Thursday, October 14, 2004
- US-EU RELATIONS
Lecturer: R. Janssens
Post-Cold War: Bosnia & Peacekeeping (*). Preliminary Remarks. Before addressing the issue of peacekeeping, Prof. Janssens summarized the aims of the course on US-EU Relations. The issue is very complex, and one has to select only a limited number of topics. One can focus on a state-by-state approach, or on national security issues, etc.
Always keep in mind that --as in any political alliance-- complications are bound to occur. They may have to do with diverging national interests, or with personalities. Charles de Gaulle, for example, was one individual who did make a difference.
The US will always be involved in Europe, for both security and economic reasons. President Clinton once said: "We went to Europe twice to save Europeans from killing themselves", and that statement largely remains valid.
In World War II, the United States were willing to fight the Nazis in Europe. Then, during the Cold War, Europeans sometimes felt anxious about the seriousness of the American commitment. To what extent would the US help Europe in the event of a Soviet invasion?
Right now, in October 2004, the basic question is, of course, the foreign policy of George W. Bush. Europeans are particularly upset, but there is really nothing new about it. Such things always happen in any alliance -- especially when it is dominated by a very powerful member.
A number of questions remain unanswered. To what extend can we speak of a common ground between Europe and the US? Is there enough willingness (or necessity) to cooperate? That was clearly the case during the Cold War. But, after the Cold War, has the need for cooperation diminished?
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the first war against Saddam Hussein, George H.W. Bush declared that the time had come for a "new world order". The alliance against Iraq was indeed an impressive one (even Syrian troops participated.)
It was a hopeful moment. Did it have to end like this? It is tempting to conclude that the present mess is George W. Bush's fault. But it's not that simple. As we shall see, peacekeeping is also a source of conflict.
From a purely military standpoint, the key difference between the 1991 Gulf War and the 2001-2003 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq is the new role of "precision bombing directed by the Special Operations Forces" (Wesley Clark, p. XXI.) It means that you need more troops to occupate a country than to actually wage war!
. Peacekeeping (I): The Lack of a Clear Mandate. The first UN-sponsored peacekeeping operation took place in 1948 in the Sinai Desert. Soon afterwards, soldiers were deployed in Kashmir, and later in Cyprus. But there was a problem: these troops did not really intervene. Their mandate was to separate the warrying parts from each other.
But this was always done under the assumption that war would not break out again any time soon. Given the UN Charter --which states that no one is allowed to interfere in domestic issues-- there was no clear-cut mandate to fight at all.
Thus, peacekeeping operations were only successful when the warrying factions were completely exhausted. But then again, they would start re-arming as soon as possible. In other words: peacekeeping missions do nothing to solve the underlying problems that lead to war in the first place.
. Peacekeeping (II): What Went Wrong in Somalia? The example of Somalia shows why peacekeeping operations are so complicated. Relief organisations were striving to hand out food to the impoverished population, but warlords would systematically disrupt the food supply.
NGOs like Médecins Sans Frontieres and others began to ask for US support, in order to ease food distribution. Finally, the Marines landed. To their surprise, they were greeted not by bullets ... but by CNN crews!
Another problem was the issue of cooperation. Italian soldiers, upset about earlier US operations undertaken within "their" zone --but without their knowledge--, did not support the beleaguered Marines in Mogadishu. Other UN-member countries "cooperated" by sending untrained and ill-equipped soldiers who were there just for the money.
In the end, President Clinton pulled out as casualties mounted (by the way, there is little information about Somalian casualties, but they must haven been considerable.)
. Peacekeeping (III): The Trouble With NGOs. The Somalian fiasco underlines the nature of the problems created by otherwise well-intentioned NGOs.
- Problem No. 1: There are hundreds of them. This complicates the task of creating a bureaucracy capable to set up law enforcement institutions, to organise the supply of food and water, to establish courts of justice, etc. The lack of coordination between NGOs is a stumbling block towards the creation of an efficient bureaucracy.
- Problem N. 2: NGOs are privately-funded organizations. In other words: they need media focus, press attention (otherwise their donors would balk at contributing funds.) Sometimes, their members are located where the press is, instead of where they are really needed.
- Problem No. 3: The issue of the food supply. If food is handed out for free (as was the case in Somalia), there will be an incentive for farmers to abandon their crops and to move to the city. Why work so hard in the countryside if (good) food is handed out for free in the cities? (See this article.)
In other words, well-meaning NGOs actually aggravated the crisis. This truth is hard to admit. It makes you wonder about the West's real willingness to help. Says Prof. Janssens: "Is there any real degree of serious commitment?" (See article by Edward Luttwak: "Toward Post-Heroic Warfare", Foreign Affairs. Vol. 74, No.3, May-June 1995.)
. Peacekeeping: Conclusion. The history of peacekeeping is not a happy one. There will always be problems with cooperation and coordination. What started out in 1991 with George H.W. Bush's optimism about a "new world order" basically ended with the UN deeply discredited.
There is no real example of a successful peace-keeping operation - - and that's quite a sad story.
________________
(*) Based on Wesley K. Clark: Waging Modern War (New York: Public Affairs, 2002), XIX-XLV.
Lecturer: R. Janssens
Post-Cold War: Bosnia & Peacekeeping (*). Preliminary Remarks. Before addressing the issue of peacekeeping, Prof. Janssens summarized the aims of the course on US-EU Relations. The issue is very complex, and one has to select only a limited number of topics. One can focus on a state-by-state approach, or on national security issues, etc.
Always keep in mind that --as in any political alliance-- complications are bound to occur. They may have to do with diverging national interests, or with personalities. Charles de Gaulle, for example, was one individual who did make a difference.
The US will always be involved in Europe, for both security and economic reasons. President Clinton once said: "We went to Europe twice to save Europeans from killing themselves", and that statement largely remains valid.
In World War II, the United States were willing to fight the Nazis in Europe. Then, during the Cold War, Europeans sometimes felt anxious about the seriousness of the American commitment. To what extent would the US help Europe in the event of a Soviet invasion?
Right now, in October 2004, the basic question is, of course, the foreign policy of George W. Bush. Europeans are particularly upset, but there is really nothing new about it. Such things always happen in any alliance -- especially when it is dominated by a very powerful member.
A number of questions remain unanswered. To what extend can we speak of a common ground between Europe and the US? Is there enough willingness (or necessity) to cooperate? That was clearly the case during the Cold War. But, after the Cold War, has the need for cooperation diminished?
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the first war against Saddam Hussein, George H.W. Bush declared that the time had come for a "new world order". The alliance against Iraq was indeed an impressive one (even Syrian troops participated.)
It was a hopeful moment. Did it have to end like this? It is tempting to conclude that the present mess is George W. Bush's fault. But it's not that simple. As we shall see, peacekeeping is also a source of conflict.
From a purely military standpoint, the key difference between the 1991 Gulf War and the 2001-2003 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq is the new role of "precision bombing directed by the Special Operations Forces" (Wesley Clark, p. XXI.) It means that you need more troops to occupate a country than to actually wage war!
. Peacekeeping (I): The Lack of a Clear Mandate. The first UN-sponsored peacekeeping operation took place in 1948 in the Sinai Desert. Soon afterwards, soldiers were deployed in Kashmir, and later in Cyprus. But there was a problem: these troops did not really intervene. Their mandate was to separate the warrying parts from each other.
But this was always done under the assumption that war would not break out again any time soon. Given the UN Charter --which states that no one is allowed to interfere in domestic issues-- there was no clear-cut mandate to fight at all.
Thus, peacekeeping operations were only successful when the warrying factions were completely exhausted. But then again, they would start re-arming as soon as possible. In other words: peacekeeping missions do nothing to solve the underlying problems that lead to war in the first place.
. Peacekeeping (II): What Went Wrong in Somalia? The example of Somalia shows why peacekeeping operations are so complicated. Relief organisations were striving to hand out food to the impoverished population, but warlords would systematically disrupt the food supply.
NGOs like Médecins Sans Frontieres and others began to ask for US support, in order to ease food distribution. Finally, the Marines landed. To their surprise, they were greeted not by bullets ... but by CNN crews!
Another problem was the issue of cooperation. Italian soldiers, upset about earlier US operations undertaken within "their" zone --but without their knowledge--, did not support the beleaguered Marines in Mogadishu. Other UN-member countries "cooperated" by sending untrained and ill-equipped soldiers who were there just for the money.
In the end, President Clinton pulled out as casualties mounted (by the way, there is little information about Somalian casualties, but they must haven been considerable.)
. Peacekeeping (III): The Trouble With NGOs. The Somalian fiasco underlines the nature of the problems created by otherwise well-intentioned NGOs.
- Problem No. 1: There are hundreds of them. This complicates the task of creating a bureaucracy capable to set up law enforcement institutions, to organise the supply of food and water, to establish courts of justice, etc. The lack of coordination between NGOs is a stumbling block towards the creation of an efficient bureaucracy.
- Problem N. 2: NGOs are privately-funded organizations. In other words: they need media focus, press attention (otherwise their donors would balk at contributing funds.) Sometimes, their members are located where the press is, instead of where they are really needed.
- Problem No. 3: The issue of the food supply. If food is handed out for free (as was the case in Somalia), there will be an incentive for farmers to abandon their crops and to move to the city. Why work so hard in the countryside if (good) food is handed out for free in the cities? (See this article.)
In other words, well-meaning NGOs actually aggravated the crisis. This truth is hard to admit. It makes you wonder about the West's real willingness to help. Says Prof. Janssens: "Is there any real degree of serious commitment?" (See article by Edward Luttwak: "Toward Post-Heroic Warfare", Foreign Affairs. Vol. 74, No.3, May-June 1995.)
. Peacekeeping: Conclusion. The history of peacekeeping is not a happy one. There will always be problems with cooperation and coordination. What started out in 1991 with George H.W. Bush's optimism about a "new world order" basically ended with the UN deeply discredited.
There is no real example of a successful peace-keeping operation - - and that's quite a sad story.
________________
(*) Based on Wesley K. Clark: Waging Modern War (New York: Public Affairs, 2002), XIX-XLV.
# posted by Agustin @ 3:19 PM 
