(2) See Paul-Marie de la Gorce. De Gaulle. Paris: Perrin, 1999.

(3) See Lawrence F. Kaplan & William Kristol. The War in Iraq. Saddam's Tyranny and America's Mission. San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2003.

(4) See John van Oudenaden: "What is Multilateral?", Policy Review, February 2003, and: "Unipolar Versus Unilateral", Policy Review, April 2004.

(5) Barbara Lerner: "Beslan changed Russia ... and the world", NationalReviewOnline, September 7, 2004.

(6) On October 14, 2004, presidents Putin of Russia and Hu Jintao of China issued a communiqué in Beijing in which they "declared each other's rebels -in Chechnya and in China's mostly Muslim region of Xinjang- to be part of international terrorism" ("Courtship in Beijing", Financial Times, October 15, 2004.)

(7) David Kopel: "The Torch of Freedom", NationalReviewOnline, October 7, 2004.

(8) See Mike Steinberger's interview with Robert Kagan ("The pros and neocons of the Iraq war", Financial Times, October 10, 2004). Kagan reiterates the view that "Saddam was deposed because of the weapons he was believed to possess and the danger he was thought to pose to other countries, not least the US." The argument about the spread of democracy in the Middle East is "an ex post facto rationalisation - a correct one, in my opinion."

2004-11-22T14:51:00.000-08:00

- MAJOR ISSUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY
Lecturer: E.F van de Bilt

John Lewis Gaddis: The Long Peace. Inquiries into the History of the Cold War. New York: 1987.

Reviewed by Koos, Otto & João.

See some interesting material here (on the Bush administration's "Grand Strategy"), here (CNN interview on the Cold War) and here (chapter 1 of his book We Now Know. Rethinking the Cold War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).

2004-11-21T11:23:00.000-08:00

- Rhonda: "I'll Be Back Some Day!" Rhonda, who has lived in Ireland, sends this very interesting piece: "Ireland named best country to live in", Economist Survey (MSNBC, Nov. 19, 2004).

LONDON - Ireland is the best country to live in with Switzerland in second spot, according to a sweeping study of 111 nations aimed at comparing happiness around the world. The survey, produced by the Economist Intelligence Unit and released on Wednesday, showed the quality of life in Ireland well ahead of the United States, which was ranked 13th, and neighboring Britain, which came in at 29th place.

Assuming that wealth is not a finite measure of human satisfaction, the survey is based on complex equations that give precedence to matters of health, well-being, political stability and security. Climate, job security, political freedom, gender equality, and "freedom, family, and community life" are also taken into account.

On a scale of one to 10, Ireland achieved 8.33 points, with Switzerland coming in at 8.07. While the United States had the second-highest GDP after tiny Luxembourg, relatively small European countries, Sweden, Italy, Denmark, and Spain, placed higher, all appearing within the top 10.

Meantime, larger European Union members France and Germany, took 25th and 26th places respectively. The United Kingdom ranked the lowest out of the EU members, primarily due to the deterioration of traditional social and family values.

Ireland not only rated high on social cohesion, but beat the United Kingdom on GDP per person. Average yearly income is now $36,790 in Ireland, versus $31,150 in Britain. For a country that was losing much of its population right up to the early 1990s as emigrants searched for work abroad, the lifestyle victory shows how far Ireland has come since joining the European Union.

Ireland wins because it successfully combines the most desirable elements of the new (the fourth highest gross domestic product per head in the world in 2005, low unemployment, political liberties) with the preservation of certain cozy elements of the old, such as stable family and community life,” the Economist survey revealed.

In the second-division, South Korea ranked just below the United Kingdom, at 30th place. And politically and economically insecure Zimbabwe came in last with in 3.89 points. The survey, which will be published in The World in 2005, has been conducted annually for 17 years.

2004-11-19T18:22:00.000-08:00

- THE US AS A CULTURAL PRESENCE IN EUROPE
Lecturer: R. Kroes

We watched a long interview with Quentin Tarantino, where he discusses (among many other things), the movie Breathless. By the way, I just found this Tarantino interview where he briefly discusses ... A bout de souffle!

Prof. Kroes asked how many of us had preferred Breathless over A bout de souffle. This is my count: Jaime, William, Gejo and myself. I made a comment on the issue of the different audiences targeted by Godard in 1960 and McBride in 1982 (see below.) Then an interesting discussion followed about the "intellectual" character of some European movies and theater pieces -- with a reference to Bertold Brecht.

2004-11-19T17:36:00.000-08:00

- THE US AS A CULTURAL PRESENCE IN EUROPE
Lecturer: R. Kroes

(These are my comments on A Bout de Souffle and Breathless.)

. A Different Kind of Audience. As a critic said, A bout de souffle is a movie mostly for "cine-snobs" like Jean-Luc Godard himself. The movie is full of "film bluff" references. Godard does not care at all for a mass audience. This was, by the way, the impression of a young Rob Kroes as we watched it for the first time in the 1960s! (1). Indeed, as another critic has pointed out, "Godard has essentially tried to please only himself, and hang what anybody else thinks." (2)

On the other hand, McBride's target in Breathless is clearly the mass audience. Richard Gere in 1982 is at the peak of his popularity, having acted in American Gigolo two years before. This stands in sharp contrast with Belmondo, who was still a relatively unknown figure in 1960 -- but also with Jean Seberg, whose carrier was in trouble:

Seberg burst on the movie scene in 1957, when, at the age of 17, she beat out 3000 contenders for the title role in Otto Preminger's epic biopic, Joan of Arc. The movie was, to put it mildly, a disappointment, due in large part to Seberg's horrible miscasting. Her career was almost over at the beginning, but Preminger used her in his next film, Bonjour Tristesse, an examination of a daughter's obsessive love for her father (David Niven). Few people saw the movie, but among those who did was Jean Luc Godard, who instantly wanted Seberg for 1959's Breathless. Suddenly, she was a celebrated actress. (3)

So, while both Belmondo and Seberg's careers took off after A bout de souffle, Richard Gere was already a well-known figure. From the beginning, McBride's target was the mass audience.

Note also that much of the 1960 film's vigor comes from collisions between popular and high culture: Godard shows us pinups and portraits of women by Picasso and Renoir, and the soundtrack includes both Mozart's clarinet concerto and snippets of French pop radio. There are no ambitions of this sort in Breathless, which, according to a critic is

… neither straight remake nor looser homage to Godard's A Bout de Souffle; better by far to just enjoy it on its own terms when it turns out at least three parts better than anyone predicted. Breathless is not good enough to cut it as a worthy US version of the original but, seen as a film it it's own right, it makes a lot more sense and it is entertaining to watch. It is not a polarising moment in cinema history but, if you can forget the film's origins and hope only for an entertaining movie, it will not let you down. (2)
_________________

(1) Comment by Rob Kroes in class, November 2004.

(2) These references are mostly taken from reviews of A bout de souffle and Breathless that I have gathered from searches on Google.

(3) From the Journals of Jean Seberg (A Review by James Bernardinelli).

2004-11-19T11:48:00.000-08:00

- Gejo Recommends A Site For Film Reviews. Gejo recommends Roger Elbert's website for film reviews. You can read a review of Breathless here.

(I'll soon post more material on recent classes.)

2004-11-18T14:32:00.000-08:00

- US - EUROPEAN RELATIONS
Lecturer: Prof. dr. Ruud Janssens

Development Aid & Aids. Presentation by Wiebke, Ieva & Tim.

2004-11-16T10:35:00.000-08:00

- US - EUROPEAN RELATIONS
Lecturer: Prof. dr. Ruud Janssens

Environment, Post-Kyoto. Presentation by Yang Yi Qin, Zhang Li, Bernadette, Sabrina, Rie & João.

2004-11-15T14:25:00.000-08:00

- MA Thesis: An E-Mail From Prof. Janssens. "Dear MA-students: we would like to discuss the proposals for the MA thesis with you. We are going to do this with the whole group. The idea is that not only the professors will make suggestions on how to do research and how to write, but that it is also very helpful to get suggestions from your fellow students.

"On top of that, it will help all students to think in terms of setting up research and writing reports, an activity you will no doubt be doing a lot in your life after the UvA. We will talk for 20 minutes about each research proposal. Each student will present her/his topic in five minutes, and then we will discuss topic and approach.

"In the opening statement of five minutes you need to tell us what the topic is, why it is interesting, and what kind of research material you are going to use for your writing. The meetings are on Friday morning, from 10 to 12 hours. There are no other classes for the MA group scheduled at that time.

"Best wishes,

Ruud Janssens.

Prof. dr. R.V.A. Janssens. Amerikanistiek, Afdeling Geschiedenis, Archeologie en Regiostudies, Universiteit van Amsterdam."

2004-11-12T19:44:00.000-08:00

- US - European Relations: Thomas Barnett's View. The author of The Pentagon's New Map (readings for September 4) reviews an article by Jeremy Rifkin on Europe: "America, Wake Up to the European Dream", Washington Post, October 31. Very interesting.

2004-11-12T17:28:00.000-08:00

- THE US AS A CULTURAL PRESENCE IN EUROPE
Lecturer: R. Kroes

A Bout de Souffle. We watched the French movie A bout de souffle (1960), directed by Jean-Luc Godard, with Jean-Paul Belmondo and Jean Seberg. See a review from the Edimburgh University Film Society.

2004-11-12T10:34:00.000-08:00

- The End of "Multiculturalism" in the Netherlands? That's the view of an American neo-conservative writer in "The Killers - The Dutch hit crisis point" (National Review Online, November 11.) Warning: this is strong stuff indeed!

2004-11-11T13:59:00.000-08:00

- US - EUROPEAN RELATIONS
Lecturer: Prof. dr. Ruud Janssens

Military Relations: NATO and Peace Enforcement. Presentation by Diana, Sjoed & Maarten

Interesting presentation today; I'll post it sometime this evening. Meanwhile, here are some comments by Prof. Janssens:

. Assymetric Warfare. How are conventional armed forces supposed to deal with urban guerrillas? As we are seeing right now in Fallujah, urban warfare makes it more difficult to use the enormous advantage of technology, on which Americans heavily rely (for a different opinion, see Ralph Kenney Bennet: "Technique and Technology in Fallujah", TechCentralStation .)

Assymetric warfare means that the enemy has the initiative, because he can pick his own fights. Thus, Fallujah itself does not mean much to "insurgents"; they will move out ant try to kill Americans elsewhere.

. NATO as a Political Organization. One should not lose sight of the fact that NATO is a political organization. It is run by ambassadors, not by generals. This is very important to the United States, because it gives them some leverage in discussions about the integration of East European countries.

. The Perception of Threats. Europeans and Americans have very different opinions on this issue. When dealing with problems in poor parts of the world (especially Eastern Europe and the Balkans, and the countries of North Africa), Europeans tend to think more in terms of social problems, globalization, trade, etc. They favor diplomatic solutions.

This stands in sharp contrast with the United States, who tend to rely more on military solutions (this is especially the case in the Bush administration -- although the difference in perceptions predates 9/11.)

2004-11-09T22:29:00.000-08:00

- US - EUROPEAN RELATIONS
Lecturer: Prof. dr. Ruud Janssens

Political Relations: UN and Bilateral Relations. Presentation by Rhonda, Liang Xin & Carlein.

- Rhonda: History and Structure of the United Nations

. Institutions leading up to the United Nations
1. Peace of Westphalia (1648)
2. Congress of Vienna (1815)
3. Concert of Europe (1830-1884)
4. League of Nations (1914-1946)

. Quotation: "prevention of mutual destruction which will be fatal to Christian civilization"; "creation of an international constitution"; "promote prosperous trade and continued peace" (Lord Robert Cecil, quoting his father 40 years prior to his receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in 1938)

. Quotation: "It would be a master-stroke if those great powers bent on peace, would form a league of peace, not only to keep the peace among themselves, but to prevent, by force if necessary, its being broken by others." (Theodore Roosevelt in 1910)

The League of Nations. Why did it fail?
1. lack of US participation
2. veto power of League members when themselves involved in conflict
3. idealism was too high

The United Nations: The creation
. Dubarton Oaks
. Yalta Conference
. San Francisco

The United Nations Charter
. Leadership for peace and security duties rests upon a small segment of the international community, primarily the great powers.
. Is the UN Charter set up for: peace keeping or peace establishment?
. Chapter 7 is entitled “Action with respect to:
- threats to the peace
- breaches of the peace
- and acts of agression

The United Nations System
. Trusteeship Council
. Security Council
. General Assembly
. Economic and Social Council
. International Court of Justice
. Secretariat

Opening of the Fifty-Ninth Session of the General Assembly, September 2004
. UN needs to find ways to respond to global challenges like:
- Infringements in the rules of law
- Conflicts
- HIV/AIDS
- Environmental issues
. For that the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) must work in harmony and fulfil their prerogatives under the Charter (General Assembly President Mr. Jean Ping)

- Liang Xin: Weakness & Willingness -- UN after the Cold War

Introduction
. There is strong evidence that shows how the operations of UN functions much weaker and weaker, going on the edge of its operation.
. For an instance, we can easily find how it malfunctions from Persian Gulf War to Kosovo War, then to the recent Iraq War in 2003, and how it is manipulated by the US unilateral policy.
. Peace is the United Nation's number one objective. Peacekeeping is an essential tool for the United Nations in its efforts to uphold international peace and security.
. Unfortunately, the Security Council, the most important UN body, was blocked for the duration of the Cold War. But then the huge political changes that took place between 1989 and 1990 seemed to usher in a period of new opportunity for the UN.
. Indeed, it is from this time that the "Agenda for Peace", one of the most important peace strategies of our time arises.
. However, the number, complexity and scope of peacekeeping operations expanded enormously, placing massive demands on the UN system with which it struggled to cope.
. During the post-cold war era, many missions ran into severe difficulties, such as the collapse of the UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia in1993 and the famous peacekeeping disaster of Rwanda.
. Problems with UN peacekeeping operations were particular seen as salient.

Body
1. Brief generalization of how inefficient UN operated through two wars
a. The Persian Gulf War---UN as an instrument of U.S government
b. The Kosovo War------U.S-led NATO’s intervention in Kosovo before the authorization of UN Security Council

2. Focus on the Iraq War and U.S unilateralism
a. Failure to prevent and stop, challenged by U.S unilateralism
b. Iraqis resistant misunderstanding and hostility toward UN
c. UN---corrupt bureaucracy
d. The anomalous situation of Security Council
e. Difficulties UN reform faces

Conclusion
. As all the facts and analysis I have stated above, UN is based on the assumption that all members are of equal stature and have equal interests, aspirations and preoccupa-tions. That is a myth.
. Now, U.S is the only superpower in the world. There is no balance of power between great powers. Unless balance of power is restored, UN can have a better future. Like most critics see, UN is nothing but the sum total of members and thus cannot be blamed as much.

- Carlein: Individual Countries and the UN, US, EU, Russia, UK, France Official Positions and Internal Challenges

. Scenario 1: The Future of the UN
- US leaves (officially or in practise) the UN; the UN then becomes as irrelevant as the League of Nations once was
- Nothing changes: long live the status quo
- UN reforms and becomes stronger than before

. Scenario 2: Reform of the Security Council
- It becomes irrelevant: the General Assembly gets all the power
- nothing changes: long live the status quo
- abolish the veto power (alternatives)
- add countries with veto powers

. Question 1:
- The character of the UN - revision needed?
- For example reform of the agenda for peace needed or should the UN solely function as a humanitarian and cultural institution?

. Question 2:
- The toothless tiger: the future of UN sanctions and do they show the real weakness of the UN?

. Question 3:
- Are the advantages of the UN more important than the disadvantages?
- Should this mean that the status quo is more important and successful than any future reform in the UN?

. Question 4:
- The future of transatlantic relations, will they worsen if the current situation (and without reform in the UN) does not change?
- Should NATO become more relevant / important than UN, should NATO (with more effective measurements than UN) be incorporated in the UN?

. Question 5:
- What happens if the US breaks away from UN?

. Question 6 (or scenario?):
- The UN works best as it works today
- Change is too difficult and creates more problems then there are now
- There should always be reform because the world doesn't stop from changing either
- It will work as long as all countries put their own ego aside and work again for the better good of the common world.

2004-11-09T20:36:00.000-08:00

- The UN & the War on Terror. An interesting comment.

2004-11-09T17:00:00.000-08:00

- US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS
Lecturer: Prof. dr. Ruud Janssens

Political Relations: UN and Bilateral Relations. Presentation by Rhonda, Liang Xin & Carlein.

Very good presentation today (I'll post it shortly.) Rhonda exuded tranquility as she discussed the history and the functioning of the UN. Liang Xin did a great job at describing the inherent weaknesses of the institution, and Carlein made some useful and interesting remarks about the problem of sovereignty and -last but not least- about the role of the UN (or lack thereof) in the war on terror.

Comments by Prof. Janssens. The Original Mission of the UN. If we take into account its original mission (to prevent a new world war), then the UN has been rather successful. As a matter of fact, most conflicts have been internal conflicts -- "ethnic cleansing", revolutions, etc.-- about which the UN was not meant to interfere.

Intervention & the UN Dilemma. After Somalia and Rwanda, the UN dilemma can be stated like this: if it does intervene, it risks a Somalia-style fiasco; but if it does not, then the risk is a new Rwanda. Not an easy one!

The Role of the People's Republic of China. Although a member of the UN Security Council, the People's Republic of China does not seem willing to actively participate in UN-led initiatives. It often uses its veto power and it does not contribute to peace-keeping operations. This is bad news for the UN, because it depends on the participation of its members.

2004-11-08T15:27:00.000-08:00

- MAJOR ISSUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY
Lecturer: E.F van de Bilt

Stanley Elkins. Slavery. A Problem in American Institutional Life and Intellectual Life. (Third edition revised, University of Chicago Press, 1976).

Reviewed by Jeniffer, Martijn and Gejo.

(See an excerpt of the book here and a comment here.)

2004-11-04T16:30:00.000-08:00

- US - EUROPEAN RELATIONS
Lecturer: Prof. dr. Ruud Janssens

Economic Relations: WTO and Subsidies. Presentation by Jaime, William, Ivo, Jeroen & Otto. I admit I was a bit lazy this morning -- I didn't take notes! (I only made a brief comment: developing countries are too often seen as "victims" of free trade, when in reality they are all very badly run, with high levels of corruption, no judicial independence, and bad economic policies. Prof. Janssens agreed.)

2004-11-02T23:24:00.000-08:00

- US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS
Lecturer: Prof. dr. Ruud Janssens

National Interests: US, EU, European nations. Text of Gejo's Presentation: "Germany and the European Union"

- Main source: Christian Hacke, Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Von Konrad Adenauer bis Gerhard Schöder. Berlin: Ullstein, 2003.

. History: 1945 - 1990. German foreign minister Joschka Fischer noted two "historic decisions" that made the new Europe possible: The US's decision to stay in Europe and France's and Germany's commitment to the principle of integration, beginning with economic links.
(Source: "Power and Weakness" by Robert Kagan, Policy Review, June 2002.)

. History: 1990-2004. Germany has 82 million inhabitants, of whom 8 million are foreigners. In total there are two million people from Turkey (a new major candidate for the European Union).
Almost 9% of the German workforce is jobless (over 4 million people). The United Nations calculated that if it wants to keep the retiring system working, Germany should let in 200,000 to 300,000 immigrants every year.

Furthermore, there is a lack of computer- and software specialists, which means that even though there is are a lots of unemployed people, still several hundred thousand of jobs cannot be filled.

The complete debt burden of the German state, including debts from the 16 federal states and cities, currently amounts to more than 1200 billion Euro. This costs every year 40 billion Euro in interest and amortization, which is 25 % of the estimate.
(Source: Michèle de Waard: Duitsland achter de schermen: het wonder van de Berlijnse Republiek. Amsterdam: Prometheus, 2002)

The enormous economical problem of Germany is a factor that influences all politics. The reunification of the two Germanys is the main cause of this. Building up the former DDR to the standards of the former West Germany has and will cost a lot of money.

That is why I picked the year 1990 (reunification) as the new starting point of Germany as a part of the European Union.

Future predictions:

1) With the help of the US, Germany takes a central role in building up the European Union, which will involve the new members of the eastern part of Europe.

The Ostvertragen (treaties between East and West Germany made at the time of the Cold War) teached Germany how to deal with the former Eastern European countries who want to join, or recently joined the European Union. This gives Germany a central position within the European Union, not only geographically.

2) Europe will be divided, which means economic problems will hold on much longer.

Germany needs partners to build up a strong economy. More labourers (immigrants) are needed. If Europe will be divided, getting rid of the debt will take much longer. This will probably make Germany a strong leader within the Eastern part of Europe, especially because the United States supports Germany in being the main player in connection with the countries in Eastern Europe.

Relations Germany-US: 700,000 labourers in Germany work directly for American companies. The same number of workers are employed in the US by German companies. More direct connections with the United States can be made. So even when Europe will be divided, Germany will stay an important partner for the US.

How good the relationship is, can be taken from the words of president Bush when he visited Berlin in 2002, where he said: "I'm here to let the German people know how proud I am of our relationship, our personal relationship, and how proud I am of the relationship between our two countries."

And on February 27, 2004 president George W. Bush and Chancellor Gerhard Schröder made a Joint Statement on the German-American alliance for the 21st century. (See also Prof. Janssens' comments below.)

2004-11-02T23:01:00.000-08:00

- US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS
Lecturer: Prof. dr. Ruud Janssens

National Interests: US, EU, European nations. Presentation by Harry, Marc, Jurjen & Gejo.

(These are my notes from this very good presentation.)

. United States (Harry). There are two scenarios for the United States: a conservative one, and a more liberal one. Under the conservative scenario, the US would benefit from a fragmented Europe. In the short run, a strong Europe would not be a welcome phenomenon.

Thus, America could follow a three-dimensional strategy. Politically, it could seek to promote bilateral relations with European countries. Militarily, it could accelerate its planned pullback from Europe. And from a economic viewpoint, it could try to establish free-trade agreements with different European partners.

Risks associated with the "conservative" scenario: (a) the long-term stability of the European Union would perhaps come under threat; (b) or, surprisingly, "core" Europe could become even more united; (c) an important global ally would be lost.

Harry went on to outline the more "liberal" scenario. It is based on ackowledging what unites Europe and the US, rather than what separates them. Europe is an ally with the same core values (democracy, the rule of law, etc.) Together, they could counter upcoming superpowers such as China.

Under this scenario, US unilateralism is to be avoided. America cannot do everything on its own. The challenge: it takes a dose of political courage to identify common long-term interests. The risk: this position can cost some influence in the short run.

Harry decidedly embraces the more "liberal" strategic option; he argues that it's the most realistic one.

. France (Jurjen). Key issues: the legacy of De Gaulle's grandeur policy; the heavy burden of the state, the biggest employer in France; the lack of trust in market-based economic solutions.

A realist French perspective seeks to curb German power within the EU and to counterbalance the United States in the global scene. France wants to "civilize" globalisation -- knowing well that it cannot control it. The French impulse for a balance of power is triggered by: (a) US unilateralism; (b) the influence of the French-Arab minority.

This scenario depends on the acceptance of the European constitution and on more defense cooperation within Europe. Within five years, one should expect more trade disputes with the US (which would make the headlines, but with only peripheral damage), and less influence within the WTO.

Risks: a multipolar world could be a more dangerous world; less trade could lead to economic stagnation; more European integration could diminish sovereignty.

Jurjen also presented a scenario where France decides to go it alone, as the EU disintegrates. The European constitution -seen as too "anti-social"- is rejected. From an economic perspective, France focuses on Asia, and less on Eastern Europe (now dominated by Germany.) Conceivably, the country could promote more relations with the rest of the French-speaking world.

. Germany (Gejo.) Very briefly, Gejo sketched the German problem mostly in economic terms. The country is heavily indebted and suffers from chronic unemployment. With the help of the US, Germany could play a key role in the EU. It could turn to the new Eastern European countries from an economic point of view. Risks: Germany needs more immigrants.

. United Kingdom (Marc.) The UK finds itself in a very awkward position: will it leave the EU and join NAFTA? Will it embrace Europe and its new currency? After reviewing "how it got there in the first place" (De Gaulle, Suez, Vietnam, etc.), Marc singled out the four strategic issues faced by the UK: sovereignty, the euro, the free markets philosophy, defense policy.

- Sovereignty. It is very, very important to the British. The last time they were invaded, it was back in ... 1066! In other words, the Brits are very reluctant to transfer power to European institutions they perceive as unaccountable.

- The Euro. Public opinion is against giving up the British pound. The pound was forced out from the Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1992 -- a bitter experience.

Marc favors a solution where the United Kingdom stays in the European Union, but with enough influence to promote an economic agenda based on free trade. Eventually, a transatlantic free market could emerge.

Comments from Prof. Janssens. Very interesting presentation, which will prove useful as we move forward and deal with more specific issues. Perhaps greater emphasis should have been put on the role played by domestic politics. Leaders may disregard long term goals in their pursuit of immediate electoral gains.

Thus, Gerhard Schröder took a very strong anti-US position in 2003, mostly because he was in real danger of losing the general election. Also, one should take into account the fact that the EU may start to "create" its own interests -- as all bureaucraties do.

2004-11-01T21:15:00.000-08:00

- MAJOR ISSUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY
Lecturer: E.F van de Bilt

Stephen Skowronek: The Politics Presidents Make. Leadership From John Adams to Bill Clinton (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 1997).

Reviewed by Carlein, Diederik & Marc

Sadly, I missed most of the presentation -- I had an appointment at the Foreign Police to pick up my new verblijfsdocument! Here are some comments by Prof. van de Bilt:

. Schlesinger v. Skowronek. What differences can one find between these two analysts of the presidency? How do their chronologies differ? (Clue: Schlesinger's is simpler, as it focuses solely on the issue of the imperial presidency. Skowronek starts with a similar chronology, but he then tries to introduce a degree of sophistication.)

. The increasing power of US presidents. Skowronek is not as concerned as Schlesinger is. Presidents, even if they seem to have ever more and more power, may be constrained by the fact that they lack a clear mandate from the electorate (see the issue of power v. authority).

. The problem of originality. Every president wants to become a disruptive president; he wants to build his legacy. To experiment radically. To attack predecessors. That in itself is a very interesting idea. It tends to create "victims", like Andrew Johnson after Lincoln, or Harry Truman after FDR. This is what litterary critic Harold Bloom called the "Anxiety of Influence": you cannot allow yourself to be seen as a mere apostle, as a follower.

2004-10-29T13:33:00.000-07:00

- SCHEDULE FOR WEEK NOVEMBER 1 - 5. BACK TO WORK!

. Monday 1, 10:00-13:00. MAJOR ISSUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY. Carlein, Diederik and Marc will review Stephen Skowronek's book The Politics Presidents Make. Leadership From John Adams to Bill Clinton (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 1997). You can read some background info on the author here, and a review of the first edition (1993) here. (Unfortunately, I will not be able to attend.)

. Tuesday 2, 9:00-11:00. US-EU RELATIONS. Presentation on "National Interests" by Harry, Marc, Jurjen and Gejo. 13:00-15:00. THE US AS A CULTURAL PRESENCE IN EUROPE. Walking Tour through Amsterdam with Profs. Rob Kroes and Herman Beliën.

. Thursday 4, 9:00-11:00. US-EU RELATIONS. Presentation on "Economic Relations: WTO and Subsidies" by Otto, Jaime, William, Ivo and Jeroen.

. Friday 5. No session.

2004-10-22T11:11:00.000-07:00

THE US AS A CULTURAL PRESENCE IN EUROPE
Lecturer: R. Kroes

Amsterdam Walking Tour: Jacqueline - Marc - Agustin

- The Americanization of Scheltema. We visited a couple of bookstores in Amsterdam: Athenaeum (Spui 14-16), Het Martyrium (Van Baerlestraat 170-172), and Scheltema (Koningsplein 20.)

We looked for physical, visible signs of "Americanization", which we defined as: (1) enormous availability of books on display; (2) availability of sitting space, so that customers can see, touch and feel the books; (3) a Café; (5) rest rooms for customers; (5) CDs and DVDs on sale; (6) Store opens on Sundays.

Our conclusion is very straightforward: while both Het Martyrium and Athenaeum have space constraints that act as a stumbling bloc to their "Americanization", Scheltema is fast becoming the Barnes & Noble (or Borders) of Amsterdam (*).

We interviewed a middle-manager at Scheltema, who gave us the following information:

. A decisive step was taken in 2000, when the bookshop bought and adjacent building in order to expand, and to house the (charming) "Petit Café Scheltema";

. Around May 2004, rooms on the upper floors were re-organized to increase the availability of books on display;

. In September 2004, overall "sitting space" was increased by a factor of 12: there are now at least 24 yellow couches. They are rather rough – you probably wouldn't have them in your living room. Clearly, these guys have learnt from the early Barnes & Noble mistake of having too lavish furniture in the display rooms. They would get too many self-styled "customers" who'd pick up a book on advanced chemistry or on sixteenth-century Japanese poetry, only to take a good nap in a well heated (or air-conditioned) room. You don't want that kind of "customer" in your store.

. The CD-DVD division is a money-loser.
________________

(*) Note that some are criticizing the "mega-bookstore" concept on the following grounds: (a) they act as predators against small-sized bookshops; (b) they are mere creations of greedy real-estate developers; (c) they destroy the architectural harmony of the downtwon area. (See Mark Nemmers: "Why Borders is bad for downtown", 1997.)

2004-10-21T17:15:00.000-07:00

- Bouncing Back! After the fiasco of my over-ambitious mini-presentation in class, my interview with Prof. Kroes went very well. My new Term Paper proposal has the following title: "Comments on the Americanization of European Law". Here's the outline:

. Introduction
- NIAS Statement: there are "hidden, but significant" types of cultural vehicles for the spread of American mass culture.
- Law is one of them.
- Three examples: Spain introduces jury trial (1996); European Court of Justice adopts stare decisis, the doctrine of the precedent (2000); France introduces plea bargaining (2004) (*).
- Questions to analyze: (a) What drives the "Americanization" of European law?; (b) Is there a "line in the sand"? ; (c) Where does that leave the more general debate about US-EU relations?

. Section I: Legal Cultures
- Key reference: Antoine Garapon & Ioannis Papadopoulos: Juger en France et en Amérique. (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2003.)
- Historical aspects: David Carpenter, The Struggle for Mastery. England 1066-1284. (London: Penguin, 2003, chapter 7); Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves. Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review (Oxford University Press, 2004); Alexis de Tocqueville, De la démocratie en Amérique.

. Section II: Europe Receives American Law
- European Court of Justice: Peter Birkes & Adrianna Pretto: Themes in Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, 2002).
- France introduces plea bargaining: Le Monde.
- The economic hypothesis (globalization, need to harmonize legal systems, etc.)

. Section III: The "Line in the Sand"

- Problems with jury trial: Spain & Great Britain (Great Britain as a "special case".)

- The death penalty: a non-negotiable element.
- The debate over international law.

. Conclusion

- Due to increasing economic interdependence, Europe has no choice but to incorporate the more practical aspects of the American legal culture (stare decisis, plea bargaining.)
- But Europeans have drawn a "line in the sand" when it comes to death penalty and international law.

- The analysis of legal cultures provides a new perspective on the broad debate over EU-US relations.

____________

(*) See Natalie Guibert, "La justice francaise passe a l'heure du plaider coupable", Le Monde, October 1, 2004.

2004-10-19T22:17:00.000-07:00

- Schlesinger Presentation: Yes! You can now read Jaime & William's presentation (Part I & II) - - see entry for Monday, October 18.

2004-10-19T17:55:00.000-07:00

- Books. The University Library has just received retired general Tommy Frank's book American Soldier (New York: Regan Books, 2004 -- see a New York Times review here).

2004-10-19T17:00:00.000-07:00

- THE US AS A CULTURAL PRESENCE IN EUROPE
Lecturer: R. Kroes

Prof. Kroes discussed chapter one of his book If you've seen one, you've seen the mall (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1996). The chapter provides an attempt at "bringing order to the wild array of views about European's reception of American culture."

The greatest difference between American and European culture is the former's "greater willingness to deconstruct." See page 42: "Although the philosophical insights inspiring this approach (Derrida and deconstruction) were novel and fashionable ... they could effortlessly blend into a game long familiar to Americans."

George W. Bush & the Neo-Cons
Prof. Kroes went on to discuss George W. Bush's idea of implementing democracy in Iraq, which he views not only as a display of "arrogance", but --more importantly-- as a proof that "Americans lack historical sense."

Americans, he said (referring to the political leadership) are "uneducated by history"; they "refuse to be informed by the past." "This is not the way" -he concluded- "for democracy to take root." He added that Israel is viewed "by some" as the only democracy in the Middle East.

He also mentioned the "great and amazing paradox" of spending more on defense while cutting taxes. "They live in denial, these neo-cons."

Americans, Europeans, Hierarchies
"Americans are more radically willing --at least in public discourse-- to accept others as more equal." "There is no sublime and vulgar: equality rules." The fact that Europeans tend to view society in more hierarchical terms is a product of the "Estate-ordered view of life."

Americans, by contrast, are constantly moving and shifting. American Studies, for example, started out with English literature as the standard of excellence. But then they moved away from "dead white males", and began to incorporate (male) American writers, then women writers, then Native American writers, then gay writers, etc. It is an ongoing cultural rebellion: it just never ends.

(Students' comments: on the nature of democracy in the Middle East; on the ambiguous role of the US in promoting democracy in some --but not all-- places; on Europe's welfare state and security arrangements with the US, etc.)

2004-10-18T14:44:00.000-07:00

- MAJOR ISSUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY
Lecturer: E.F van de Bilt

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr: The Imperial Presidency (New York: Mariner Books, 2004, 589 pages -- first edition 1973.)

Reviewed by Jaime & William (Part I)

. In The Imperial Presidency Schlesinger aims to outline the shift in the constitutional balance between the Presidency and Congress. He will demonstrate that as the presidency increased its powers in foreign policy, particularly as the war making power became more and more fuzzy, presidents became emboldened and would eventually translate their new found power to domestic pursuits.

. As you will see, this shift was as much a matter of congressional abdication as of presidential usurpation, and the Imperial Presidency, in its most broad and powerful sense, will come to fruition during the reign of President Nixon. He begins his story, at the obvious starting point, with founding fathers.

. Founding fathers wanted more government centralization than the Articles of Confederation had allowed, but everyone feared the concentration of power in one man, thus, separation of powers. Schlesinger focuses on foreign affairs side of constitution debates because that is the realm in which the presidency will first begin to concentrate its powers.

Foreign Policy Duties: Congressional vs. Presidential
. Regulate commerce with foreign nations
. Power to make treaties
. Power to make appropriations
. Raise and maintain armed forces and make rules for their government and regulation
. Regulate naturalization and immigration
. Most importantly to DECLARE WAR
. Power to receive foreign envoys
. Appoint ambassadors with the advice and consent of the Senate
. Make treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate
. Article 2 of the constitution gave the President general executive power which in the 64th and 75th federalist papers, Madison and Hamilton described as unity, secrecy, decision, dispatch and superior sources of information. All very advantageous to the conduct of diplomacy.

Reasons Congress Cannot Conduct Foreign Policy Practically
. Congress can not easily stay abreast of the details of relations with foreign states.
. Congress rarely acts as a unified body. Thus, it would be difficult for them to conduct negotiations.
. Congress could not be relied on to preserve secrecy about matters where secrecy was indispensable.
. International law itself, by requiring in every nation a single point of responsible authority, confirmed Presidential primacy in foreign relations.

The War-Making Power
. No one wanted to hinder the President’s ability to respond to a surprise attack OR give him the sole power to initiate hostilities.
. Madison wrote a letter to Jefferson, saying "the constitution supposes, what the history of all governments demonstrates, that the executive is the branch of power most interested in war and most prone to it. It has accordingly with studied care, vested the question of war in the legislature."

"Make" vs. "Declare" War
. Drafts of the Constitution say Congress has the power to "make" war.
. Madison and Gerry propose to change the wording from "make" to "declare" hoping to make it more specific.
. They did this so that the power to "make" war, such as repelling sudden attacks, still lies in the hands of the President.

Emergencies
. Emergencies were described by John Locke in his Second Treatise on Government.
. When the President deems a situation an emergency, he can initiate extra-legal or even illegal action and he is then either vindicated or condemned by the people and Congress.
. This emergency clause was not explicitly written, because of its flexibility, but in notes and letters of the Founding Fathers, it is evident that they intended to leave this loophole for the President.

First Foreign Policy Dilemma
. President George Washington recognized the revolutionary government of France, thus giving it legitimacy.
. Members of Congress who were opposed to Presidential power, also happened to be in favor of the revolutionary government in France
. Therefore, they were so glad for the result that they were willing to ignore the question of whether or not this decision fell within Washington’s jurisdiction

Another Dilemma
. Washington declared America neutral in a war between Britain and France.
. Anti-centralists didn’t like this action, because it was a unilateral action of the President.
. Madison says that the President cannot make declarations about war.
. Hypothetical Scenario: What if Congress had declared war… Where Congress declares war and the President declares neutrality, this serves to both confuse and render the US illegitimate in the international system.
. But Hamilton reminds us that foreign policy is executive in nature… He said that Washington’s declaration was based on treaty obligations, and if congress had declared war, Washington would have complied with congresses wishes.

Centralists v. Anti-Centralists: On War-Making Power
. Congress' power to declare war is rigorously limited because they should consult the president who has a real hand in foreign policy (Centralists - Hamilton.)
. Congress has spacious power that is not to be abridged by prior declarations of the President (Anti-Centralists -- Madison.)
. Schlesinger argues that that Madison should have provided procedures of consultation

Louisiana Purchase
. Even though congress was fully involved he felt that congress was his accomplice in an action that was not explicitly allowed by the constitution. (Louisiana Purchase was made without an amendment)
. It also demonstrates that when Congress agrees with actions of the President, even when they are not explicitly legal, he is even more powerful.

Monroe Doctrine
. The Monroe Doctrine initially called for an end to European intervention in the Americas, but it was later extended to justify U.S. imperialism in the Western Hemisphere
. Monroe Doctrine makes the imperial Presidency possible.
. Monroe Doctrine allowed the President to take foreign policy by the reigns

Schlesinger Point
. The restraint of these early Presidents was based on the fact that they were babying their invention. Like taking care of a child, they had to be very careful with their young nation. They weren't afraid of impeachment… they just wanted to make it work.
. John Tyler wanted to annex Texas, but Texas was still trying to liberate itself from Mexico.
. In 1844 he orders forces to the Gulf and Southwestern border of Texas, secretly relaying to the Texans that if Mexico tried to attack them, the US would defend Texas as long as annexation was underway.
. Tyler submitted the treaty to the Senate for ratification. Unfortunately, the Senate found out about the deployment of the troops and said no.
. Tyler tries majority vote in the House and Senate combined (joint resolution, or concurrent resolution). This was unprecedented, and not explicitly included in the design of the Constitution.
. First new weapon for the executive… Presidential control of diplomacy and troop deployment allow for loopholes in Congressional war-making power.

Another Dilemma
. Polk sends units into disputed land between Texas and Mexico and, as expected, they were attacked. Thus Congress HAD to declare war, because a state of war existed regardless of their ratification.

Information Control
. Early, Jefferson and Monroe, when asked for documents, were asked only for what they "may deem compatible with the public interest."
. Under the Jackson administration, this power to withhold information becomes more specified.
- Confidentiality of his exchanges with his advisors
- Defense against Congressional harassment (Unreasonable demands for information)
- Protection of active investigation and litigation (confidential informants, innocent persons)
- Protection of foreign intelligence operations
. Still, if Congress has grounds for impeachment, the President must hand over any and all information requested to protect this method of last resort.

Shifts in the War Making Power
. The war making power drained from congress through two veins, both which lead to the Presidency.
. It becomes so that Congress was not involved with the war making process if A) a threat seemed too trivial to require Congressional consent, and B) a threat seems too big and pressing to allow for Congressional consent.
. Gradually it becomes very evident that Presidents could contrive circumstances where Congress would have little option not to declare war. Through diplomacy a President could give rise to a threat and choose to deal with it preemptively for the purposes of defense.

Trivial Threat Example
. Presidents assert that military action on non-sovereign entities (rebels, Indians, pirates, etc.) as well as rescue operations of American citizens endangered by the breakdown of order abroad, where additional Congressional appropriations are not necessary, "did not rise to the dignity of Congressional consent."

The Great Threat
. Lincoln's use of power during the Civil War was totally outside the lines of the Constitution.
. Lincoln ignored one law and Constitutional provision after another.
- He assembled the militia
- Enlarged the army and the navy beyond their authorized strength
- Called out volunteers for three years’ service
- Spent public money without Congressional appropriation
- Suspended Habeas Corpus
- Arrested people ‘represented’ as involved in ‘disloyal’ practices
- Instituted a Naval blockade of the Confederacy

The Great Threat (continued)
. All of these were measures which, Lincoln later told Congress, "whether strictly legal or not, were ventured upon under what appeared to be a popular demand and a public necessity; trusting then as now that Congress would readily ratify them."
. Lockean principles at work. "Yet often a limb must be amputated to save a life; but a life is never wisely given to save a limb." (Lincoln)
. If the execution of the whole of the laws should require the violation of a single law, "are all the laws but one to go unexecuted and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated?" (Lincoln)

The Supreme Court Disagrees
. The Supreme Court Case ex parte Milligan in 1866, explicitly dismissed the Locke-Jefferson-Lincoln idea that necessity might be higher than the Constitution.
. Almost reversing Lincoln's analogy about giving a limb to save a life, the Court said, "a country preserved at the sacrifice of all the cardinal principles of liberty, is not worth the cost of preserving."

Executive Agreements
. The Executive Agreement is essentially a treaty made by the President, that doesn’t require Senatorial approval.
. Congress historically chose to overlook this usurpation of power.
. Three types of Executive Agreement developed:
- Those made pursuant to existing treaties
- Those that had prior, or subsequent, legislative authorization
- Those made by Presidents in areas where they possessed Constitutional authority to act without consent of Congress (recognition of foreign governments and settling foreign claims, arranging of cease-fires or armistice agreements, and "what were not quite agreements but rather unilateral commitments on the order of the Monroe Doctrine")
. The rise of the executive agreement was accompanied by new Presidential exuberance, in the commitment of armed force to combat.

President Wilson
. Wilson has a greater respect for the utility of Congress.
. "No doubt I could do what is necessary in the circumstances to enforce respect for our government without recourse to the Congress and yet not exceed my Constitutional powers as President, but I do not wish to act in a matter of so grave consequence except in close conference and cooperation with both Senate and House." (Wilson, after the bloodshed at Tampico)

FDR is Restrained…
. Roosevelt built his New Deal Government on the basis of authority directly granted by Congress.
. After WWI, Roosevelt wanted the power to place an embargo on arms shipments to the aggressor nations.
. The House passes the bill, but the Senate contends that it could lead the United States into war and fails to pass it.
. A revised version of the bill was passed by the Senate, placing arms embargos on all nations involved in conflict.

FDR Resurgent
. "The very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the Federal Government in the field of international relations – a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress." (Justice Sutherland)
. International compacts do not always have to be treaties, thus bypassing the Senate. Sutherland says that an executive agreement is legal in power and not clearly limited in applicability.
. "That a treaty was something they had to send to the Senate to get approval by a 2/3 vote. An executive agreement was something they did not have to send to the Senate."
. These two Court cases combined REALLY increase Presidential power.

Lend-Lease Act
. Americans lend battleships to the UK for use against German aggression, after repeated requests from Churchill.
. Roosevelt gets concerned about the security of the route that the ships were traveling to Britain because there were German ships in the Atlantic.
. He deploys troops to Greenland and Iceland, without Congressional approval, to protect the ships.
. In 1941 there is a change in the way that Roosevelt defines his role as Commander in Chief. His actions that accompanied the Lend-Lease act demonstrate his new way of thinking.
. What had been the aim, to seek Congressional collaboration, shifts to what is now, in a sense, leading Congress along.
. The new FDR is Lockean… He believes that the US is in a state of emergency and he must assert his Presidential power to protect it. Still, he tries to include Congress as much as possible.
. Schlesinger writes, "Where independent power exercised in domestic affairs did not necessarily produce equivalent power in foreign affairs, as the case of Roosevelt in the 1930s had shown, independent power exercised in foreign affairs was very likely to strengthen and embolden the Presidency at home."
. "Next to the Civil War, the Second World War was the greatest crisis in American history. Powers thus claimed in a war for survival on issues on which Congress and public opinion supported the President provided only strained and meager precedents for powers claimed without equivalent crisis or consensus. Nor did Roosevelt suggest that such powers were part of the routine equipment of the Presidency."

Korean War
. 24 June 1950: North Korea invades South Korea
. 25 June 1950: UN Security Council calls for North Korean withdrawal
Night of 25 June 1950: Truman commits troops
. 27 June 1950: Congress and the nation are notified of his decision
. 27 June 1950: UN Security Council passed a second resolution calling for military measures.

Korean War (continued). Acheson steps in…
. Secretary of State Acheson; formerly a law clerk for a Justice of the Supreme Court
. Revered by Truman as having a great understanding of Constitutional law
. 3 July 1950: Acheson recommends that Truman not request a resolution by Congress, but rather rely on his Constitutional powers as President and Commander in Chief. Truman, not wanting to squander the power of his office, accepted Acheson’s recommendation.
. The State Department argument was that "the President, as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States has full control over the use thereof," that there was a "traditional power of the President to use the armed forces of the Untied States without consulting Congress," and that this had often been done in "the broad interests of American foreign policy."

2004-10-18T14:40:00.000-07:00

- MAJOR ISSUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY
Lecturer: E.F van de Bilt

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr: The Imperial Presidency (New York: Mariner Books, 2004, 589 pages -- first edition 1973.)

Reviewed by Jaime & William (Part II)

Trumped up Truman
. April 1952: The US Government seizes operation of the steel mills.
. The Steel Industry sues the government.
. The Supreme Court rules that the steel seizure was unconstitutional.

Eisenhower's Information Controls
. "It is essential to efficient and effective administration that employees in the executive branch be in a position to be completely candid in advising with each other on official matters. " Therefore "it is not in the public interest that any of their conversations or communications or any documents or reproductions concerning such advise be disclosed."
. Schlesinger contends that the historical rule was disclosure with exceptions, but Eisenhower's administration made it denial with exceptions.
. Between June 1955 and June 1960 there are at least 44 instances when people used Eisenhower's directive. This is more than in the first century of American history.

Advanced Authorization?
. In 1955 Eisenhower requested a joint resolution to cover possible military action in defense of fishermen and territory around Formosa.
. He claimed that some of the actions which may be required of him in Formosa would be inherent in the authority of the Commander in Chief, but Congressional ratification would publicly establish that authority.
. The Formosa Resolution ordered no specific action and named no enemy except as the President might thereafter decide. Rather, it committed Congress to the approval of hostilities without knowledge of the specific situation in which they would begin.

Further Expansion of Presidential Power by Eisenhower
. Eisenhower most effectively deprived Congress a voice in foreign policy by giving so much power to the CIA, which was entirely out of Congressional reach.
. "The CIA helped to overthrow governments in Iran (1953) and Guatemala (1954), failed to do so in Indonesia (1958), helped to install governments in Egypt (1954) and Laos (1959), organized an expedition of Cuban refugees against the Castro regime (1960-1961) and engaged in a multitude of lesser experiments in subvention and subversion."

JFK's Success
. "For the missile crisis was less unique in the post-war years in that it really combined all those pressures of threat, secrecy, and time that the foreign policy establishment had claimed as characteristic of decisions in the nuclear age. Where the threat was less grave, the need for secrecy less urgent, the time for debate less restricted – i.e., in all other cases – the argument for independent and unilateral presidential action was notably less compelling."

Lyndon B. Johnson
. In the spring of 1965, Johnson sent 22,000 troops into the Dominican Republic, without Congressional consent.
. The real reason was that "we don't propose to sit here in our rocking chair with our hands folded and let the communists set up any government in the Western Hemisphere."

Vietnam
. In early 1965, Johnson declares the Americanizaiton of the Vietnam War. He sends troops for the first time into the South, and begins regularly bombing the North.
. What Kennedy had called ‘their war’ had become ‘our war.’
. Unlike Roosevelt, Truman, and Kennedy, Johnson was sending troops into immediate combat. . . No U.N. resolution had been made, nor had there been invasion across frontiers, and unlike Cuba, there was no emergency threat to the US.
. "If this decision was not for Congress under the Constitution, then no decision of any consequence in matters of war and peace is left to Congress."
. August 1964: Tonkin-Gulf Resolution

WAKE UP… IT’S ABOUT TO GET GOOD!!!!

Psychology of Richard M. Nixon
. Schlesinger writes, on FDR and Kennedy, "No one, if he wished it, could see a greater variety of people than the President or consult a wider range of opinion or tap more diversified sources of knowledge."
. Unfortunately Nixon was not this type of President. He was more of a personal isolationist and he began to think of Presidential power not only as inherent but as exclusive.
. Nixon viewed everything as a battle. "I believe in the battle, whether it’s the battle of a campaign or the battle of this office… it’s always there wherever you go. I, perhaps, carry it more than others because that’s my way."
. Tom Charles Huston who served for a year as Domestic Security Planner says Nixon "abhors confrontations, most particularly those based on philosophical convictions."
. In 1972 Nixon had 48 personal assistants. White House payroll had grown from 266 in 1954 to 600 in 1971. The executive office had grown from 1175 in 1954 to 1664 in Kennedy’s last year, to 5395 under Nixon in 1971. In the first Nixon term the operating cost of the executive office rose from $31 million to $71 million. The important point here is the centralization of substantive operations by the White House.
. White House aids were often very powerful figures. Aids had much more influence and control than even cabinet members. Unlike members of the cabinet they were not subject to confirmation by the Senate or interrogation by members of Congress.

Nixon's Press
. Truman said, "When I was President I felt that I always learned more about what was on the minds of the people from the reporters questions than they could possibly learn from me."
. Under Nixon, the press conference practically disappeared. In his first term he held 28 press conferences, the same number FDR held in his first three months in office.
. The press conference, which to many Presidents was a way to gain power, was basically eliminated by Nixon. "…The whole process of exposure, scrutiny, challenge and accountability evidently exacted too heavy a psychic toll."
. Rather, Nixon chose to address the public on prime time television, where he felt protected.

Impoundment and the Pocket Veto
. Impoundment enables the White House to modify, reshape or nullify completely laws passed by the legislative branch.
. By 1973 Nixon’s impoundments had affected over 100 federal programs and reached the level of about $15 billion which was between 17% and 20% of controllable funds.
. The Senate passes the Family Practice of Medicine Act with a vote of 64-1. It passes with a vote of 345-2 in the House. However, Nixon didn’t want to sign it, and knowing that Congress would pass the bill over his veto, he did a pocket veto when they went home for Christmas for three days.

DENYING INFORMATION TO CONGRESS
. "Only the President may invoke executive privilege but just about any of his subordinates may exercise it… they simply do not employ the forbidden words." (Nixon)
. In March of 1973 Nixon said that past as well as present membership of White House Staff conferred immunity against appearances before Congressional committees. This was referred to as eternal privilege.
. In May of the same year he extended the doctrine so that it not only apply to Congress but to questions asked by Grand Juries or the FBI.
. It also extended to "Presidential papers," not just to people.
. By 1972, the cost of protecting classified materials was more than $60 million per year. There were 20 million classified documents in the defense security system of which less than half of a percent actually contained information qualifying even for the lowest defense classification under executive order 10501. "Newspaper clippings were classified; information in the public domain was classified; and, when one member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff wrote another saying that too many undeserving papers were being stamped top secret, his note itself was stamped top secret."

Powers Derived From Secrecy
. There are three powers derived from secrecy… the power to withhold, the power to leak, and the power to lie.
. Power to withhold… "if you only knew what we know" is an effective way to defend the national security monopoly and prevent democratic control of foreign policy
. Power to leak… means the power to tell the people what it served the government’s purpose that they should know.
. Power to withhold and leak lead to the power to lie… lying was easy when finding the truth was so hard.

THE PLOT THICKENS…

Symington Committee
. In 1930, the US made 25 treaties and 9 executive agreements. The Nixon administration, up to May 1, 1972, had made 71 treaties and 608 executive agreements.
. In response to the increasing number of executive agreements, the Symington Committee was created in 1969 to investigate US security agreements and commitments abroad.

Symington Findings
. In 1962, under Johnson, a declaration was made to protect Thailand from communist aggression (this much was known).
. Seven air bases, seven generals and 32,000 soldiers, without Congressional authorization OR knowledge, were in Thailand.
. Congress thought that American bombing in Laos was directed at North Vietnamese troops on the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
. However, the executive branch had been waging a separate and secret war in support of the Vientiane government against the Pathet Lao in Northern Laos since 1964.
Since 1953 the US had been subsidizing the Ethiopian army.
. Congress did not know that Eisenhower had secretly assured that we would protect Ethiopia. With American aid their army grew to 40,000. The Somali, their alleged threat, had an army of roughly 2,000.
. Since 1953 the United States army had bases in Spain in order to protect the Spanish from communism.
. Congress did not know that there were several thousand US paratroopers flown down from Germany to train, not for foreign invasion, but for a hypothetical internal uprising of anti-Franco Spaniards.
. The Symington Committee had at first received cooperation about locating nuclear weapons abroad from US representatives overseas. However during the investigation, the executive branch, under Nixon, forbade all discussion of the nuclear question.
. The Symington Committee summarized what it believed to be the current executive practice as "maximize commitment in secret discussions with foreign governments; then minimize the risk of commitments in statements made to the American public."

Reigning in the Executive Agreement
. In response to this, in 1972 Congress passed a bill requiring all executive agreements to be transmitted to the Senate and the House within 60 days of their negotiation. Agreements deemed too sensitive for disclosure would go to the foreign relations committee only.

Paranoid Nixon
. In a broad request to the intelligence community "he authorized system of burglary, wiretapping, bugging, mail covers, secret agents, and political blackmail in defiance of the laws and the constitution."
. Nixon then set up his own private outfit (known as the plumbers, since they were supposed to "stop leaks") within the White House which acted faithfully in the plan’s spirit.
. Nixon said "that as a matter of first priority the unit should find out all it could about Mr. Ellsberg’s associates and motives… I did impress on Mr. Crow (head plumber) the vital importance to the national security of his assignment."
. Another mission of the plumbers was to compile "an accurate record of events related to the Vietnam War."
. "I would remind all concerned that the way we got into Vietnam was through overthrowing Diem, and the complicity in the murder of Diem." (Nixon)
In reference to the actions of his plumbers, Nixon said "it was and is important that many of the matters worked on by the special investigations unit not be publicly disclosed because disclosure would unquestionably damage the national security."

Watergate
. June 17, 1972: Frank Wills, a 24 year old security guard noticed tape over the latches of two doors on the bottom level of the Watergate Hotel. Wills called the police, and the burglars were arrested while breaking into the office of the Democratic National Committee.
. Watergate was only a symptom of a much larger problem. Its importance was in the way it brought those symptoms to the surface and got people thinking about the question of Presidential power.
. Nixon's appointees had engaged, "…at the very least, in burglary; in forgery; in illegal wiretapping; in illegal electronic surveillance; in perjury; in subordination of perjury; in obstruction of justice; in destruction of evidence; in tampering with witnesses; in misprision of felony; in bribery (of the Watergate defendants); in acceptance of bribes (from Vesco and the ITT); in conspiracy to involve government agencies (the FBI, the CIA, the Secret Service, the IRS, the Securities and Exchange Commission) in illegal action."
. The genius of impeachment lay in the fact that it can punish the man without punishing the office. Watergate was potentially the best thing to have happened to the Presidency in a long time. If the trails were followed to their end it would be many years before another White House staff would dare take the liberties with the constitution and the laws that the Nixon White House had taken.

The War Against the Media
. Nixon orders phones of offending newspaper men to be wire tapped.
. Department of Justice tried to subpoena reporters’ notebooks and tapes.
. Acting head of the FBI complained that American journalists threatened to destroy respect for established institutions.
. A White House assistant warned networks that they might be subject to anti-trust prosecution if they did not "move conservatives and people with a viewpoint of middle America on to the networks."
. The head of the White House Office of Telecommunications denounced what he called ideologues and "station managers and network officials who fail to correct imbalance or consistent bias from the networks—or who acquiesce by silence—can only be considered willing participants, to be held fully accountable… at license renewal time."
. When the Washington Post was working on the Watergate story the Nixon campaign challenged the renewal of licenses for two Florida television stations owned by the Post, thereby producing a loss of 25% of the market value of Post stocks in two weeks.

Judicial Response
. The Supreme Court went back and forth on the issue of the constitutionality of the Vietnam War.
. No judge backed the war based on the inherent powers of a President. Even the theory that Congress, by voting for appropriations, ratified the war was left up for argument.
. "Every military appropriation bill from October 1970 and beyond contained a proviso expressly forbidding military support for the government of Cambodia except in connection with the withdrawal of American troops from Southeast Asia and the release of the POWs – conditions fulfilled by March 1973."
. The same Judge Judd who had declared Vietnam legal, held the Presidential war in Cambodia unconstitutional.
. "At any concrete historical point, the constitutional balance was too much at the mercy of fluctuating intangibles of circumstance, judgment, opinion, and prophesy to permit the Court to lay down a mechanical standard."

Congressional Response
. Congress begins using their power to appropriate in order to get information they desire.
. Pass anti-impoundment legislation.
. Pass a bill to prevent Presidential abuse of the pocket veto.
. Congress felt that it had to find a way to restrain Presidential war power.

On the War-Power
. Create some Congressional control over the deployment of armed forces outside the US
. "The President could act until Congress acted; but, if Congress acted, its legislation would supersede an otherwise valid order of the president.
. Schlesinger also asserts that Congress, in its annual encounter with the defense budget, should review military man power in the same way it reviews the procurement of military weapons, especially because man power was consuming more than half of the budget.
. Create a Presidential obligation to report immediately to Congress with full information and justification whenever he sent troops into battle and to keep on reporting so long as the hostilities continued
. Create a declaration by Congress of its right at any point to terminate such military action by concurrent resolution.

Schlesinger's Recommendations to Future Presidents
. Reduction in the size and power of White House staff.
. Restoration of the access and prestige of the executive departments.
. He must not make himself the prisoner of a single information system.
. The cabinet serves Presidents best when it contains strong and independent men. Strong enough to make permanent government responsive to Presidential policy and independent enough to carry honest dissents into the oval office.
. Rid themselves of honest misconceptions about the nature and power of their office.
. Do something to revive the Department of State.
. Admit to Congress genuine, if only junior partnership in the foreign policy process.
. The acceptance of a larger accountability should not be taken by future presidents as a vexatious and wasteful interruption of their serious work. Embrace it as your duty. This is the primary challenge of the Presidency.

The End
Discussion Points
- It is clear that Schlesinger is a Democrat, and that this book had been completed before even Nixon knew that he would have to resign. Does this book strike anyone as one of those politically motivated books that come out during a Presidency, about that Presidency? Does the research and thesis hold up to higher standards?

- Post-WWII, Presidential power expanded greatly as national-security became an important issue. Does the Bush administration find themselves with the same leeway of cold war times?Since 9-11, do they have more? What would Schlesinger think?

- Debate is the essence of Democracy, but the Bush administration has managed to infer that in the presence of war debate must be suspended and it is unpatriotically to challenge Presidential judgment. Does a democratic nation have a moral obligation to support the government in a time of war? Historically, have Americans abstained from debate, and dissent as they have during the current war? Why or why not?

2004-10-18T14:26:00.000-07:00

- MAJOR ISSUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY
Lecturer: E.F van de Bilt

Jaime & William's presentation on Schlesinger's book will be posted here soon. Meanwhile, here are some of Prof. van de Bilt's comments:

. The Great Contradiction. Arthur Schlesinger displays a very ambivalent attitude. On the one hand, he rails the presidency for its almost natural tendency to become "imperial." On the other hand, he credits the presidency for most of the progress achieved by the United States at a political, cultural and social level.

. A Very Benevolent View. On the whole, and despite his many critical comments, Schlesinger offers a very benevolent view of the institution. There is no willingness to take on the presidency as such. There is nothing irrational about it. Nixon is the only sick guy. The book is definitely "pro-presidency."

. Some Question Marks. How would America have developed without the presidency? What criteria can we select to determine whether a president acts in an "imperial" fashion?

2004-10-15T16:27:00.000-07:00

- Schedule for Week 18 - 22 October. Arthur Schlesinger & And "Group" Walking Tours.
Monday 18, 10:00-13:00. MAJOR ISSUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY. Jaime & William will discuss Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. 's book The Imperial Presidency (New York: Mariner Books, 2004 -- first edition 1973.) For some background info on the author, see this. You can read some of his contributions to The New York Review of Books here, and an article against the war in Iraq here.

Tuesday 19, 11:00-13:00. THE US AS A CULTURAL PRESENCE IN EUROPE. Slide show by Prof. Kroes.

Friday 22, 13:00- ? THE US AS A CULTURAL PRESENCE IN EUROPE. Students present the findings of their own "walking tours."

(NO US-EU RELATIONS SESSIONS NEXT WEEK.)

2004-10-15T16:07:00.000-07:00

- Tips for Term Paper. While exploring Marc Trachtenberg's site (*), I came accross this very interesting piece: Term Paper Guidelines. See for yourself.
____________

(*) Author of "The Making of a Political System: The German Question in International Politics", in Paul Kennedy & William I. Hitchcock (eds.): From War to Peace: Altered Strategic Landscapes in the Twentieth Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000.) We discussed this piece on September 23.

2004-10-15T11:58:00.000-07:00

- Prof. Janssens' Tips For Presentations, Term Papers & Thesis. During lectures over the past month or so, prof. Janssens has made a couple a remarks about presentations and term papers. Here's what I've gathered.

. Presentation. "Describe what the issue is", and then "provide a set of policy options." Finally, do some follow-up work: "provide landmarks about what is likely to happen when each of the options is followed."

. Term Paper. "It can be on any topic you like -- as long as it is has to do with US-EU Relations." "The theme of your presentation can become the theme of your term paper." "You can never be too specific; the risk is that your arguments might prove too vague."

. Thesis. "Be aware of what other people have written"; "Take into account what matters to other people."

(More material coming soon.)

2004-10-14T20:34:00.000-07:00

- New Somali President Calls for Peacekeepers. Gejo has spotted this wonderful article: right when we discuss Somalia in class, a new president is sworn-in ... And he's calling for peacekeepers!

2004-10-14T16:24:00.000-07:00

- Speaking of NGOs. The American Enterprise Institute has a website devoted to them: NGO Watch. (They provide a huge alphabetical listing.)

2004-10-14T15:19:00.000-07:00

- US-EU RELATIONS
Lecturer: R. Janssens

Post-Cold War: Bosnia & Peacekeeping (*). Preliminary Remarks. Before addressing the issue of peacekeeping, Prof. Janssens summarized the aims of the course on US-EU Relations. The issue is very complex, and one has to select only a limited number of topics. One can focus on a state-by-state approach, or on national security issues, etc.

Always keep in mind that --as in any political alliance-- complications are bound to occur. They may have to do with diverging national interests, or with personalities. Charles de Gaulle, for example, was one individual who did make a difference.

The US will always be involved in Europe, for both security and economic reasons. President Clinton once said: "We went to Europe twice to save Europeans from killing themselves", and that statement largely remains valid.

In World War II, the United States were willing to fight the Nazis in Europe. Then, during the Cold War, Europeans sometimes felt anxious about the seriousness of the American commitment. To what extent would the US help Europe in the event of a Soviet invasion?

Right now, in October 2004, the basic question is, of course, the foreign policy of George W. Bush. Europeans are particularly upset, but there is really nothing new about it. Such things always happen in any alliance -- especially when it is dominated by a very powerful member.

A number of questions remain unanswered. To what extend can we speak of a common ground between Europe and the US? Is there enough willingness (or necessity) to cooperate? That was clearly the case during the Cold War. But, after the Cold War, has the need for cooperation diminished?

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the first war against Saddam Hussein, George H.W. Bush declared that the time had come for a "new world order". The alliance against Iraq was indeed an impressive one (even Syrian troops participated.)

It was a hopeful moment. Did it have to end like this? It is tempting to conclude that the present mess is George W. Bush's fault. But it's not that simple. As we shall see, peacekeeping is also a source of conflict.

From a purely military standpoint, the key difference between the 1991 Gulf War and the 2001-2003 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq is the new role of "precision bombing directed by the Special Operations Forces" (Wesley Clark, p. XXI.) It means that you need more troops to occupate a country than to actually wage war!

. Peacekeeping (I): The Lack of a Clear Mandate. The first UN-sponsored peacekeeping operation took place in 1948 in the Sinai Desert. Soon afterwards, soldiers were deployed in Kashmir, and later in Cyprus. But there was a problem: these troops did not really intervene. Their mandate was to separate the warrying parts from each other.

But this was always done under the assumption that war would not break out again any time soon. Given the UN Charter --which states that no one is allowed to interfere in domestic issues-- there was no clear-cut mandate to fight at all.

Thus, peacekeeping operations were only successful when the warrying factions were completely exhausted. But then again, they would start re-arming as soon as possible. In other words: peacekeeping missions do nothing to solve the underlying problems that lead to war in the first place.

. Peacekeeping (II): What Went Wrong in Somalia? The example of Somalia shows why peacekeeping operations are so complicated. Relief organisations were striving to hand out food to the impoverished population, but warlords would systematically disrupt the food supply.

NGOs like Médecins Sans Frontieres and others began to ask for US support, in order to ease food distribution. Finally, the Marines landed. To their surprise, they were greeted not by bullets ... but by CNN crews!

Another problem was the issue of cooperation. Italian soldiers, upset about earlier US operations undertaken within "their" zone --but without their knowledge--, did not support the beleaguered Marines in Mogadishu. Other UN-member countries "cooperated" by sending untrained and ill-equipped soldiers who were there just for the money.

In the end, President Clinton pulled out as casualties mounted (by the way, there is little information about Somalian casualties, but they must haven been considerable.)

. Peacekeeping (III): The Trouble With NGOs. The Somalian fiasco underlines the nature of the problems created by otherwise well-intentioned NGOs.

- Problem No. 1: There are hundreds of them. This complicates the task of creating a bureaucracy capable to set up law enforcement institutions, to organise the supply of food and water, to establish courts of justice, etc. The lack of coordination between NGOs is a stumbling block towards the creation of an efficient bureaucracy.

- Problem N. 2: NGOs are privately-funded organizations. In other words: they need media focus, press attention (otherwise their donors would balk at contributing funds.) Sometimes, their members are located where the press is, instead of where they are really needed.

- Problem No. 3: The issue of the food supply. If food is handed out for free (as was the case in Somalia), there will be an incentive for farmers to abandon their crops and to move to the city. Why work so hard in the countryside if (good) food is handed out for free in the cities? (See this article.)

In other words, well-meaning NGOs actually aggravated the crisis. This truth is hard to admit. It makes you wonder about the West's real willingness to help. Says Prof. Janssens: "Is there any real degree of serious commitment?" (See article by Edward Luttwak: "Toward Post-Heroic Warfare", Foreign Affairs. Vol. 74, No.3, May-June 1995.)

. Peacekeeping: Conclusion. The history of peacekeeping is not a happy one. There will always be problems with cooperation and coordination. What started out in 1991 with George H.W. Bush's optimism about a "new world order" basically ended with the UN deeply discredited.

There is no real example of a successful peace-keeping operation - - and that's quite a sad story.
________________

(*) Based on Wesley K. Clark: Waging Modern War (New York: Public Affairs, 2002), XIX-XLV.

2004-10-13T21:27:00.000-07:00

- US Elections. Relax before the debate!

2004-10-13T12:46:00.000-07:00

- Mass Grave Unearthed in Iraq. A new mass grave is being unearthed in Iraq. One of the (nine) trenches is believed to contain as many as 300 bodies, presumably Kurds killed during Saddam's crackdown in 1987-88.

2004-10-13T10:05:00.000-07:00

- New Book on Reagan & Gorbachev. The library of the University has a new book on Reagan, Gorbachev, and the end of the Cold War. See Jack F. Matlock: Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended. (New York: Random House, 2004.) Here's a very interesting review.

2004-10-13T09:46:00.000-07:00

- Anti-Bush Websites. These are two well-known anti-Bush websites: MoveOn.org and georgesoros.com.

2004-10-12T21:35:00.000-07:00

- Dutch Webiste on US Elections. Check out this site hosted by the Dutch national television on the upcoming US elections. (Hat tip to Gejo.)

2004-10-12T20:56:00.000-07:00

- THE US AS A CULTURAL PRESENCE IN EUROPE
Lecturer: R. Kroes

Everyone made a brief presentation about his/her term paper. My own statement was rather confusing: paper too ambitious, points too difficult to prove, little relation to the course. Already thinking about Plan B.

2004-10-12T18:24:00.000-07:00

- US-EU RELATIONS
Lecturer: R. Janssens

End of the Cold War: Unification of Germany & NATO Expansion (*). Group divided into six countries: Federal Republic of Germany (Helmut Kohl - Bernadette), Democratic Republic of Germany (Egon Krenz - Sabrina), United States (George H.W. Bush - Diederik), United Kingdom (Margaret Thatcher - Theresa), USSR (Mikhail Gorbachev - Diana), and France (Francois Mitterrand - Jaime.)

. Task. November 1989: Will the re-unification of Germany take place? Each country defends its own position in terms of national interests. Each participant has to define: its own "optimum scenario", what it is willing to give away, and what it is not prepared to surrender.

. Tips. Think in terms of balance of power, economics, and culture. Think about the repercussions of your statements. During negotiations, start with the optimal scenario -- and do not immediately reveal what you will eventually give away. Do not make too blunt opening statements. Keep your options intact.

Prof. Janssens. Three elements were missing. No.1: The role of public opinion. This was especially important in West Germany. Hemult Kohl's remarks about the right to self-determination created a very emotional climate. Events were not controled by politicians.

No. 2: The economy, a decisive factor. Kohl had a key role to play thanks to the size and the strength of the German economy. No. 3: The issue of borders. There was some concern that Gdansk might become part of Germany again (Kohl was making noises about German-speaking peoples in general.)
___________

(*) Based on Philip Zelikow & Condoleeza Rice. Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995, 4-38 & 102-148.

2004-10-12T16:53:00.000-07:00

- Good News! João has sent his comments on the NIAS Statement (you can read them in the entry for September 17.) Remember: anybody can post his/her work here. (agustin_mackinlay@yahoo.com)

2004-10-12T15:05:00.000-07:00

- From Koos van Nuenen on the Diffusion of the English Language. "Maybe you could look at the role of American Cinema if you want to investigate the diffusion of the English language in Europe -- or at least in Holland.

A profesor from the UvA has studied this subject; his name is Karel Dibbets and he wrote the book De geluidsfilm in Nederland which means "Sound Cinema in the Netherlands". Several economic and cultural factors have caused the fact that Holland doesn't use synchronisation but subtitles on TV and film and I think that this has been important for (the spread of) English language in our country.

I don't think the book is translated but maybe you can find more information in the film -and televisionstudies library in de nieuwe doelen (universiteitstheater)."

2004-10-11T15:53:00.000-07:00

- Prof. Janssens Interview. There's an interview with Prof. Janssens here (in Dutch.)

2004-10-11T14:14:00.000-07:00

- MAJOR ISSUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY
Lecturer: E.F van de Bilt

Final Comments on Baylin and Wood.

. The Elusive Transition. Prof. van de Bilt said that while both Baylin and Wood were in agreement about the republican paradigm, they failed --at least initially-- to account for the events of the early nineteenth century. How did the transition take place between the republican mentality of 1776 and the liberal-capitalist society of the 1800s?

. Wood's Solution. That was the problem with Gordon Wood's 1969 book, The Creation of the American Republic. In part III of The Radicalism of the American Revolution (1992), Wood tried to clarify the issue by focusing on society at large. In the end, it was the American people --ordinary men and women with "their workaday concerns and their pecuniary pursuits of happiness"- - who would create "a prosperours free society." Prof. van de Bilt: "The 1992 book is much more structured, linear, and easy to follow for the reader."

. Statements Have Consequences. Statements like "all men are created equal", made in 1776 by slave-owning aristocrats, would come back to haunt them. Says Wood: "... it is important to realize that the Revolution suddenly and effectively ended the the cultural climate that had allowed black slavery to exist" (p. 186)

. John Adams. Was John Adams a monarchist? That seems to be the case, according to Gordon Wood. Prof. van de Bilt: "Adams would agree with Wood about the American Revolution being more radical than the French Revolution." The former was a success, and the latter a complete fiasco.

. Writing Style. Baylin and Wood write like traditional historians. By avoiding the use of the personal pronoun "I", they seek to create a sense of impartiality. But post-modern or deconstructionist historians, looking at how Baylin and Wood structure their arguments, can undermine the smoothness of their narrative.

2004-10-11T08:42:00.000-07:00

- Request for Info. For my Kroes paper, I'm looking for material on the diffusion of the English language in Europe. Any idea? (agustin_mackinlay@yahoo.com).

2004-10-11T08:28:00.000-07:00

- Essay on Bush's Foreign Policy. There's an essay on Bush's foreign policy by historian Marvin P. Leffler (he's the author of "American Grand Strategy from World War to Cold War, 1940-1950" -- see readings for Session 6, US-EU Relations.)

2004-10-09T05:53:00.000-07:00

- Lecture by David McCullough, celebrating John Adams (1734 - 1826). Tuesday, 21 September 2004, 8 p.m., Aula Universiteit, Singel 411, Amsterdam. "I hope you know this; if you don't, I hope you won't forget it: John Adams was the only Founding Father who never owned a slave -- it was a matter of principle."

This was David McCullough's opening statement at the lecture organized by the John Adams Institute. One could almost see tears in his eyes as he spoke those words. (By the way, he added, Republicans like Thomas Jefferson and James Madison were both slave-owners.)

McCullough went on to briefly discuss Adams's achievements as a politician. These include the appointment of Thomas Jefferson as writer of the Declaration of Independence --which "changed the world"-- and the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, which Adams wrote almost singlehandedly.

This document is the oldest functioning constitution on earth. McCullough emphazised the following statements:

"Wisdom, and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused generally among the body of the people, being necessary for the preservation of their rights and liberties; and as these depend on spreading the opportunities and advantages of education in the various parts of the country, and among the different orders of the people, it shall be the duty of legislatures and magistrates, in all future periods of this commonwealth, to cherish the interests of literature and the sciences..."

The image of John Adams as an aristocrat unconcerned by the welfare of the people is wrong, according to McCullough. The Massachusetts constitution soundly refutes this stereotype.

The rest of the lecture was devoted to the craft of the biographer (I listened in carefully, since I plan to write on my own.) John Adams, says David McCullough, is a biographer's dream come true. Unlike Thomas Jefferson -who undertook to systematically hide his own feelings- Adams wrote about almost everything he saw and felt.

A good biographer should accumulate a great deal of knowledge about his or her hero: the food, the climate, the country, the language, the teachings, etc. The biographer should read every personal letter written and read by the character.

"We can't understand them without understanding their life." I thought this was a particularly good remark, and he clearly used this technique in his 2001 book when he discussed Adams' theory of checks and balances.

Adams was consumed by vanity to such a degree that he felt the need of checks and balances at a personal level. This led him to think that religion was a necessary feature of any successful society, a point he explicitely made in the context of his sharp critique of the French Revolution.

"There's no such thing as a self-made man", said McCullough. "You have to get below the surface, and know what their parents were teaching them." McCullough went on to suggest that even diplomatic history and economic history require authors who are ready to plunge into the details of personal life.

The only moment of tension came when the moderator, Herman Beliën, unexpectedly decided to crack a joke. McCullough had said that Adams' son, John Quincy Adams, would have been the US President with by far the highest IQ ever, if such tests would have been available then.

When the Q & A session started, Mr. Beliën immediately asked Mr. McCullough: "Now that we know your opinion about John Quincy Adams' IQ, who would you say is the US President with the lowest IQ ever?" It was an obvious reference to George W. Bush, and an explosion of laughter followed.

But David McCullough did not laugh. In fact, he remained stone-faced, with not a single muscle in his face making the slightest motion. Clearly, he didn't like Mr. Beliën's comment.

At the very end of his remarks, McCullough once again talked about John Adams's insistence on the need to spread education as widely as possible. And he added, as an obvious reference to the West's struggle against Islamic terrorism: "We are confronted -- all of us, not just the United States-- by an ennemy who believes in enforced ignorance." (Thunderous applause.)

2004-10-04T16:59:00.000-07:00

- MAJOR ISSUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY
Lecturer: E.F van de Bilt

Gordon Wood: The Radicalism of the American Revolution. How a Revolution Transformed Society into a Democratic One Unlike Any Other That Had Ever Existed. New York: Knopf, 1992, 447 pages.

(See dozens of links here.)

(Reviewed by Agustin – Part I)
First I will review the book itself and then I will just "throw" some issues at this hungry public. In reviewing a book, I find it useful to concentrate on the one, two, three, four major issues raised by the author. In other words, I rarely follow a chapter-by-chapter approach. This is especially valid in this case, because the main ideas are scattered in different parts of The Radicalism.

After reading a couple of chapters, I admit I was having a hard time making sense of the book. It was only at about page 150 that I said to myself: "Gotcha!" And that's how I began to draw a couple of sketches in order to get a more systematic view of the argument.

Sketch 1: The Dynamic Forces
Right in the middle of the eighteenth century, says Wood, a contradiction was taking place between what he calls a de facto republican society and a hierarchical culture. This de facto republican society was the product of two "dynamic forces": (a) the availability of cheap land; (b) the demographic explosion.

Already, Wood is making a major statement: the American Revolution is an ongoing process, not a sudden crisis. This means that the people -the ordinary men and women who buy and sell land and who are constantly on the move- find themselves in the driver's seat.

Had the Revolution been a sudden crisis, leaders -not the people- would have been considered the key actors. Thus we can identify here, at this early stage of the book, one of the points to be discussed later: the people v. leaders.

Also, note the importance of the so-called "dynamic forces" (essentially, economic factors). It means that other possible explanations of the American Revolution --based, for example, on constitutional or even on religious factors-- will take the back seat.

- Abundance of Cheap Land. The 1763 Peace Treaty with France meant that an additional half-billion acres (especially in the Ohio valley) were made available to the colonists.

- Demographic Explosion. Driven by organic growth (larger families supported) and by immigration. Total population: 1750, 1 million; 1770, 2 million; 1790, 4 million. In North Carolina, the population increased by a factor of 6 between 1750 and 1775.

Sketch 1: A Hierarchical Culture.
"We will never appreciate the radicalism of the 18th century idea that all men are created equal unless we see it within this age-old difference" (Wood says that people were thought to be physically different!)

Aristocrats considered themselves the custodians of morals, the only fit to lead in war, arts, government. In Virginia, 1 in 25 adult white males was acknowledged as a gentleman. The rest was widely described as "the mob", "the herd", "the unthinking mob", "the ignorant vulgar", etc.

The bottom line, says Gordon Wood, is that all people were created unequal. Here are some examples:

. Juries: "Seats on the Virginia Grand Juries were perpetuated within families almost as frequently as seats on the county courts" (p. 84). In 1759, 11 justices of the peace resigned because of the appointement of one member of "the vulgar."

. Women. Women lacked an idependent existence, at least in law (p.49.) "Most husbands in their wills refused to give their wives outright ownership of their landed estates; at best the wife got a life-use of the estate." (p.49).

. Children. Treated like the property of their parents.

. Slaves. "The most severe patriarchal authority" (p. 51.)

. Law. Harsher punishments, in murder cases, for: (a) a servant who kills his master; (b) a wife who kills her husband.

The word "hierarchy" (and its variations) gets 54 mentions, or 2.8 times/chapter on average. "Dependence" (and its variations) gets 61 mentions, or 3.2 times/chapter. Finally, "paternalism" (and its variations) shows up as much as 70 times (3.7 times/chapter on average.) On the other hand, other issues usually analyzed by historians of the American Revolution -such as, for example, the Bill of Rights- are barely mentioned.

This is particularly revealing. It means that constitutional and war-related issues are relegated to a very minor role. Thus, says Wood: "The problems of American politics were at bottom neither imperial nor constitutional but social" (p.122.)

Sketch 1: The Clash.
Here’s what I call Gordon Wood’s astonishing insight: trade and consumption created a new culture. What does he mean by that? Because of the frenzy of buying, selling and consuming, social relations change. With the growth of commercial exchanges, people begin to see each other as equal counterparts in commercial transactions -- not as superior v. inferiors.

This is best understood with a couple of examples. The most telling example the case of Horace Mann and his family, in Southeastern Massachusetts. Mann works on the farm. One day, his wife sees a market opportunity: Why not manufacture ladies' hats? Pretty soon, Ms. Mann finds herself producing 6000 hats/year -- and making more money than her husband.

Examples such as this show that the growth of internal trade was putting considerable pressure on the paternalistic culture of the colonies. Gordon Wood warns the reader about the difficulty –in today's democratic societies- of really grasping the importance of what was then going on.

That is why I decided to break one of the golden rules of a book review, and to illustrate the author's idea with a couple of examples from outside the book. I think they adequatly illustrate Wood's theory in a more current context. The first example comes from India. A month ago I was watching a CNN Special on "Outsourcing in India", with journalist Thomas Friedman.

Friedman went to India to interview people from the other side of the outsourcing controversy. He met two sisters who worked at a call center in Bangalore. He had dinner with the women and their family. The father admitted that his daughters were making more money than he was. Now, that’s a cultural shock -- especially in India. Says Friedman:

"These are young college grads, most of these kids, who aren't engineers. They could never get jobs, not for $200 to $300 a month, which is the starting pay in a call center without this opportunity. And what this has given them is really a chance to grab the first rung of the ladder. A lot of them on the side are studying for MBAs or other college degrees. Some of them are now supporting their family. Many of them, their starting salary is more than their parents' retiring salary."

The second example comes from China. An editorial of the Financial Times (September 20, 2004) warned China about the need to modernize its political system: "…the openness to the outside world that comes with economic growth makes the secrecy and intrigue of Communist party politics an uncomfortable anachronism."

This is exactly the kind of conflict between a hierarchical culture and an expanding economy that Gordon Wood envisages in his analysis of revolutionary America. Examples from China are particularly interesting because many commentators compare today's economic boom in China with the American Wild West of the late eighteenth century and the early nineteenth century.

Thus James Glassman, a scholar with the American Enterprise Institute, describes Chinas as "a free-wheeling business atmosphere, much as I imagine America was in the days of the wild west."

A recent issue of Fortune magazine, devoted to China, has a section on the city of Chionqing, describing it as "The New Wild West." The new generation of Chinese children are seen as "little emperors" accustomed to buy and sell over the Internet, and to follow their own tastes in consumption matters. This is bound to have some serious consequences later on, as they will likely rebel against any patriarchal authority (see here Fortune's Photo Essay.)

The third and last example comes from the economics of slums. An economist from Peru, Hernando de Soto, has studied the similarities between the history of property rights in the American Revolution and the current situation in slums worldwide.

Let's imagine for a minute that the University of Amsterdam is a slum and that this room is my physical possession, but not my legal property. Now, I am an entrepreneur, and I need capital. Because I lack a formal title to my piece of land, I cannot use it as a collateral for a loan.

In other words, I do not have access to formal, impersonal credit markets. I have to rely on personal relations: an uncle, a friend, or some kind of tribal leader. In that case, the cost of capital will be very high (bank credit is much cheaper because banks have access to large pools of savings.)

This is exactly what Gordon Wood has in mind when he describes American credit markets in the second half of the eighteenth century: "Without banks, without many impersonal sources of credit … most economic exchanges in the colonies had to be personal, between people who knew each other." (p. 67)

End of Sketch 1
People who are free of dependent connections and influence are called patriots. They want to bring American culture more into line with society. On the other hand, people whose rank came artificially from above are called courtiers. They yearn for a more stringent hierarchical and patriarchal society. The two views are mutually incompatible.

In the end, patriots won. The British system, based on a strictly hierarchical culture where offices were almost hereditary and social authority was incontestable, could not prevail in America. But why? Gordon Wood states two different types of reasons. First, geography played an important role. Britain was an island, with only so much free land available.

America, on the other hand, was a continent, with a limitless supply of free land. This provided a perfect situation for people to move, to buy and to sell, to produce and to consume -- exactly the kind of environment that creates a republican culture.

Culture was important too: America was a loosely hierarchical society. Says Wood: "Most colonial aristocrats were never able to dominate their localities to the extent that English aristocrats did" (p. 115)

(More material coming soon.)

2004-09-27T09:24:00.000-07:00

- MAJOR ISSUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY
Lecturer: E.F van de Bilt

"Media & Money in the American Presidential Election", a lecture by Darrell West, Professor of Political Science, Brown University.

(Read his bio here; check out his website here.)

. The First One-Billion-Dollars Election. For the first time ever, the amounts spent on the campaign trail will surpass the one billion dollar mark. Half of it is earmarked for TV ads.

. On Code-Words. "2004 is a great code-word election. Code-words are very important communication tools. Emotions and symbols do matter."

. A Forecast. "It will be a close election, very polarised. I think GWB wins narrowly, although I will not vote for him."

. About the Economy. "It's growing nicely (4%/5% GDP growth); however, the Iraq war is dividing the electorate."

. On Leadership. "There is a strong desire for leadership; 911 had a galvanizing impact. Bush is seen as strong and principled, and his campaign has been successfull at depicting Kerry as a flip-flopper. The Bush campaign attacked early, and early views matter."

. On John Kerry. "He is an intellectual who reads widely. But he is the ambivalent-personality type, and he is torn by the complexity of events. He is having a difficult time convincing women to vote for him."

. On Bush's Constituency. "The home-owners (68% of Americans), the stock-owners, and the religious right."

. On the United Nations. "Multilateralism means going back to the UN. But Americans basically hate the UN."

. On the new media (Internet blogs.) "They are not always accountable, but they are a net addition to democracy in the media."

2004-09-24T23:21:00.000-07:00

- THE US AS A CULTURAL PRESENCE IN EUROPE
Lecturer: R. Kroes

We watched a video on George Gerschwin's Porgy and Bess (1934). More info here and here.

2004-09-23T16:36:00.000-07:00

- US-EU RELATIONS
Lecturer: R. Janssens

World War II & Aftermath: UN & Bretton Woods (*)

Group divided into two US Departments: State and War. This is mid-1942. Each Department has to come up with three different scenarios: Best Case, Worst Case, Realistic. Scenarios are to be "sold" to President Janssens-FDR.

Prof. Janssens. The idea of three scenarios was hated by Henry Kissinger, who thought it gave planners the opportunity to say, after the facts: "I told you so." There were three omissions in our presentations: (1) We were too concerned about the spread of communism; in the early 1940s, the real danger was thought to come from Nazi Germany, not from the Soviet Union.

(2) The ghost of the 1930s Depression played a key role in planning during the 1940s, something that was not apparent in our discussions; (3) In "selling" the scenarios, you failed to take into account the importance of personalities (FDR was indeed a very special character - - he once gave the green light to develop a plan to attack Japan with the help of ... bats!)

On the plus side, we correctly anticipated that the US would go it alone in the war against Japan, that is to say, without relying on Great Britain. While Winston insisted about the need to preserve the British Empire, FDR was less than impressed. He had visited, on his way to a meeting with Churchill, an African country of the Britihs Empire, and he was apalled by the standards of living of its people.

Finally, the President added that he would consider using of the US dollar as the world's reserve currency, but that he would first have the plan analyzed by experts.
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(*) Based on two readings from Paul Kennedy & William I. Hitchcock (eds.): From War to Peace: Altered Strategic Landscapes in the Twentieth Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000. Chapter 3, Melvyn P. Leffler: "American Grand Strategy from World War to Cold War, 1940-1950, " 55-78; chapter 5, Marc Trachtenberg: "The Making of a Political System: The German Question in International Politics", 103-119.

2004-09-21T08:30:00.000-07:00

THE US AS A CULTURAL PRESENCE IN EUROPE
Lecturer: R. Kroes

Weekly discussion paper on Emily S. Rosenberg ("A Century of Exporting the American Dream") and Lothar Bredella ("How is Intercultural Understanding Possible?") Comments by Agustin.

(1) "A Century of Exporting the American Dream"
After surveying the history of "Exporting America" --which begins early in the XXth century after the Spanish-American war-- Rosenberg outlines a number of conceptual explanations used by scholars to assess the significance of American cultural exports.

Three different approaches are outlined: (1) the Marxist school of 'Teoría de la dependencia'; (2) the Neo-Marxist school (Gramsci and others); (3) postmodernism. To help the reader grasp the differences, Rosenberg uses the hypothetical example of a Busby Berkeley musical playing abroad in the 1930s.

The Marxist explanation would view the Busby Berkeley musical as stimulating "US-style consumption" and thus producing and reproducing dependency relationships. Rosenberg criticizes this framework for its excessive determinism.

The Neo-Marxist approach elevates the status of cultural production as an autonomous realm. Thus, the Busby Berkeley musical is more than a reflection of cultural relations: it is also a product capable of either reinforcing or satirizing a set of power hierarchies.

Finally, the postmodern explanation looks at different responses according to the context in which an audience meets the cultural product. In this case, the Busby Berkeley musical could produce a number of reactions that could take place simultaneously. Here, the meaning of the cultural export cannot be generalized.

(2) "How is Intercultural Understanding Possible?"
The starting point of cultural understanding is the "liberating" insight that each culture is a creative answer to the human condition. This is the first step, not to be forgotten when one perceives another culture. However, perception itself is –from its very nature- selective and constructive: we tend to supplement what is not given.

Thus, stereotypes are not such a bad thing after all. Although they are never neutral, they help us categorize things and events. Using stereotypes with a self-critical attitude (forcing us to remember that each man is only a small part of the world) can be a profitable experience.

Bredella criticizes Wittgenstein’s "extreme relativism" (which denies the possibility of cultural understanding), because it fails to grasp the one thing we all have in common: the human condition. "All cultures", he says, "are creative responses to the human condition."

2004-09-17T13:16:00.000-07:00

- THE US AS A CULTURAL PRESENCE IN EUROPE
Lecturer: R. Kroes

Weekly discussion paper on Bernard Gendron ("Jamming at Le Boeuf") and NIAS Statement: "On the European reception of American Mass Culture")

(Comments on NIAS Statement by João; comments on "Jamming at Le Boeuf" and NIAS Statement by Agustin.)
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Questions of Cultural Interchange: The NIAS Statement on European Perception of American Mass Culture

João Tiago Duarte Martins

Kroes' article affirms the existence of American mass culture, one that is comprised of various elements, and one that reaches Europe and demands a wide-scope cultural study.
For Europe, America has always been synonymous with the idea of new and the idea of future. But not necessarily in a good way.

European perspective on the two cultures is one of opposing fields, in which the American side is rejected for three main reasons, all dealing with America's cultural shortcomings:
1 - American culture is shallow (lacking the amplitude and depth of European culture)
2 - American culture lacks a historical foundation (being excessively new)
3 - American culture lacks a cultural inheritance that would group all its constituents under a notion of wholeness (as opposed to the idea that Europe, supposedly, has one such notion).

This vision of American culture often translates into an anti-American sentiment.
Kroes then sketches a general idea of the expansion of America, accompanied by the gigantic development of media, technology and transportation means.

The blooming of America is simultaneous with a self-discovery and self-praise. Whitman was the herald of the vernacular "Americaness", of its democratic and all-encompassing art. This breakthrough served as the backbone of what later became American Studies.

America's economic pragmatism has also been a key factor in the development and dissemination of American mass culture. A giant in airline, oil, telecommunications and film industries (with the obvious example of Hollywood), America picks up, incorporates and transforms into a sales item almost everything, including the most rebellious elements of its cultural society.

The influences of industrial management exported to Europe, coupled with the Marshall Plan and the American cultural offensive sponsored by the U.S Information Agency in 1948, paved the way for an American assault on European culture and mentality. Obviously, each European country has accommodated and adapted American influences in its own particular way, due to specific political, economical and cultural conditions.

With the advent of mass tourism and, especially, satellite broadcasting, the ideas of national culture (and sometimes proud containment) have been shattered and replaced by transnational "communities". Culture is now a product of multinational conglomerates that distribute and disseminate local products from one area in other areas of the world.

With the uprise of global communications possibilities, America may stand to lose some of its influence as a key creator of mass culture. But that is not yet the case.

This article raises some rather interesting points. Fundamenting its reasoning on historical and economical facts, it shows how American mass culture has spread throughout the world (with an empashis on Europe). Truly interesting are the issues of recycling and appropriation of marginal and "rebellious" art forms by information and entertainment conglomerates.

One could argue about to what extent do these conglomerates rip out essential elements of the art products that they sell in order to make them more appealing. The idea of "authenticity" comes back to haunt every consumer of culture.

Another interesting aspect, one that could be not be discussed at the time the article was written, is the enormous influence of the Internet. Working beyond the notion of a "satellite broadcast" (which allows access to only some aspects of some cultures), the Internet is an extraordinary tool for cultural dissemination. Whether it will mean unlimited possibilities of cultural interchange or, on the contrary, a conglomerate-run market for the lowest common cultural denominator, only time will tell.
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Comments by Agustin:

(1) “Jamming at Le Boeuf” (On Darius Milhaud: see here, here and here; on Stravinsky: see this site; on Jean Cocteau: check out this.)

In order to provide insights into the "scope and nature of modernism's engagement with popular culture", the essayist provides a contextual review of Darius Milhaud's The Creation of the World (1923), the first symphony for a jazz orchestra.

One way to analyze the paper is to look at the parallel portraits of Mihaud and Stravinsky, on the one hand, and Milhaud and Cocteau, on the other hand.

. Milhaud & Stravinsky. There are striking contrasts between the two. First, whereas Stravinsky had not actually listened to jazz music, Milhaud had heard the Billy Arnold Band "straight from New York" in 1920. Moreover, he visited New York in 1922 to get direct exposure to Afro-American jazz.

Second, Milhaud viewed jazz as "an innovative art form in its own right", and not as raw material for "modernist experimentation or avant-garde shock tactics." Thus, The Creation of the World was technically consistent with jazz ("sober authenticism" - Although Hodeir disputes this.)

Whereas Stravinsky was a playful and irreverent bricoleur –"the great scavenger of twentieth-century music-, Milhaud held an "authenticist posture" towards jazz. The contrast between Milhaud and Stravinsky is somewhat attenuated, as both are seen as flaneurs, defined by Baudelaire as people who look to extract poetry from fashion.

. Milhaud & Cocteau. Both were flaneurs, but with different goals. Whereas Milhaud declared (only a few years after 1924) that he was "no longer interested in jazz" (because it had become “official”), Cocteau acted more like an entrepreneur. Thus, while Cocteau was had much less musical knowledge than Milhaud, he managed to act as the leader of a non-political avant-garde movement centered on jazz (while at the same time striving to keep its "frenchness.")

Thanks in part to the success of the restaurant-bar Le Boeuf sur le Toit, the Montmarte culture of poverty and social marginality gave way (at least in some influential circles) to Cocteau’s vision of "upscale pleasure and fashionable consumption."

In other words, while Mihaud was the ultimate flaneur, Cocteau was an "impresario of the first order."

(2) NIAS Statement: The nature of American mass culture
One key idea here is the role of innovation. Innovation is correctly defined here –in Schumpeterian terms- as an invention that finds a market. The high speed press, roll film, the gramophone, the movie camera, etc., all contributed decisively to facilitate both mass production and mass marketing strategies.

American mass culture is best defined by Hollywood, and, to a certain, extent, by music companies. Interestingly, the authors add other --"often more hidden"-- elements: management (which has "transformed Europeans into consumers of American products and images"), therapy and education.

While this analysis his very helpful –because it broadens our perspective of American mass culture- Law is only mentioned in passing, and not at all in its connection with language. One is reminded here of Fustel de Coulanges's book Les institutions politiques de l'Ancienne France, where he analyzed the impact of Latin and Roman Law on the Gallic society of the early empire.

Language, according to Fustel, was absolutely critical in terms of the expansion of Roman Law, which was in turn regarded as the key vehicle of "romanization." A similar phenomenon seems to be occurring right now with Anglo-Saxon Law, in particular with respect to the notion of stare decisis, the doctrine of the supremacy of the precedent (*).
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(*) Hans W. Baade: "Stare Decisis in Civil Rights Countries: The Last Bastion", in Peter Birks & Adrianna Pretto: Themes in Comparative Law (Oxford, 2002.)

2004-09-16T03:37:00.000-07:00

(PLEASE DISREGARD THIS - I USE THIS PART OF THE SITE AS A TEMPORARY BACK-UP FOR MY TERM PAPERS)

I. The American legal culture: property rights and the sources of law

I. a.- A brief historical account of the early English common law

Most legal systems today recognize a number of different sources of law. In the Dutch system, for example, enacted law –that is, law created by a legislative body- is usually placed at the top of the hierarchy. As in most civil law jurisdictions, case law and customary law play a secondary role. According to Sanne Taekama, “…Within the category of enacted law, there is a clear hierarchy of sources … treaties precede the Constitution, which precedes Acts of Parliament, which precede other government regulations.” (1)

This stands in sharp contrast to American law, which belongs to the legal family of the English common law. Here the hierarchy is reversed: non-codified case law usually finds itself at the top. Indeed, enacted law was originally meant to “operate on the principles of the common law.” (2) Understanding this hierarchical structure –with lex non scripta at the top- is one of the keys to unveil the apparent mystery of the American legal culture.

A brief historical account
As Zweigert and Koetz have noted, “More than any other legal system, English law demands a study of its historical origins.”(3) Some degree of knowledge about the early development of the English common law is required if one whishes to capture the essence of the modern American legal culture.

The most recent account of the birth of the English common law is David Carpenter’s The Struggle for Mastery. Britain 1066-1284 (London: Penguin, 2003.) The development of what Carpenter calls Britain’s “uniquely powerful institutions” is inextricably linked to the fact that England was ruled, from 1154 on, by the Angevin or Plantagenet dynasty.

As kings of England, Henry II and his sons Richard the Lionheart and John “Lackland” were also dukes of Normandy, and they ruled Anjou and Aquitaine as well. That meant one sure thing: perpetual war with the French King! At the risk of over-simplifying Carpenter’s account, we can say that the legal system known as English common law was devised out of Henry II’s need to create an administrative framework that would enable him to keep his power basis in England while simultaneously waging war against the French king.

The key initial steps were taken between 1166 and 1215. It is commonly assumed that the institution of jury trial was extended to civil cases around the year 1166. This was a crucial step, for it crystallized a political alliance of sorts between the crown and the impoverished gentry. With juries manned by members of the gentry, property disputes between members of the gentry and the rich land-owners who contested the king’s power (the so-called barons) were mostly settled in favor of the former.

The form of procedure was simple and cheap. A form called writ would suffice to start a legal action in a property dispute. The verdict would then be given by a local jury of “twelve free and law-worhty men” before the king’s justices. A writ would cost only 6 pennies, a sum that was “within the reach of the humblest freeman.” Thus from the outset, the Angevin legal system was a highly formalistic one. Legal action in royal courts could only be undertaken by means of a writ covering a specific offense. (4)

I. b.- The American legal culture: the sources of law

This brief historical account of the early English common law shows the importance of “the idea of utility” (Carpenter.) Legal writers would discuss “things not theoretical but useful: non subtilia sed utilia.” Already, there was a premium on law, as opposed to justice.

But there is an additional –and more substantial- difference between the early English common law and the systems that were later implemented in France and in Germany in accordance with Roman law. It is about the sources of law - and it provides much of the material needed to understand the disparities between current legal cultures.

Law as “external” to the sovereign body
Given the constant absence of the Angevin kings (they were out of England most of the time, fighting the French in Normandy or crusading against Muslims), a set of criteria had to be devised. Which cases necessitated the issuance of new writs? What punishment to apply? If these absentee kings could not be relied upon to act as the source of law (as in Roman law), something else had to be found.

That is probably how the doctrine of precedent came into being in England. In his fascinating account of the English common law in A History of the English-Speaking Peoples, Winston S. Churchill writes:

“The law was already there, in the customs of the land, and it was only a matter of discovering it by diligent study and comparison of recorded decisions in earlier cases and applying it to the particular dispute before the court… Here was precedent … popularly known as case law.” (5)

In the end, as we know, the Angevin kings created a system that proved too successful for their own good. Once the barons forced King John to sign Magna Carta in 1215, the principle that “the king should be under God and the law” became a well-established one. Rex non debet esse sub hominess sed sub Deo et lege! (6).

“The law”, writes Churchill, “flows from the people, and is not given by the King.” This, wrote the English statesman in 1939, is a principle “that endures to this day.” As is emphasizing this point, Article 39 of Magna Carta –reformulated by James Madison in the American Bill of Rights- sets forth the idea that law is external to the king.

These developments were taking place well before Parliament began to exist, let alone to legislate. Indeed, according to Norman Cantor, there was a “reluctance to accept the idea of positive legislation.” To any European intellectual trained in the enlightened democratic republican tradition –which sees legislation as the sole source of the law- these views are highly surprising.

Summing up: property rights and the English common law tradition
A proper understanding of the principles underlying the American legal culture starts with the early history of the English common law. This tradition formed an essential part of the American colonists’ toolkit. If anything, the American Revolution went decidedly further down that road.

According to historian Ralph Turner, when Americans “put into practice Magna Carta’s fundamental lesson of limitations on a government’s power”, they went “further” than the old charter. Thus, the first amendment prohibits Congress from legislating about the establishment of an official religion, and about the abridgement of freedom of speech or the press. (7) And as Tocqueville famously observed, Americans converted the old aristocratic English jury system into a powerful machine of popular representation.

What is now called the “Anglo-American legal culture” emerged out of a very peculiar historical –and geographical- context. The Angevin kings had devised a legal system designed to protect the property rights of the gentry, their political ally in the struggle against the barons. They did so to keep their power base in England while waging war in the continent. Neither the French nor the German kings faced such an intricate strategic situation. (8)

In due time, the British Parliament saw fit to enact sweeping reforms that reorganized the courts and modernized the common law by abolishing forms of action. Meanwhile, in the United States, case law lost part of its dominant position due to the growth of legislation. Thus, the gap between the Anglo-American and the Continental European legal traditions was reduced.

Yet the fact remains, as Cantor timely reminds us, that “the whole of English constitutional history is an appendix to the land laws.” A constitution based on land laws? Indeed. The Anglo-American legal system is a set of institutions originally designed to protect the stability of private property rights. One needs to fully grasp this fact to understand why concepts and values such as sovereignty (as a source of law), equality, dignity, and even “justice” play only a minor role in the Anglo-American legal culture (9).

II. Europe Receives the American Legal Culture

II. a.- The European Court of Justice embraces the doctrine of precedent

The Court of Justice of the European Communities, better known as the European Court of Justice (ECJ), was established in Luxemburg to adjudicate on matters of European law. It is sometimes called the “supreme court of the European Union.” In 2000, the ECJ stunned the judicial establishment when it decided to embrace stare decisis, the doctrine of precedent. (10)

Up to then, the Court had based its procedures on a mandate from Justinian’s code: "Cases should be decided on the basis of laws, not precedents.” In other words, judicial precedent was not considered a formal source of law. In an often-cited 1962 case, Advocate-General Lagrange had argued that “the Court should accept the French strict view of Res Judicata, according to which no decision of any court can have regulatory effect for any one who was not party to the litigation” (11).

The entirely new position embracing stare decisis was put forward by the Court in a document issued in May 2004 to consolidate its rules:

“Where a question referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling is identical to a question on which the Court has already ruled, where the answer to such a question may be clearly deduced from existing case-law or where the answer to the question admits of no reasonable doubt, the Court may, after informing the court or tribunal which referred the question to it, … give its decision by reasoned order in which, if appropriate, reference is made to its previous judgment or to the relevant case-law.” (emphasis added.) (12)

In an essay devoted to this particular incident, Hans Baade calls our attention to the fact that “precedent of the Court of Justice of the European Union … is binding on French and German courts at all levels.” Thus he concludes:

“… the emergence of the very notion of judicial precedent in the case-law of these two European courts [the European Court of Justice and the Strasbourg-based European Court of Human Rights] shows that stare decisis is in the ascendant in civil-law countries.” (13)

Why apply precedents?
Stare decisis is not officially recognized in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy or the Netherlands, but high court decisions in these nations do influence lower courts. In the Netherlands, the Supreme Court will in practice “usually not overrule its own previous decisions.” (14) But why apply precedents at all?

Power is a possible explanation. Professor Jonathan Miller of Southwestern University has outlined a model of the “independent charismatic authority of the judiciary” based on Max Weber’s work on law and economics. (15) According to Miller, an independent supreme court needs to apply stare decisis to its own rulings in order to acquire prestige and “charismatic authority.” Paradoxically, this power may then be used to deviate from precedent in a “charismatic decision” –for example, on abortion or gun control. To rebuild its prestige, the court then initiates a new (and long) period of respect for its own rulings.

Another concern is the rule of law. Stare decisis is seen as a way to “foster stability in the law” and to “engender reliance”, as Justice Kennedy ruled when presenting the opinion of the US Supreme Court in ITEL v. Joe Huddleston in 1993. More recently, however, economic explanations seem to have taken the upper hand. Legal counsel Patti Waldmeir, in a series of newspaper articles on the reach of American law, nails down the usual suspect: globalisation. Says Waldmeir:

“… as economies become globalised, do does the law .. Globalisation was the biggest theme of the last US Supreme Court term, a term dominated by cases that dramatized the interdependence of economies around the world – and the cultural and legal conflicts that arise.” (16)

Following that trail, I came across an intriguing connection between stare decisis and business competitiveness. Comparing case law in the United States and enacted law in civil law countries, Kevin Johnson argues that businesses can better assess legal risk when stare decisis enables courts to develop and clarify previously enacted law (17).

This, says Johnson, may have important consequences for companies. Before deciding on a project, any business needs to assess a number of risks: country risk, currency risk, interest rate risk, market risk – and legal risk. The more relevant information there is about each of these risks, the better a company can prepare.

In the particular case of legal risk, court opinions are a precious source of information. Johnson shows how American courts –drawing on the Civil Rights Act of 1964- have interpreted (or “constructed”) a body of sexual harassment law that has attained, over a sixteen-year span covering five major cases, a level of precision that no positive legislation can match. All of the likeliest scenarios of sexual harassment have been precisely defined and catalogued, “without involving the legislative process.”

This is what judges do when their opinions carry the weight of stare decisis. As they shape the law, step by step, court opinions provide crucial information that can be cheaply obtained even by small businesses, which normally lack the legal resources of big corporations. Thus, concludes Johnson, businesses can reduce costs by precisely tailoring the type of insurance they need to confront the issue of sexual harassment. The same process is valid “for virtually any legal issue.”

Stare decisis and economic competitiveness
Did the European Court of Justice have such ideas in mind when it decided to embrace stare decisis? Quite possibly. In 2000, the issue of European competitiveness was all the rage. In March 2000, the EU Heads of States and Governments agreed to make the EU "the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-driven economy by 2010" (the so-called Lisbon Agenda.)

Checking the most recent “World Competitiveness Scoreboard” from the Lausanne-based IMD business school, which lists sixty countries according to their level of competitiveness, one finds some interesting results (18). Among the ten most competitive countries, the first four are common-law jurisdictions applying stare decisis: the United States, Singapore, Canada, and Australia. Two more among the “top-ten”, Hong Kong (7th in rank) and Ireland (10th), are also common-law jurisdictions.

The presence of three Nordic Countries –Iceland (5th), Denmark (7th) and Finland (8th)- is not all that surprising. On its website, the Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs informs that,

“From ancient times existing the contents of the law have … been determined by the courts by means of case law in areas where there is no legislation, and this still occurs, for instance especially in the law of compensation. In other legal systems, especially in countries with legal systems inspired by Anglo-Saxon law, common law, the courts have, however, a far greater law-creating function than in Denmark.” (emphasis added.)

The same principle applies to Icelandic and Finnish law: Nordic countries are not common law jurisdictions, but they do apply some measure of stare decisis. One the other hand, we note that the ten least competitive countries of the World Competitiveness Scoreboard (Russia, Italy, Philippines, Brazil, Romania, Turkey, Poland, Indonesia, Argentina and Venezuela) are all civil law jurisdictions with no stare decisis.

While much work needs to be done to arrive at more solid conclusions, preliminary evidence tends to suggest that a sound legal system endowed with stare decisis may indeed be one factor (among many others) explaining competitiveness. At a time when competitiveness is so eagerly sought, the Court’s reception of this doctrine should come as no surprise (19).

II. b.- France adopts plea bargaining

In yet another stunning development, France has adopted the legal procedure known as plea bargaining. From October 2004 on, a defendant can plead guilty in return for a reduction of the severity of the charges. If an agreement is reached, no trial takes place. Officially labeled “comparution sur reconnaissance préalable de culpabilité”, the new procedure –also known as “plaider coupable”- is the key tenet of the so-called loi Perben.

This piece of legislation has created unprecedented turmoil within the French legal establishment. Le Monde mentions a state of “ébullition du monde judiciaire” even as the new procedure threatens “to upset the judicial culture” (“bouleverser la culture judiciaire.”) (20)

The driving force behind the new scheme is the need to reduce costs. The French judicial administration, burdened by an ever increasing case-load, badly needs to shorten the length of proceedings and to improve its overall efficiency. However, at the heart of the plea bargaining controversy lies a sharp cultural divide centered on the trial itself, known as procès in French. The following section draws largely on Garapon and Papadopoulos’ thorough analysis of “trial v. procès” (21).

American trial or French procès? A cultural divide
The American trial, write Garapon and Papadopoulos, is a formalized event centered on the initial plea. In any criminal suit, the defendant must either plead “guilty”, “not guilty” or “no contest.” Only a “not guilty” plea leads to a full trial, also known as trial by jury or jury trial. The contrast with the procès is striking: here, the French État opens the proceedings with a public reading of the act of accusation.

The American trial is considered an “accusation-driven” contest between two parties, with the judge acting as an “umpire.” By contrast, the procès is an inquisitorial affair where the judge is sometimes deeply involved in the investigation phase. The very notion of truth is seen from different angles. In the American trial, the goal is not necessarily to attain a hypothetically absolute truth, but to persuade members of the jury by using “common sense” (and doing so orally.) Meanwhile, the French enquête spares no efforts to arrive at intellectually satisfactory conclusions –mostly in written form. Droit savant v. jury-oriented common sense: Descartes v. Locke!

Garapon and Papadopoulos point to the inherent injustice of the plea bargaining system. Plea bargaining, they say, is a threat to innocent people who may be tempted to enter an agreement if they feel they risk much higher penalties in a full trial. Risk-averse individuals may thus end up unjustly penalized. To Garapon and Papadopoulos, the indictment of innocent people is morally unacceptable and socially dangerous. It is one of the dangers of a “contractual” judicial culture.

Largely to quell such fears –“pour calmer les esprits”, says Le Monde- French authorities have opted for a very gradual introduction of plea bargaining. Their estimates for the first year call for approximately ten cases per day in Paris, and only seven cases per week in Toulouse. All in all, they foresee an initially modest 5% reduction in the number of procès. In the United States, according to figures quoted by Garapon and Papadopoulos, as much as 95% of trials in federal courts, and 94% of trials in state courts are avoided thanks to plea bargaining.

Such statistics must have caught the attention of M. Perben and his associates. According to Garapon and Papadopoulos, over-generous appeal rules mean that French judges are usually tempted to quickly dispatch initial cases, knowing that they are likely to encounter them once again at a higher level. This is not a recipe for a sound (or cheap) legal system. Data compiled by the Canadian think tank Fraser Institute clearly show France lagging behind other non-Mediterranean European countries when it comes to the impartiality of its courts of justice (22).

III. Is There a “Line in the Sand”?

The ECJ’s adoption of stare decisis and France’s introduction of plea bargaining are but two examples of the powerful trend towards the “Americanization” of European law. But the process will not be a smooth one. Spain’s spectacular re-introduction jury trial in 1996 appears to be hitting a brick wall (23). Perhaps, just as Prof. Carlos Ruiz Moreno had warned back in 1995, the risks outlined by Max Weber about “any assault on traditional legal procedure that threatens the material interests of the practitioners” are finally materializing in the sun-bathed peninsula. (24).

Besides, the so-called “Globalization of law” is not a one-way street phenomenon. In a 2003 case involving sodomy laws in Texas, US Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy noted that state sodomy bans were “out of step with the laws in other Western democracies” – and he went on to cite rulings from the European Court of Human Rights. His colleague Justice Sandra Day O’Connor is quoted as having told the Atlanta Constitution newspaper that “American courts need to pay more attention to international legal decisions to help create a more favorable impression abroad.” (25)

These comments have emboldened American environmental and human rights activists into lobbying US courts to allow European rulings as precedents. James Lovegrove, managing director of the European division of the American Electronics Association, a United States industry lobby, recently complained: "The moment the ink hits the paper in Europe it becomes a global piece of legislation." (26) Needles to say, this situation has the US Supreme Court deeply divided, with Justice Antonin Scalia usually acting as the standard-bearer of the conservatives.

III. a.- The line in the sand: death penalty and international law

While American courts will undoubtedly respond from time to time to activists’ concerns –perhaps even citing European precedents- this movement is dwarfed by the momentous implications of the European Court of Justice’s embrace of stare decisis and France’s adoption of plea bargaining. In at least two areas, however, even non-lawyers can see a distinct “line in the sand” drawn by Europeans in their reception of the American legal culture. These areas are the death penalty, on the one hand, and the rather imprecise and politically charged domain of international law, on the other hand.

In their brief but illuminating discussion of the death penalty, Garapon and Papadopoulos clearly show how this “line in the sand” operates. While US federal law only provides procedural guidelines aimed at limiting arbitrary executions in state jurisdictions, the European Council imposes (on every candidate member) a judicial and moral model to be adopted in substance. Thus, even when an American lawyer condemns such and such execution on procedural grounds, his or her European colleagues tend to react with incredulity. To them, the death penalty is intrinsically bad. They see it as contrary to the principle of human dignity.

The principle of human dignity plays an important role in European Court of Justice rulings. On October 14, 2004, the ECJ upheld a ban imposed by German courts on the Bonn-based "Laserdrome", where participants simulate killing each other with lasers. The Court cited “the protection of human dignity which the [German] national constitution seeks to guarantee.” Commenting on the ruling, Renée Cordes reckons that Germany is “justifiably keen to thwart all behavior that even simulates violence and recalls the nightmare of its troubled past.” (27)

Contrast this reasoning with George W. Bush’s response to a European journalist on his first overseas trip as president, in June 2001. The reporter asked the president why he supported the death penalty – a question timed to coincide with Timothy McVeigh’s execution. William Schneider, a resident fellow with the American Enterprise Institute think tank, recounts Bush’s reaction:

“Bush answered that in the United States the people rule and that the death penalty is the democratic consensus of the American people. He said that, as an elected leader, he is in no position to defy the will of the people.” (28)

The ECJ’s mention of “human dignity” and President Bush’s response can be interpreted as a restatement –from each side of the cultural divide- of the basic issue of the ultimate sources of law. Let us see why.

War, sovereignty and the source of law
As the sixteenth century wars of religion in France threatened to create a major upheaval in Europe, the French jurist Jean Bodin came up in 1576 with the principle of sovereignty in his ground breaking treatise Les Six Livres de la République (29). Shocked by the horrors of the French religious wars, Bodin sought to establish a strong centralized authority as a means to uproot civil war. He set out clearly the argument round which most political discussion centered in the 17th and 18th centuries: law is merely an expression of the sovereign will (30).

Yet more civil wars broke out, followed by several centuries of horrific inter-sate European wars. Thus, the current muscle-flexing European institutions can be seen, in the words of Jacques Delors, as a “Bodin-esque” attempt to transcend this

“… interminable guerre civile européenne qui a tourné par deux fois à la guerre mondiale.” (31) (emphasis added.)

In 1993, when a monetary crisis erupted in Europe over the issue of Germany’s high interest rates, former chancellor Helmut Schmidt warned the central bank about the risks it was taking, just as war was raging in the Balkans and Kohl and Mitterrand were showing signs of disagreement. Schmidt then followed up in 1996 with a dramatic open letter to the Bundesbank president, complaining that the central bank’s high interest rates were threatening to undo the project of European Monetary Union. And he warned Mr. Tietmeyer in stark terms:

“Hat uns 1930, 1931, 1932 nicht schon einmal eine Leitung der Reichsbank, Ihrer Vorgängerin, wegen monomaner deflationistischer Ideologie ins Unglück massenhafter Arbeitslosigkeit gestürzt, mit grauenhaften politischen Folgen?” (32)

Thus, Europeans appear to be willing to endow a number of supra-national institutions –the European Central Bank, the ECJ, and others- with powers aimed at erasing the possibility of any conflict that recalls “the nightmare of the continent’s troubled past.” If reaching this ultimate goal comes at the cost of letting the ECJ uphold the rather vague notion of human dignity –with some potentially negative consequences in terms of economic freedom and jobs (as shown by the Bonn “Laserdrome” case)- they do not seem to mind.

The contrast with the American view is patent. President Bush’s reply about the execution of Timothy McVeigh stressed the old common law notion that the sovereign is not the source of law. As we saw in Section I, the Anglo-American legal tradition was originally based on the protection of private property rights. Thus, it should come as no surprise that Bush’s response carries an implicit message: “human dignity” is too imprecise a principle (from a common law perspective.) That is what Edmund Burke had in mind when he criticized the French Revolution and its ideas of “metaphysical rights.” A quarter of a century later, Justice Joseph Story, the pioneer of the “Americanization” of the English common law, put it even more bluntly:

“The obligation of the common law to deal with cases and controversies forced it to grapple with substances, instead of shadows, with men’s business, and rights, and inheritances, and not with entities and notions…”; “We ought not to permit ourselves to indulge in the theoretical extravagance of some well-meaning philosophical jurists, who blieve that all human concerns can be provided for in a code, speaking definite language”; “What legislatures can do is not to create principles of law but to clarify and refine those which had been developed over time by the common-law courts”; “Beware of metaphysical inclinations and of perfectionist and radical speculation” (33).

International law: where’s my lawyer?
Building on the success of the EU, some Europeans intellectuals and politicians are eager to extend the model of peace-through-centralized-institutions well beyond the confines of Europe. Sometimes, this leads them to promote some colorful political initiatives. Thus, in September 2004, French and Spanish presidents Jacques Chirac and José-Luis Rodríguez Zapatero announced at the UN Assembly General their support for a “global tax on financial transactions and on greenhouse gas emissions” to up to US$ 50 billion to fund a worldwide campaign against hunger. President Bush did not care to attend the meeting.

But the European idea of universal jurisdiction, derived from an overarching concern for global peace, shows that a “line in the sand” clearly exists between Europe and the United States when it comes to key aspects of international law. The well-known controversies over the International Criminal Court, the Kyoto treaty on emissions and the 2003 war in Iraq are only the most visible signs of a dispute centered –once more- on the issue of the sources of law.

A telling example occurred early in 2004 when the UN Security Council asked the International Court of Justice to provide advice on the “legal consequences” of Israel’s security fence in the West Bank. According to an editorial from the British newspaper The Telegraph, the UN was sending the case to The Hague “as if it were a supreme court” and not an “arbitration panel.” An arbitration panel provides “a mechanism whereby two states can, by mutual agreement, refer a dispute to third party settlement.” But Israel did not recognize the validity of the proceedings. Thus, concludes The Telegraph, precedents set by Belgian and Spanish judges (failing to recognize national sovereignty) and by rulings from the ECJ and the EHRC have emboldened the UN to “strike at the principle of territorial jurisdiction that ultimately underpins diplomatic relations.” (34)

Simply put, the controversy boils down to a different set of values. Europeans favor peace above all; Americans are more concerned with economic growth and prosperity. On the one side, human dignity trumps the formality of judicial proceedings. On the other, formality is the law. But international law, by its very essence, is not of a formalistic nature. Thus, when German chancellor Gerhard Schröder complained to president Bush in 2003 that the Iraq war did not conform to the UN Charter and therefore was illegal, Bush responded: “International law? I better call my lawyer. He didn't bring that up to me.” (35)

III. b.- Britain at the crossroads

Although he supported the Americans in the Iraq war, British Prime Minister Tony Blair does not share president Bush’s contempt for international law. In a speech to his constituency in March 2004, he argued that “…we went to war to enforce compliance with the UN resolutions.” Blair is also an enthusiastic promoter the Kyoto initiative. In September 2004, he said that Britain would make climate a priority during its G8 presidency. And he added: “I want the G8 to secure an agreement as to the basic science on climate change and the threat it poses,” in a likely reference to US reluctance to sign up to agreements to fossil fuel emissions. (36)

(1) Sanne Taekama (ed.): Understanding Ducth Law. Boon Juridische uitgevers, 2004.

(2) Edmund Burke: Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 20.

(3) Konrad Zweigert & Hein Koetz: An Introduction to Comparative Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998.

(4) This stands in obvious contrast to the European legal tradition that later evolved in the continent. Thus, Garapon and Papadopoulos quote an author who –without mincing her words- writes that Americans (who adopted and refined the English common law) “see law as a set of procedures, with little regard to its substance.” See Carol J. Greenhouse: “Perspectives anthropologiques sur l’américanisation du droit”, Archives de philosophie du droit (Paris: Dalloz, 2001), cited by Antoine Garapon & Ioannis Papadopoulos: Juger en France et en Amérique. Paris: Odile Jacob, 2003. As Carpenter and others have shown, the new system proved immensely successful. The standardization of the procedures, the low cost of the writs, and the key role played by local juries gave the crown a virtual monopoly in pleas involving possession of the land. The legal system was actually very user-friendly! The more I read on the subject, the more I am inclined to draw an analogy between the English common law and … the modern “Windows” operating system for personal computers. This particular piece of software may not be the best, but it is cheap and secure. Users can opt for a competing operating system, but they tend to choose Windows. The same happened to the Angevin legal machine: people could opt for baronial courts – but instead they chose the standardized, cheap and reliable system of royal courts with local juries. R. N. Swanson, in The Twelfth Century Renaissance, summarizes the situation in business-like language: “The effectiveness of the changes was due to market forces; the crown offered solutions, encouraged plaintiffs, and rival jurisdictions could not stand the competition … feudal justice was driven out of business.” See also Mike Macnair: “Vicinage and the Antecedents of the Jury”, Law and History Review, Vol. 17, No. 3, 1999.

(5) Winston S. Churchill: A History of the English-Speaking Peoples, Vol. I. London: Cassell and Company, 1956.

(6) See Norman F. Cantor: The English. A History of Politics and Society to 1760. London: Allen & Unwin, 1967. This raises another question: is Christianity as a source of law? Judges applied precedents, but what was the basis of these precedents? Searching for clues, I stumbled upon W. L. Warren’s book King John (London: Book Club Associates, 1960) and its account of Magna Carta. Warren says of Archbishop Stephen Langton: “… he more than anyone can be held responsible” for the text of Magna Carta. Intrigued, I read the 61 articles of the charter looking for signs of religious influence. To my surprise, I found that Magna Carta can indeed be interpreted in such terms (a fact eschewed by the modern historians I have read.) The charter provides for security against murder, against bearing false witness, against adulteration of weights and measures, and against robbery. These are the very principles of … Deuteronomy 25, 13-16 and of the second half of the Ten Commandments! The relationship between Christianity and the English common law was famously debated in the context of the American Revolution by Thomas Jefferson and Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story, with Jefferson taking the “enlightened” view and Story the more religious side. The point here is to remind the reader that important authors do see a link between the English common law tradition and Christianity - - another key difference with the modern European legal tradition. Thus, religious views are sometimes considered superior to precedents. In one case involving slavery in 1819, judge Story –a fervent abolitionist- dissented from the Supreme Court’s opinion, which was based on a precedent upholding slavery. See R. Kent Newmyer: Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story. Statesman of the Old Republic. Chapell Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1985.

(7) Ralph Turner: Magna Carta Through the Ages. London: Pearson, 2003.

(8) The fact that Britain was an island was a factor too: it was easier for Henry II to extend the administrative authority of the crown than it was for Frederick Barbarossa. Over the years, the administrative unity of England meant that a key impulse behind the movement of codification of law would be forever absent. The point is made by Alan Harding in his Medieval Law and the Foundations of the State. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

(9) Thus Justice Story, one of the pioneers of the “Americanization” of the English common law, defined it as a system “by which contracts are interpreted, and property secured.” Judicial decisions, in turn, were deemed “but the formal promulgations of rules antecedently existing.” His biographer concluded that Story “did not, of course, speak to the enslaved, the poor and property-less … but to the property-owning middle and upper class and to the venturesome entrepreneurs who defined cultural values.” (emphasis added) See R. Kent Newmyer, op.cit., p. 304.
(10) The term commonly used for the doctrine of precedent is called stare decisis. This is an abbreviation of the Latin phrase, stare decisis et non quieta movere (to stand by precedents and not to disturb settled points). Stare decisis means that a point of law once settled by a judicial decision is not to be departed from. In other words, an earlier case when directly in point must be followed in a subsequent case. A court is bound by statute or by the decisions of superior courts. See A.R. Biswas: “Radio Decidendi and Common Cause vs. Union of India”, Supreme Court Cases, Vol. 25, No.4, 1987.
(11) See J. W. Harris: “Precedent”, in Legal Philosophies (second edition.) London: Lexis Nexis, 2003.
(12) Rules of Procedure of the European Court of Justice, Article 104 (3), Chapter 9. See www.curia.eu.int
(13) Hans W. Baade: “Stare Decisis in Civil Rights Countries: The Last Bastion” in Peter Birks & Adrianna Pretto (eds.): Themes in Comparative Law. In Honour of Bernard Rudden. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
(14) Sanne Taekama (ed.): Understanding Ducth Law. Boon Juridische Uitgevers, 2004.
(15) Jonathan Miller: “Judicial Review and Constitutional Stability: A Sociology of the US Model and its Collapse in Argentina”, Hastings International and Comparative Law Journal, Vol. 21, 1997.
(16) Patti Waldmeir: “How far should the long arm of US law reach?”, Financial Times, March 1, 2004 and “The vanishing borders of justice”, Financial Times, July 5, 2004.
(17) Kevin B. Johnson: “Assessing legal risk and the evolution of law”, Emporia State University, 2002.
(18) IMD – World Competitiveness Yearbook 2004, available at www.imd02.ch
(19) “Competitiveness, competitiveness, competitiveness" should be the mantra of the new Barroso Commission, according to European business association UNICE (www.unice.org). This organization also calls for “better regulation with compulsory business assessment for new legislative proposals.”
(20) Nathalie Guibert: “La justice française passe à l’heure du plaider coupable”, Le Monde, October 1, 2004.
(21) Garapon & Papadopoulos, Juger en France et en Amérique. Paris: Odile Jacob, 2003, chapters III and IV.
(22) See Economic Freedom of the World: 2003 Annual Report, Fraser Institute (www.fraserinstitute.ca)
(23) See the recent well-publicized cases of Sonia Carabantes Guzmán and Juan Manuel Fernández Montoya “Farruquito”, which are both to be heard by a “professional court” instead of “popular juries.”
(24) Carlos Ruiz Miguel, “Jurado y Estado Social y Democrático de Derecho”, Congreso Internacional de Derecho Constitucional, Alicante, 1995. The Max Weber quote if from Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, as cited by Konrad Zweigert & Hein Koetz: An Introduction to Comparative Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998.

(25) See Charles Lane: “Thinking Outside the US”, Washington Post, 4 August 2003 and Tom Barett: “American Daily”, June 11, 2003.

(26) See Otto Pohl: “Environmentalists Push a New Lever: Globalization”, International Herald Tribune, July 6, 2004.
(27) Renée Cordes: “Laser-Faire”, Tech Central Station, October 19, 2004.
(28) William Schneider: “A People-Watching Court”, AEI, June 29, 2002.
(29) See Ruben Alvarado: “Rights, Revolution and World Order”, Common Law Review, March 28, 2003.
(30) Although customary or natural law do provide some limitations in the case of an absolute monarch. See Antonio-Carlos Pereira Menaut: Lecciones de Teoría Constitucional. Madrid: Colex, 1997.

(31) Jacques Delors: “Réunifier l’Europe: notre mission historique”, Conférence Wallenberg, Aspen Institute, November 1999.

(32) Helmut Schmidt: “Offener Brief an Bundesbakspräsident Hans Tietmeyer”, Die Zeit, November 8, 1996.

(33) Quoted by R. Kent Newmyer: Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story. Statesman of the Old Republic. Chapell Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1985.

(34) “Positive side of the fence”, The Telegraph, 23 February 2004.

(35) Quoted by Mark Steyn: “All the good things they never tell you about Iraq”, The Telegraph, September 19, 2004.

(36) “Blair makes appeal to tackle global warming”, AP, September 16, 2004.