Tuesday, November 30, 2004
- THE US AS A CULTURAL PRESENCE IN EUROPE
Lecturer: R. Kroes
We watched the documentary A Dreamscape: Gambling in America (1994), by Bernie IJdis. I found this review. Prof. Kroes asked us to write a one to one and a half page review of the film, with the following questions in mind: does gambling make America a land of dreams? Is it a "neutral" report on gambling? Is there a "construction" of America? Are Europeans different?
Lecturer: R. Kroes
We watched the documentary A Dreamscape: Gambling in America (1994), by Bernie IJdis. I found this review. Prof. Kroes asked us to write a one to one and a half page review of the film, with the following questions in mind: does gambling make America a land of dreams? Is it a "neutral" report on gambling? Is there a "construction" of America? Are Europeans different?
Monday, November 29, 2004
- MAJOR ISSUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY
Lecturer: E.F van de Bilt
Walter Russell Mead: Special Providence. American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World. New York: Routledge, 2001.
Reviewed by Rie, Sabrina & Wiebke.
This interesting presentation emphasized Mead's well-known model centered on the four American foreign-policy types: Hamiltonian, Wilsonian, Jeffersonian and Jacksonian. Prof. van de Bilt guided the debate by asking a number of questions. How can we explain the success of America as the sole super-power? Is Mead a conservative?
Another interesting question: do we need a Jeffersonian streak whenever foreign policy becomes too tightly guided by one or the other three impulses? Prof. van de Bilt argued that it was the interaction between the four "schools" that created a hugely successful foreign policy over the years.
If US policy makers can keep this consensus, then there is little doubt that America will remain the "top dog" among nations. But he stressed the importance of the self-critical Jeffersonian voice that acts as a check on the impulses emanating from the other "schools."
About the course
Prof. van de Bilt asked our opinion about the course. There were some suggestions about the reading list and about the methodology. Should the lecturer take a more pro-active stance? Should we read about the Civil War? My comment: on the whole, I was very satisfied, especially because I had to review a very interesting book.
I added that, in my opinion, history is also --and perhaps mostly-- about wars, battles and leadership. That's why I thought that some of the issues covered over the past three months had more to do with sociology than with history. But I cannot complain! (Here's link-rich review of Mead's book by BrothersJudd.)
Lecturer: E.F van de Bilt
Walter Russell Mead: Special Providence. American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World. New York: Routledge, 2001.
Reviewed by Rie, Sabrina & Wiebke.
This interesting presentation emphasized Mead's well-known model centered on the four American foreign-policy types: Hamiltonian, Wilsonian, Jeffersonian and Jacksonian. Prof. van de Bilt guided the debate by asking a number of questions. How can we explain the success of America as the sole super-power? Is Mead a conservative?
Another interesting question: do we need a Jeffersonian streak whenever foreign policy becomes too tightly guided by one or the other three impulses? Prof. van de Bilt argued that it was the interaction between the four "schools" that created a hugely successful foreign policy over the years.
If US policy makers can keep this consensus, then there is little doubt that America will remain the "top dog" among nations. But he stressed the importance of the self-critical Jeffersonian voice that acts as a check on the impulses emanating from the other "schools."
About the course
Prof. van de Bilt asked our opinion about the course. There were some suggestions about the reading list and about the methodology. Should the lecturer take a more pro-active stance? Should we read about the Civil War? My comment: on the whole, I was very satisfied, especially because I had to review a very interesting book.
I added that, in my opinion, history is also --and perhaps mostly-- about wars, battles and leadership. That's why I thought that some of the issues covered over the past three months had more to do with sociology than with history. But I cannot complain! (Here's link-rich review of Mead's book by BrothersJudd.)
Thursday, November 25, 2004
- THE US AS A CULTURAL PRESENCE IN EUROPE
Lecturer: R. Kroes
We watched the 1986 documentary Big Fun in the Big Town by Bram van Splunteren (on rap music in New York City.) Prof. Kroes discussed chapter 8 of his book and a paper on Turkish-German rap music (Heinz Ickstadt: "Appropiating Difference: Turkish-German Rap", Kennedy Institute for Northamerican Studies, FU-Berlin.) Here are my comments:
- Ickstadt: Two "Cultural Chairs"? Or Maybe Just One! As he sums up his discussion of German-Turkish rap-groups and performers, Ickstadt mentions the "new generation of hyphenated citizens" who know "at least two cultures." He says that these performers sit between "two cultural chairs": they do not feel Turkish, yet they do not feel completely accepted by German society.
In my opinion, there is a massive confusion here between culture and language. All of the artists interviewed say they want to live in Germany. AMIGO even says that "... he very much wished he had been born in Berlin." All of them stress the fact that they enjoy in Germany "... a freedom their parents never had and that they can't imagine ever to have should they choose (or be forced) to go back to Turkey."
In other words, what defines culture here is freedom. And that's the culture these musicians care about. Only Germany offers it -- not Turkey. Language plays only a secondary role. In this sense there is no such thing as a "multicultural Germany." Germany's culture is the culture of freedom, and that freedom may be expressed in either language (which is exactly what these guys wish to exploit.)
- Kroes, Chapter 8: It Takes Two to Tango! The chapter begins with very interesting comments about mass, popular and vernacular culture, but I will discuss a different issue altogether. Throughout the chapter –and indeed, perhaps, throughout the book- it would seem that corporations are the "bad guys" that somehow force artists to sell their products in a determined way.
Thus, one reads here that "Jazz musicians and blues singers have been taken to the recording studios" (emphasis added.) Note the musicians' passivity! The studios are the only ones to act. Rap music itself, says Rob Kroes, "was picked up by the mass-culture industry, recorded, and distributed worldwide." Again, note the passivity of the musicians, and the active behavior of the studios.
This language, which emphasizes corporate activity and artistic passivity, is then contradicted by the assertion that "… the boys who were interviewed already had their dreams of recording studios and market success." So, is mass culture being "reappropiated", as Kroes suggests? I beg to disagree.
It takes two to tango. Artists sell their products willingly; corporate giants buy them in a free market transaction. The emphasis on corporations as know-it-all (and sometimes evil) manipulators hides the fact that artists are perfectly free to sell (or not) their creations.
Thus, corporations can easily be blamed for the "negative ring" associated with the notion of mass culture. From the free markets view that I tend to embrace, such a vision is highly biased. If popular culture is indeed "bad", it's also a matter of artists' personal responsibility.
Lecturer: R. Kroes
We watched the 1986 documentary Big Fun in the Big Town by Bram van Splunteren (on rap music in New York City.) Prof. Kroes discussed chapter 8 of his book and a paper on Turkish-German rap music (Heinz Ickstadt: "Appropiating Difference: Turkish-German Rap", Kennedy Institute for Northamerican Studies, FU-Berlin.) Here are my comments:
- Ickstadt: Two "Cultural Chairs"? Or Maybe Just One! As he sums up his discussion of German-Turkish rap-groups and performers, Ickstadt mentions the "new generation of hyphenated citizens" who know "at least two cultures." He says that these performers sit between "two cultural chairs": they do not feel Turkish, yet they do not feel completely accepted by German society.
In my opinion, there is a massive confusion here between culture and language. All of the artists interviewed say they want to live in Germany. AMIGO even says that "... he very much wished he had been born in Berlin." All of them stress the fact that they enjoy in Germany "... a freedom their parents never had and that they can't imagine ever to have should they choose (or be forced) to go back to Turkey."
In other words, what defines culture here is freedom. And that's the culture these musicians care about. Only Germany offers it -- not Turkey. Language plays only a secondary role. In this sense there is no such thing as a "multicultural Germany." Germany's culture is the culture of freedom, and that freedom may be expressed in either language (which is exactly what these guys wish to exploit.)
- Kroes, Chapter 8: It Takes Two to Tango! The chapter begins with very interesting comments about mass, popular and vernacular culture, but I will discuss a different issue altogether. Throughout the chapter –and indeed, perhaps, throughout the book- it would seem that corporations are the "bad guys" that somehow force artists to sell their products in a determined way.
Thus, one reads here that "Jazz musicians and blues singers have been taken to the recording studios" (emphasis added.) Note the musicians' passivity! The studios are the only ones to act. Rap music itself, says Rob Kroes, "was picked up by the mass-culture industry, recorded, and distributed worldwide." Again, note the passivity of the musicians, and the active behavior of the studios.
This language, which emphasizes corporate activity and artistic passivity, is then contradicted by the assertion that "… the boys who were interviewed already had their dreams of recording studios and market success." So, is mass culture being "reappropiated", as Kroes suggests? I beg to disagree.
It takes two to tango. Artists sell their products willingly; corporate giants buy them in a free market transaction. The emphasis on corporations as know-it-all (and sometimes evil) manipulators hides the fact that artists are perfectly free to sell (or not) their creations.
Thus, corporations can easily be blamed for the "negative ring" associated with the notion of mass culture. From the free markets view that I tend to embrace, such a vision is highly biased. If popular culture is indeed "bad", it's also a matter of artists' personal responsibility.
- US - EUROPEAN RELATIONS
Lecturer: Prof. dr. Ruud Janssens
Final Session: Discussion of future of transatlantic policies.
Prof. Janssens proposed a number of debate issues about the future of US-EU relations. What is the common ground between Europe and the United States? Why are so many European citizens upset about George W. Bush's "unilateralism"? Was Bush's choice of policy iniciatives logical?
A lively debate followed. I thought that Prof. Janssens' emphasis on "unilateralism" betrayed a Eurocentric view of the world. If the free world was the sum of Europe and the US (as it used to be), then breaking up the relationship would be tremendously costly indeed. But what if --and, admitedly, it's a big "if"-- the free world includes (before long) China, India, Russia and others?
In other words, in my view, Europe --while still hugely important-- is less relevant now than it was in the past. Then Prof. Janssens made some comments about the limits to military power, citing an article by Condoleeza Rice in Foreign Affairs in which she stated that military strength was the key indicator in terms of power.
But Prof. Janssens mentioned reports about a worsening food situation in Afghanistan as a proof that military solutions cannot do the trick by themselves (that situation, reportedly, has Bush talking about the need to get the Europeans more involved.) Then Janssens asked another interesting question: is Bush's "unilateralism" acting against the very idea of globalization that he is supposed to uphold?
About the course
Prof. Janssens then asked our opinions about the course itself. There were many interesting suggestions about the length of the presentations and about the choice of the topics to be discussed.
My comment: such concerns usually miss the big picture. And the big picture is a very positive one. It was only three months, and we covered a lot of ground. I'm pretty sure that we will remember these months as an incredibly rewarding experience, especially when we get back to the real life. Also, I told him that his course was a bit more disciplined than the others (especially Prof. Kroes.)
Acamedics and Politicians
Finally, Prof. Janssens closed the session with some comments about the interplay between academics and politicians. Policy makers, he said, usually do not take advice from academic types. They don't like to hear about historical backgrounds, analogies, etc.
Also, keep in mind that their goal is to be reelected and that means --among other things-- the attention of the press. Take, for example, the issue of the environment. Knowing how much the electorate cares about it, politicians are prepared to make costly decisions if they "smell" political dividends.
The recent upheaval in the CIA is another case in point. George W. Bush did not take its advice on the issue of WMD. Rather, to be seen by the world as the "toxic Texan" was thought to be a more attractive strategy in terms of the American electorate.
Lecturer: Prof. dr. Ruud Janssens
Final Session: Discussion of future of transatlantic policies.
Prof. Janssens proposed a number of debate issues about the future of US-EU relations. What is the common ground between Europe and the United States? Why are so many European citizens upset about George W. Bush's "unilateralism"? Was Bush's choice of policy iniciatives logical?
A lively debate followed. I thought that Prof. Janssens' emphasis on "unilateralism" betrayed a Eurocentric view of the world. If the free world was the sum of Europe and the US (as it used to be), then breaking up the relationship would be tremendously costly indeed. But what if --and, admitedly, it's a big "if"-- the free world includes (before long) China, India, Russia and others?
In other words, in my view, Europe --while still hugely important-- is less relevant now than it was in the past. Then Prof. Janssens made some comments about the limits to military power, citing an article by Condoleeza Rice in Foreign Affairs in which she stated that military strength was the key indicator in terms of power.
But Prof. Janssens mentioned reports about a worsening food situation in Afghanistan as a proof that military solutions cannot do the trick by themselves (that situation, reportedly, has Bush talking about the need to get the Europeans more involved.) Then Janssens asked another interesting question: is Bush's "unilateralism" acting against the very idea of globalization that he is supposed to uphold?
About the course
Prof. Janssens then asked our opinions about the course itself. There were many interesting suggestions about the length of the presentations and about the choice of the topics to be discussed.
My comment: such concerns usually miss the big picture. And the big picture is a very positive one. It was only three months, and we covered a lot of ground. I'm pretty sure that we will remember these months as an incredibly rewarding experience, especially when we get back to the real life. Also, I told him that his course was a bit more disciplined than the others (especially Prof. Kroes.)
Acamedics and Politicians
Finally, Prof. Janssens closed the session with some comments about the interplay between academics and politicians. Policy makers, he said, usually do not take advice from academic types. They don't like to hear about historical backgrounds, analogies, etc.
Also, keep in mind that their goal is to be reelected and that means --among other things-- the attention of the press. Take, for example, the issue of the environment. Knowing how much the electorate cares about it, politicians are prepared to make costly decisions if they "smell" political dividends.
The recent upheaval in the CIA is another case in point. George W. Bush did not take its advice on the issue of WMD. Rather, to be seen by the world as the "toxic Texan" was thought to be a more attractive strategy in terms of the American electorate.
Tuesday, November 23, 2004
- THE US AS A CULTURAL PRESENCE IN EUROPE
Lecturer: R. Kroes
Prof. Kroes discussed two pieces by Victoria de Grazia: "Mass Culture and Sovereignty: The American Challenge to European Cinemas, 1920-1960", Journal of Modern History, No. 61, March 1989, 53-87 and: "American Supermarkets - European Small Shops: Or how transnational capitalism crossed paths with the moral economy in 1960s Italy."
See more recent stuff by De Grazia here and here.
Lecturer: R. Kroes
Prof. Kroes discussed two pieces by Victoria de Grazia: "Mass Culture and Sovereignty: The American Challenge to European Cinemas, 1920-1960", Journal of Modern History, No. 61, March 1989, 53-87 and: "American Supermarkets - European Small Shops: Or how transnational capitalism crossed paths with the moral economy in 1960s Italy."
See more recent stuff by De Grazia here and here.
- US - EUROPEAN RELATIONS
Lecturer: Prof. dr. Ruud Janssens
War on Terror: Options. Presentation by Jeniffer, Theresa, Diederik & Agustin.
(This is a version of my own comments.)
I will present the current US administration's view on the war on terror in a way that (I hope) many among you will find surprising, and in a way that illustrates one possible outcome of the war -- at least according to some writers.
The US administration's view is based on two types of assumptions. First, there is a heavy reliance on analogies. This is both a risky and a (potentially) rewarding methodology. We can discuss the risks later on, but the rewards are pretty clear: with the help of analogies, we can put current events into a framework that will be familiar to anyone who reads history.
The second assumption is that we are --right here, right now-- at war. Some even talk about World War IV, World War III being the Cold War (1). This war is fought between islamo-fascists (or global jihad, or militant Islam), on the one hand, and primarily the West, on the other hand. And within the West, the United States and Israel are the No.1 targets. But countries such as Russia, Thailand, and even China are involved as well.
The use of analogies in war provides a surprising perspective on the following issues: the war in Iraq, unilateralism v. multilateralism, and regime change in the Middle East. Let me tackle first the crucial issue of uni- and multilateralism.
Winston's Early Unilateral Stance
Here's our first analogy. Imagine that we are in 1939; there is a staunch, a fierce unilateralist out there. His name is Winston Spencer Churchill. Winston's unilateral stance is based upon the need to check the growth of the Nazi war machine. But what are the multilateralists doing? They are busy plotting the destruction of Central Europe!
On the one hand, the British are making deals with Hitler (with the approval of the French) about the Sudetenland, Austria, Checoslovakia, etc. One the other hand, Stalin is making deals with Hitler about the rape of Poland. And if this wasn't enough, the French are making their own deals with the Japanese about some possessions in East Asia (2).
In other words, ladies and gentlemen: multilateralists can be the bad guys; unilateralists can be the good guys, as was amply demonstrated in 1939. This is a key idea for the current US administration (3). But how did the situation evolve? By 1943, Winston's early unilateralism had shifted, had mutated, had been transformed into a new multilateral consensus.
This time, however, the consensus was not based on the appeasement of totalitarian regimes, but on their utter destruction. The appeasement of totalitarian regimes is sometimes referred to as dysfunctional multilateralism by people close to the current administration (4).
The Current War on Terror
How does the current war on terror fit into this scheme? The key event here is Belsan, in early September 2004, when jihadists killed more than 300 Russian children. This will likely be seen in the future as the turning point in the war on terror. After Beslan, Russia decidedly embraced the Bush doctrine. Beslan was Russia's September 11; it might become the jihadists' Stalingrad (5).
A couple of days after Beslan, jihadists bombed the Australian embassy in Jakarta, killing 8 people. It was another colossal blunder. That week saw a flurry of diplomatic activity, with Pakistan announcing a security deal with Russia, and Australia offering to cooperate with ... Russia.
Now, Australia cooperates -in security matters- with America, which cooperates with Pakistan. In other words, we've come full circle! It doesn't make any sense to talk about a unilateral approach anymore. If we add the situation in Thailand (with its ongoing war in the south against Islamic militants) and the recent events in China (the state of emergency in a westward, mostly Muslim province), things could soon change in a dramatic way.
In fact, we may be about to witness -- not tomorrow, not next week, but perhaps in the next couple of months or years-- the birth of a new gigantic multilateral animal, much like the one that emerged in 1943. This, by the way, would fit nicely into Thomas Barnett's view on the war on terror.
Barnett, the author of The Pentagon's New Map, envisages a situation in which the US cooperates with Russia, China, Australia and with many other players to provide both security and economic development to the Middle East (6).
The War in Iraq
Let me finish my comments with some analogies that may help place the war in Iraq in a surprising context. What was the first country invaded by Franklin Delano Roosevelt after Pearl Harbor? It was Tunisia. The invasion of Tunisia was carried out against international law (7). And Tunisia had nothing to do with Pearl Harbor, or with Japan.
However, Roosevelt thought that the occupation of North Africa was very important from a strategic point of view, because it would ultimately weaken the position of totalitarian regimes in Italy, Germany and eventually Japan. A similar approach was taken with Iraq in 2003. By occupying Iraq --and by turning it into a successful, normal country-- the appeal of jihadists in the Middle East will be fatally weakened.
One more comment, this time about the issue of weapons of mass destruction. Here's another World War II analogy: in December 1945, a massive intelligence failure was uncovered in the US. As it turned out, Hitler was far from being in a position to produce the atomic bomb.
In early 1945, however, Roosevelt faced the following dilemma: should he bomb a quarter of Germany --killing thousands of innocent German citizens-- in order to avoid even a slight risk of letting a mad man play with an atomic bomb? Roosevelt's decision was: yes. And George W. Bush made a similar decision (8).
Finally, let me anticipate a question that will surely come up in the discussion. People tell me that a muscular approach to the war on terror creates more, not less, terrorists. My answer is: yes, probably so. But again, what happened in 1939-1940 when the first SS soldiers were being killed? Did that create more imitators throughout the Western world? Quite possibly. Was it wrong to target them anyway? I don't think so.
_________________
(1) Norman Podhoretz: "World War IV: How It Started, What It Means, And Why We Have to Win", Commentary, September 2004.
(2) See Paul-Marie de la Gorce. De Gaulle. Paris: Perrin, 1999.
(3) See Lawrence F. Kaplan & William Kristol. The War in Iraq. Saddam's Tyranny and America's Mission. San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2003.
(4) See John van Oudenaden: "What is Multilateral?", Policy Review, February 2003, and: "Unipolar Versus Unilateral", Policy Review, April 2004.
(5) Barbara Lerner: "Beslan changed Russia ... and the world", NationalReviewOnline, September 7, 2004.
(6) On October 14, 2004, presidents Putin of Russia and Hu Jintao of China issued a communiqué in Beijing in which they "declared each other's rebels -in Chechnya and in China's mostly Muslim region of Xinjang- to be part of international terrorism" ("Courtship in Beijing", Financial Times, October 15, 2004.)
(7) David Kopel: "The Torch of Freedom", NationalReviewOnline, October 7, 2004.
(8) See Mike Steinberger's interview with Robert Kagan ("The pros and neocons of the Iraq war", Financial Times, October 10, 2004). Kagan reiterates the view that "Saddam was deposed because of the weapons he was believed to possess and the danger he was thought to pose to other countries, not least the US." The argument about the spread of democracy in the Middle East is "an ex post facto rationalisation - a correct one, in my opinion."
Lecturer: Prof. dr. Ruud Janssens
War on Terror: Options. Presentation by Jeniffer, Theresa, Diederik & Agustin.
(This is a version of my own comments.)
I will present the current US administration's view on the war on terror in a way that (I hope) many among you will find surprising, and in a way that illustrates one possible outcome of the war -- at least according to some writers.
The US administration's view is based on two types of assumptions. First, there is a heavy reliance on analogies. This is both a risky and a (potentially) rewarding methodology. We can discuss the risks later on, but the rewards are pretty clear: with the help of analogies, we can put current events into a framework that will be familiar to anyone who reads history.
The second assumption is that we are --right here, right now-- at war. Some even talk about World War IV, World War III being the Cold War (1). This war is fought between islamo-fascists (or global jihad, or militant Islam), on the one hand, and primarily the West, on the other hand. And within the West, the United States and Israel are the No.1 targets. But countries such as Russia, Thailand, and even China are involved as well.
The use of analogies in war provides a surprising perspective on the following issues: the war in Iraq, unilateralism v. multilateralism, and regime change in the Middle East. Let me tackle first the crucial issue of uni- and multilateralism.
Winston's Early Unilateral Stance
Here's our first analogy. Imagine that we are in 1939; there is a staunch, a fierce unilateralist out there. His name is Winston Spencer Churchill. Winston's unilateral stance is based upon the need to check the growth of the Nazi war machine. But what are the multilateralists doing? They are busy plotting the destruction of Central Europe!
On the one hand, the British are making deals with Hitler (with the approval of the French) about the Sudetenland, Austria, Checoslovakia, etc. One the other hand, Stalin is making deals with Hitler about the rape of Poland. And if this wasn't enough, the French are making their own deals with the Japanese about some possessions in East Asia (2).
In other words, ladies and gentlemen: multilateralists can be the bad guys; unilateralists can be the good guys, as was amply demonstrated in 1939. This is a key idea for the current US administration (3). But how did the situation evolve? By 1943, Winston's early unilateralism had shifted, had mutated, had been transformed into a new multilateral consensus.
This time, however, the consensus was not based on the appeasement of totalitarian regimes, but on their utter destruction. The appeasement of totalitarian regimes is sometimes referred to as dysfunctional multilateralism by people close to the current administration (4).
The Current War on Terror
How does the current war on terror fit into this scheme? The key event here is Belsan, in early September 2004, when jihadists killed more than 300 Russian children. This will likely be seen in the future as the turning point in the war on terror. After Beslan, Russia decidedly embraced the Bush doctrine. Beslan was Russia's September 11; it might become the jihadists' Stalingrad (5).
A couple of days after Beslan, jihadists bombed the Australian embassy in Jakarta, killing 8 people. It was another colossal blunder. That week saw a flurry of diplomatic activity, with Pakistan announcing a security deal with Russia, and Australia offering to cooperate with ... Russia.
Now, Australia cooperates -in security matters- with America, which cooperates with Pakistan. In other words, we've come full circle! It doesn't make any sense to talk about a unilateral approach anymore. If we add the situation in Thailand (with its ongoing war in the south against Islamic militants) and the recent events in China (the state of emergency in a westward, mostly Muslim province), things could soon change in a dramatic way.
In fact, we may be about to witness -- not tomorrow, not next week, but perhaps in the next couple of months or years-- the birth of a new gigantic multilateral animal, much like the one that emerged in 1943. This, by the way, would fit nicely into Thomas Barnett's view on the war on terror.
Barnett, the author of The Pentagon's New Map, envisages a situation in which the US cooperates with Russia, China, Australia and with many other players to provide both security and economic development to the Middle East (6).
The War in Iraq
Let me finish my comments with some analogies that may help place the war in Iraq in a surprising context. What was the first country invaded by Franklin Delano Roosevelt after Pearl Harbor? It was Tunisia. The invasion of Tunisia was carried out against international law (7). And Tunisia had nothing to do with Pearl Harbor, or with Japan.
However, Roosevelt thought that the occupation of North Africa was very important from a strategic point of view, because it would ultimately weaken the position of totalitarian regimes in Italy, Germany and eventually Japan. A similar approach was taken with Iraq in 2003. By occupying Iraq --and by turning it into a successful, normal country-- the appeal of jihadists in the Middle East will be fatally weakened.
One more comment, this time about the issue of weapons of mass destruction. Here's another World War II analogy: in December 1945, a massive intelligence failure was uncovered in the US. As it turned out, Hitler was far from being in a position to produce the atomic bomb.
In early 1945, however, Roosevelt faced the following dilemma: should he bomb a quarter of Germany --killing thousands of innocent German citizens-- in order to avoid even a slight risk of letting a mad man play with an atomic bomb? Roosevelt's decision was: yes. And George W. Bush made a similar decision (8).
Finally, let me anticipate a question that will surely come up in the discussion. People tell me that a muscular approach to the war on terror creates more, not less, terrorists. My answer is: yes, probably so. But again, what happened in 1939-1940 when the first SS soldiers were being killed? Did that create more imitators throughout the Western world? Quite possibly. Was it wrong to target them anyway? I don't think so.
_________________
(1) Norman Podhoretz: "World War IV: How It Started, What It Means, And Why We Have to Win", Commentary, September 2004.
(2) See Paul-Marie de la Gorce. De Gaulle. Paris: Perrin, 1999.
(3) See Lawrence F. Kaplan & William Kristol. The War in Iraq. Saddam's Tyranny and America's Mission. San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2003.
(4) See John van Oudenaden: "What is Multilateral?", Policy Review, February 2003, and: "Unipolar Versus Unilateral", Policy Review, April 2004.
(5) Barbara Lerner: "Beslan changed Russia ... and the world", NationalReviewOnline, September 7, 2004.
(6) On October 14, 2004, presidents Putin of Russia and Hu Jintao of China issued a communiqué in Beijing in which they "declared each other's rebels -in Chechnya and in China's mostly Muslim region of Xinjang- to be part of international terrorism" ("Courtship in Beijing", Financial Times, October 15, 2004.)
(7) David Kopel: "The Torch of Freedom", NationalReviewOnline, October 7, 2004.
(8) See Mike Steinberger's interview with Robert Kagan ("The pros and neocons of the Iraq war", Financial Times, October 10, 2004). Kagan reiterates the view that "Saddam was deposed because of the weapons he was believed to possess and the danger he was thought to pose to other countries, not least the US." The argument about the spread of democracy in the Middle East is "an ex post facto rationalisation - a correct one, in my opinion."
Monday, November 22, 2004
- MAJOR ISSUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY
Lecturer: E.F van de Bilt
John Lewis Gaddis: The Long Peace. Inquiries into the History of the Cold War. New York: 1987.
Reviewed by Koos, Otto & João.
See some interesting material here (on the Bush administration's "Grand Strategy"), here (CNN interview on the Cold War) and here (chapter 1 of his book We Now Know. Rethinking the Cold War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
Lecturer: E.F van de Bilt
John Lewis Gaddis: The Long Peace. Inquiries into the History of the Cold War. New York: 1987.
Reviewed by Koos, Otto & João.
See some interesting material here (on the Bush administration's "Grand Strategy"), here (CNN interview on the Cold War) and here (chapter 1 of his book We Now Know. Rethinking the Cold War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
Sunday, November 21, 2004
- Rhonda: "I'll Be Back Some Day!" Rhonda, who has lived in Ireland, sends this very interesting piece: "Ireland named best country to live in", Economist Survey (MSNBC, Nov. 19, 2004).
LONDON - Ireland is the best country to live in with Switzerland in second spot, according to a sweeping study of 111 nations aimed at comparing happiness around the world. The survey, produced by the Economist Intelligence Unit and released on Wednesday, showed the quality of life in Ireland well ahead of the United States, which was ranked 13th, and neighboring Britain, which came in at 29th place.
Assuming that wealth is not a finite measure of human satisfaction, the survey is based on complex equations that give precedence to matters of health, well-being, political stability and security. Climate, job security, political freedom, gender equality, and "freedom, family, and community life" are also taken into account.
On a scale of one to 10, Ireland achieved 8.33 points, with Switzerland coming in at 8.07. While the United States had the second-highest GDP after tiny Luxembourg, relatively small European countries, Sweden, Italy, Denmark, and Spain, placed higher, all appearing within the top 10.
Meantime, larger European Union members France and Germany, took 25th and 26th places respectively. The United Kingdom ranked the lowest out of the EU members, primarily due to the deterioration of traditional social and family values.
Ireland not only rated high on social cohesion, but beat the United Kingdom on GDP per person. Average yearly income is now $36,790 in Ireland, versus $31,150 in Britain. For a country that was losing much of its population right up to the early 1990s as emigrants searched for work abroad, the lifestyle victory shows how far Ireland has come since joining the European Union.
Ireland wins because it successfully combines the most desirable elements of the new (the fourth highest gross domestic product per head in the world in 2005, low unemployment, political liberties) with the preservation of certain cozy elements of the old, such as stable family and community life,” the Economist survey revealed.
In the second-division, South Korea ranked just below the United Kingdom, at 30th place. And politically and economically insecure Zimbabwe came in last with in 3.89 points. The survey, which will be published in The World in 2005, has been conducted annually for 17 years.
LONDON - Ireland is the best country to live in with Switzerland in second spot, according to a sweeping study of 111 nations aimed at comparing happiness around the world. The survey, produced by the Economist Intelligence Unit and released on Wednesday, showed the quality of life in Ireland well ahead of the United States, which was ranked 13th, and neighboring Britain, which came in at 29th place.
Assuming that wealth is not a finite measure of human satisfaction, the survey is based on complex equations that give precedence to matters of health, well-being, political stability and security. Climate, job security, political freedom, gender equality, and "freedom, family, and community life" are also taken into account.
On a scale of one to 10, Ireland achieved 8.33 points, with Switzerland coming in at 8.07. While the United States had the second-highest GDP after tiny Luxembourg, relatively small European countries, Sweden, Italy, Denmark, and Spain, placed higher, all appearing within the top 10.
Meantime, larger European Union members France and Germany, took 25th and 26th places respectively. The United Kingdom ranked the lowest out of the EU members, primarily due to the deterioration of traditional social and family values.
Ireland not only rated high on social cohesion, but beat the United Kingdom on GDP per person. Average yearly income is now $36,790 in Ireland, versus $31,150 in Britain. For a country that was losing much of its population right up to the early 1990s as emigrants searched for work abroad, the lifestyle victory shows how far Ireland has come since joining the European Union.
Ireland wins because it successfully combines the most desirable elements of the new (the fourth highest gross domestic product per head in the world in 2005, low unemployment, political liberties) with the preservation of certain cozy elements of the old, such as stable family and community life,” the Economist survey revealed.
In the second-division, South Korea ranked just below the United Kingdom, at 30th place. And politically and economically insecure Zimbabwe came in last with in 3.89 points. The survey, which will be published in The World in 2005, has been conducted annually for 17 years.
Friday, November 19, 2004
- THE US AS A CULTURAL PRESENCE IN EUROPE
Lecturer: R. Kroes
We watched a long interview with Quentin Tarantino, where he discusses (among many other things), the movie Breathless. By the way, I just found this Tarantino interview where he briefly discusses ... A bout de souffle!
Prof. Kroes asked how many of us had preferred Breathless over A bout de souffle. This is my count: Jaime, William, Gejo and myself. I made a comment on the issue of the different audiences targeted by Godard in 1960 and McBride in 1982 (see below.) Then an interesting discussion followed about the "intellectual" character of some European movies and theater pieces -- with a reference to Bertold Brecht.
Lecturer: R. Kroes
We watched a long interview with Quentin Tarantino, where he discusses (among many other things), the movie Breathless. By the way, I just found this Tarantino interview where he briefly discusses ... A bout de souffle!
Prof. Kroes asked how many of us had preferred Breathless over A bout de souffle. This is my count: Jaime, William, Gejo and myself. I made a comment on the issue of the different audiences targeted by Godard in 1960 and McBride in 1982 (see below.) Then an interesting discussion followed about the "intellectual" character of some European movies and theater pieces -- with a reference to Bertold Brecht.
- THE US AS A CULTURAL PRESENCE IN EUROPE
Lecturer: R. Kroes
(These are my comments on A Bout de Souffle and Breathless.)
. A Different Kind of Audience. As a critic said, A bout de souffle is a movie mostly for "cine-snobs" like Jean-Luc Godard himself. The movie is full of "film bluff" references. Godard does not care at all for a mass audience. This was, by the way, the impression of a young Rob Kroes as we watched it for the first time in the 1960s! (1). Indeed, as another critic has pointed out, "Godard has essentially tried to please only himself, and hang what anybody else thinks." (2)
On the other hand, McBride's target in Breathless is clearly the mass audience. Richard Gere in 1982 is at the peak of his popularity, having acted in American Gigolo two years before. This stands in sharp contrast with Belmondo, who was still a relatively unknown figure in 1960 -- but also with Jean Seberg, whose carrier was in trouble:
Seberg burst on the movie scene in 1957, when, at the age of 17, she beat out 3000 contenders for the title role in Otto Preminger's epic biopic, Joan of Arc. The movie was, to put it mildly, a disappointment, due in large part to Seberg's horrible miscasting. Her career was almost over at the beginning, but Preminger used her in his next film, Bonjour Tristesse, an examination of a daughter's obsessive love for her father (David Niven). Few people saw the movie, but among those who did was Jean Luc Godard, who instantly wanted Seberg for 1959's Breathless. Suddenly, she was a celebrated actress. (3)
So, while both Belmondo and Seberg's careers took off after A bout de souffle, Richard Gere was already a well-known figure. From the beginning, McBride's target was the mass audience.
Note also that much of the 1960 film's vigor comes from collisions between popular and high culture: Godard shows us pinups and portraits of women by Picasso and Renoir, and the soundtrack includes both Mozart's clarinet concerto and snippets of French pop radio. There are no ambitions of this sort in Breathless, which, according to a critic is
… neither straight remake nor looser homage to Godard's A Bout de Souffle; better by far to just enjoy it on its own terms when it turns out at least three parts better than anyone predicted. Breathless is not good enough to cut it as a worthy US version of the original but, seen as a film it it's own right, it makes a lot more sense and it is entertaining to watch. It is not a polarising moment in cinema history but, if you can forget the film's origins and hope only for an entertaining movie, it will not let you down. (2)
_________________
(1) Comment by Rob Kroes in class, November 2004.
(2) These references are mostly taken from reviews of A bout de souffle and Breathless that I have gathered from searches on Google.
(3) From the Journals of Jean Seberg (A Review by James Bernardinelli).
Lecturer: R. Kroes
(These are my comments on A Bout de Souffle and Breathless.)
. A Different Kind of Audience. As a critic said, A bout de souffle is a movie mostly for "cine-snobs" like Jean-Luc Godard himself. The movie is full of "film bluff" references. Godard does not care at all for a mass audience. This was, by the way, the impression of a young Rob Kroes as we watched it for the first time in the 1960s! (1). Indeed, as another critic has pointed out, "Godard has essentially tried to please only himself, and hang what anybody else thinks." (2)
On the other hand, McBride's target in Breathless is clearly the mass audience. Richard Gere in 1982 is at the peak of his popularity, having acted in American Gigolo two years before. This stands in sharp contrast with Belmondo, who was still a relatively unknown figure in 1960 -- but also with Jean Seberg, whose carrier was in trouble:
Seberg burst on the movie scene in 1957, when, at the age of 17, she beat out 3000 contenders for the title role in Otto Preminger's epic biopic, Joan of Arc. The movie was, to put it mildly, a disappointment, due in large part to Seberg's horrible miscasting. Her career was almost over at the beginning, but Preminger used her in his next film, Bonjour Tristesse, an examination of a daughter's obsessive love for her father (David Niven). Few people saw the movie, but among those who did was Jean Luc Godard, who instantly wanted Seberg for 1959's Breathless. Suddenly, she was a celebrated actress. (3)
So, while both Belmondo and Seberg's careers took off after A bout de souffle, Richard Gere was already a well-known figure. From the beginning, McBride's target was the mass audience.
Note also that much of the 1960 film's vigor comes from collisions between popular and high culture: Godard shows us pinups and portraits of women by Picasso and Renoir, and the soundtrack includes both Mozart's clarinet concerto and snippets of French pop radio. There are no ambitions of this sort in Breathless, which, according to a critic is
… neither straight remake nor looser homage to Godard's A Bout de Souffle; better by far to just enjoy it on its own terms when it turns out at least three parts better than anyone predicted. Breathless is not good enough to cut it as a worthy US version of the original but, seen as a film it it's own right, it makes a lot more sense and it is entertaining to watch. It is not a polarising moment in cinema history but, if you can forget the film's origins and hope only for an entertaining movie, it will not let you down. (2)
_________________
(1) Comment by Rob Kroes in class, November 2004.
(2) These references are mostly taken from reviews of A bout de souffle and Breathless that I have gathered from searches on Google.
(3) From the Journals of Jean Seberg (A Review by James Bernardinelli).
- Gejo Recommends A Site For Film Reviews. Gejo recommends Roger Elbert's website for film reviews. You can read a review of Breathless here.
(I'll soon post more material on recent classes.)
(I'll soon post more material on recent classes.)
Thursday, November 18, 2004
- US - EUROPEAN RELATIONS
Lecturer: Prof. dr. Ruud Janssens
Development Aid & Aids. Presentation by Wiebke, Ieva & Tim.
Lecturer: Prof. dr. Ruud Janssens
Development Aid & Aids. Presentation by Wiebke, Ieva & Tim.
Tuesday, November 16, 2004
- US - EUROPEAN RELATIONS
Lecturer: Prof. dr. Ruud Janssens
Environment, Post-Kyoto. Presentation by Yang Yi Qin, Zhang Li, Bernadette, Sabrina, Rie & João.
Lecturer: Prof. dr. Ruud Janssens
Environment, Post-Kyoto. Presentation by Yang Yi Qin, Zhang Li, Bernadette, Sabrina, Rie & João.
Monday, November 15, 2004
- MA Thesis: An E-Mail From Prof. Janssens. "Dear MA-students: we would like to discuss the proposals for the MA thesis with you. We are going to do this with the whole group. The idea is that not only the professors will make suggestions on how to do research and how to write, but that it is also very helpful to get suggestions from your fellow students.
"On top of that, it will help all students to think in terms of setting up research and writing reports, an activity you will no doubt be doing a lot in your life after the UvA. We will talk for 20 minutes about each research proposal. Each student will present her/his topic in five minutes, and then we will discuss topic and approach.
"In the opening statement of five minutes you need to tell us what the topic is, why it is interesting, and what kind of research material you are going to use for your writing. The meetings are on Friday morning, from 10 to 12 hours. There are no other classes for the MA group scheduled at that time.
"Best wishes,
Ruud Janssens.
Prof. dr. R.V.A. Janssens. Amerikanistiek, Afdeling Geschiedenis, Archeologie en Regiostudies, Universiteit van Amsterdam."
"On top of that, it will help all students to think in terms of setting up research and writing reports, an activity you will no doubt be doing a lot in your life after the UvA. We will talk for 20 minutes about each research proposal. Each student will present her/his topic in five minutes, and then we will discuss topic and approach.
"In the opening statement of five minutes you need to tell us what the topic is, why it is interesting, and what kind of research material you are going to use for your writing. The meetings are on Friday morning, from 10 to 12 hours. There are no other classes for the MA group scheduled at that time.
"Best wishes,
Ruud Janssens.
Prof. dr. R.V.A. Janssens. Amerikanistiek, Afdeling Geschiedenis, Archeologie en Regiostudies, Universiteit van Amsterdam."
Friday, November 12, 2004
- US - European Relations: Thomas Barnett's View. The author of The Pentagon's New Map (readings for September 4) reviews an article by Jeremy Rifkin on Europe: "America, Wake Up to the European Dream", Washington Post, October 31. Very interesting.
- THE US AS A CULTURAL PRESENCE IN EUROPE
Lecturer: R. Kroes
A Bout de Souffle. We watched the French movie A bout de souffle (1960), directed by Jean-Luc Godard, with Jean-Paul Belmondo and Jean Seberg. See a review from the Edimburgh University Film Society.
Lecturer: R. Kroes
A Bout de Souffle. We watched the French movie A bout de souffle (1960), directed by Jean-Luc Godard, with Jean-Paul Belmondo and Jean Seberg. See a review from the Edimburgh University Film Society.
- The End of "Multiculturalism" in the Netherlands? That's the view of an American neo-conservative writer in "The Killers - The Dutch hit crisis point" (National Review Online, November 11.) Warning: this is strong stuff indeed!
Thursday, November 11, 2004
- US - EUROPEAN RELATIONS
Lecturer: Prof. dr. Ruud Janssens
Military Relations: NATO and Peace Enforcement. Presentation by Diana, Sjoed & Maarten
Interesting presentation today; I'll post it sometime this evening. Meanwhile, here are some comments by Prof. Janssens:
. Assymetric Warfare. How are conventional armed forces supposed to deal with urban guerrillas? As we are seeing right now in Fallujah, urban warfare makes it more difficult to use the enormous advantage of technology, on which Americans heavily rely (for a different opinion, see Ralph Kenney Bennet: "Technique and Technology in Fallujah", TechCentralStation .)
Assymetric warfare means that the enemy has the initiative, because he can pick his own fights. Thus, Fallujah itself does not mean much to "insurgents"; they will move out ant try to kill Americans elsewhere.
. NATO as a Political Organization. One should not lose sight of the fact that NATO is a political organization. It is run by ambassadors, not by generals. This is very important to the United States, because it gives them some leverage in discussions about the integration of East European countries.
. The Perception of Threats. Europeans and Americans have very different opinions on this issue. When dealing with problems in poor parts of the world (especially Eastern Europe and the Balkans, and the countries of North Africa), Europeans tend to think more in terms of social problems, globalization, trade, etc. They favor diplomatic solutions.
This stands in sharp contrast with the United States, who tend to rely more on military solutions (this is especially the case in the Bush administration -- although the difference in perceptions predates 9/11.)
Lecturer: Prof. dr. Ruud Janssens
Military Relations: NATO and Peace Enforcement. Presentation by Diana, Sjoed & Maarten
Interesting presentation today; I'll post it sometime this evening. Meanwhile, here are some comments by Prof. Janssens:
. Assymetric Warfare. How are conventional armed forces supposed to deal with urban guerrillas? As we are seeing right now in Fallujah, urban warfare makes it more difficult to use the enormous advantage of technology, on which Americans heavily rely (for a different opinion, see Ralph Kenney Bennet: "Technique and Technology in Fallujah", TechCentralStation .)
Assymetric warfare means that the enemy has the initiative, because he can pick his own fights. Thus, Fallujah itself does not mean much to "insurgents"; they will move out ant try to kill Americans elsewhere.
. NATO as a Political Organization. One should not lose sight of the fact that NATO is a political organization. It is run by ambassadors, not by generals. This is very important to the United States, because it gives them some leverage in discussions about the integration of East European countries.
. The Perception of Threats. Europeans and Americans have very different opinions on this issue. When dealing with problems in poor parts of the world (especially Eastern Europe and the Balkans, and the countries of North Africa), Europeans tend to think more in terms of social problems, globalization, trade, etc. They favor diplomatic solutions.
This stands in sharp contrast with the United States, who tend to rely more on military solutions (this is especially the case in the Bush administration -- although the difference in perceptions predates 9/11.)
Tuesday, November 09, 2004
- US - EUROPEAN RELATIONS
Lecturer: Prof. dr. Ruud Janssens
Political Relations: UN and Bilateral Relations. Presentation by Rhonda, Liang Xin & Carlein.
The League of Nations. Why did it fail?
1. lack of US participation
2. veto power of League members when themselves involved in conflict
3. idealism was too high
The United Nations: The creation
. Dubarton Oaks
. Yalta Conference
. San Francisco
The United Nations Charter
. Leadership for peace and security duties rests upon a small segment of the international community, primarily the great powers.
. Is the UN Charter set up for: peace keeping or peace establishment?
. Chapter 7 is entitled “Action with respect to:
- threats to the peace
- breaches of the peace
- and acts of agression
The United Nations System
. Trusteeship Council
. Security Council
. General Assembly
. Economic and Social Council
. International Court of Justice
. Secretariat
Opening of the Fifty-Ninth Session of the General Assembly, September 2004
. UN needs to find ways to respond to global challenges like:
- Infringements in the rules of law
- Conflicts
- HIV/AIDS
- Environmental issues
. For that the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) must work in harmony and fulfil their prerogatives under the Charter (General Assembly President Mr. Jean Ping)
- Liang Xin: Weakness & Willingness -- UN after the Cold War
Introduction
. There is strong evidence that shows how the operations of UN functions much weaker and weaker, going on the edge of its operation.
. For an instance, we can easily find how it malfunctions from Persian Gulf War to Kosovo War, then to the recent Iraq War in 2003, and how it is manipulated by the US unilateral policy.
. Peace is the United Nation's number one objective. Peacekeeping is an essential tool for the United Nations in its efforts to uphold international peace and security.
. Unfortunately, the Security Council, the most important UN body, was blocked for the duration of the Cold War. But then the huge political changes that took place between 1989 and 1990 seemed to usher in a period of new opportunity for the UN.
. Indeed, it is from this time that the "Agenda for Peace", one of the most important peace strategies of our time arises.
. However, the number, complexity and scope of peacekeeping operations expanded enormously, placing massive demands on the UN system with which it struggled to cope.
. During the post-cold war era, many missions ran into severe difficulties, such as the collapse of the UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia in1993 and the famous peacekeeping disaster of Rwanda.
. Problems with UN peacekeeping operations were particular seen as salient.
Body
1. Brief generalization of how inefficient UN operated through two wars
a. The Persian Gulf War---UN as an instrument of U.S government
b. The Kosovo War------U.S-led NATO’s intervention in Kosovo before the authorization of UN Security Council
2. Focus on the Iraq War and U.S unilateralism
a. Failure to prevent and stop, challenged by U.S unilateralism
b. Iraqis resistant misunderstanding and hostility toward UN
c. UN---corrupt bureaucracy
d. The anomalous situation of Security Council
e. Difficulties UN reform faces
Conclusion
. As all the facts and analysis I have stated above, UN is based on the assumption that all members are of equal stature and have equal interests, aspirations and preoccupa-tions. That is a myth.
. Now, U.S is the only superpower in the world. There is no balance of power between great powers. Unless balance of power is restored, UN can have a better future. Like most critics see, UN is nothing but the sum total of members and thus cannot be blamed as much.
- Carlein: Individual Countries and the UN, US, EU, Russia, UK, France Official Positions and Internal Challenges
. Scenario 1: The Future of the UN
- US leaves (officially or in practise) the UN; the UN then becomes as irrelevant as the League of Nations once was
- Nothing changes: long live the status quo
- UN reforms and becomes stronger than before
. Scenario 2: Reform of the Security Council
- It becomes irrelevant: the General Assembly gets all the power
- nothing changes: long live the status quo
- abolish the veto power (alternatives)
- add countries with veto powers
. Question 1:
- The character of the UN - revision needed?
- For example reform of the agenda for peace needed or should the UN solely function as a humanitarian and cultural institution?
. Question 2:
- The toothless tiger: the future of UN sanctions and do they show the real weakness of the UN?
. Question 3:
- Are the advantages of the UN more important than the disadvantages?
- Should this mean that the status quo is more important and successful than any future reform in the UN?
. Question 4:
- The future of transatlantic relations, will they worsen if the current situation (and without reform in the UN) does not change?
- Should NATO become more relevant / important than UN, should NATO (with more effective measurements than UN) be incorporated in the UN?
. Question 5:
- What happens if the US breaks away from UN?
. Question 6 (or scenario?):
- The UN works best as it works today
- Change is too difficult and creates more problems then there are now
- There should always be reform because the world doesn't stop from changing either
- It will work as long as all countries put their own ego aside and work again for the better good of the common world.
Lecturer: Prof. dr. Ruud Janssens
Political Relations: UN and Bilateral Relations. Presentation by Rhonda, Liang Xin & Carlein.
- Rhonda: History and Structure of the United Nations
. Institutions leading up to the United Nations
1. Peace of Westphalia (1648)
2. Congress of Vienna (1815)
3. Concert of Europe (1830-1884)
4. League of Nations (1914-1946)
. Quotation: "prevention of mutual destruction which will be fatal to Christian civilization"; "creation of an international constitution"; "promote prosperous trade and continued peace" (Lord Robert Cecil, quoting his father 40 years prior to his receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in 1938)
. Quotation: "It would be a master-stroke if those great powers bent on peace, would form a league of peace, not only to keep the peace among themselves, but to prevent, by force if necessary, its being broken by others." (Theodore Roosevelt in 1910)The League of Nations. Why did it fail?
1. lack of US participation
2. veto power of League members when themselves involved in conflict
3. idealism was too high
The United Nations: The creation
. Dubarton Oaks
. Yalta Conference
. San Francisco
The United Nations Charter
. Leadership for peace and security duties rests upon a small segment of the international community, primarily the great powers.
. Is the UN Charter set up for: peace keeping or peace establishment?
. Chapter 7 is entitled “Action with respect to:
- threats to the peace
- breaches of the peace
- and acts of agression
The United Nations System
. Trusteeship Council
. Security Council
. General Assembly
. Economic and Social Council
. International Court of Justice
. Secretariat
Opening of the Fifty-Ninth Session of the General Assembly, September 2004
. UN needs to find ways to respond to global challenges like:
- Infringements in the rules of law
- Conflicts
- HIV/AIDS
- Environmental issues
. For that the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) must work in harmony and fulfil their prerogatives under the Charter (General Assembly President Mr. Jean Ping)
- Liang Xin: Weakness & Willingness -- UN after the Cold War
Introduction
. There is strong evidence that shows how the operations of UN functions much weaker and weaker, going on the edge of its operation.
. For an instance, we can easily find how it malfunctions from Persian Gulf War to Kosovo War, then to the recent Iraq War in 2003, and how it is manipulated by the US unilateral policy.
. Peace is the United Nation's number one objective. Peacekeeping is an essential tool for the United Nations in its efforts to uphold international peace and security.
. Unfortunately, the Security Council, the most important UN body, was blocked for the duration of the Cold War. But then the huge political changes that took place between 1989 and 1990 seemed to usher in a period of new opportunity for the UN.
. Indeed, it is from this time that the "Agenda for Peace", one of the most important peace strategies of our time arises.
. However, the number, complexity and scope of peacekeeping operations expanded enormously, placing massive demands on the UN system with which it struggled to cope.
. During the post-cold war era, many missions ran into severe difficulties, such as the collapse of the UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia in1993 and the famous peacekeeping disaster of Rwanda.
. Problems with UN peacekeeping operations were particular seen as salient.
Body
1. Brief generalization of how inefficient UN operated through two wars
a. The Persian Gulf War---UN as an instrument of U.S government
b. The Kosovo War------U.S-led NATO’s intervention in Kosovo before the authorization of UN Security Council
2. Focus on the Iraq War and U.S unilateralism
a. Failure to prevent and stop, challenged by U.S unilateralism
b. Iraqis resistant misunderstanding and hostility toward UN
c. UN---corrupt bureaucracy
d. The anomalous situation of Security Council
e. Difficulties UN reform faces
Conclusion
. As all the facts and analysis I have stated above, UN is based on the assumption that all members are of equal stature and have equal interests, aspirations and preoccupa-tions. That is a myth.
. Now, U.S is the only superpower in the world. There is no balance of power between great powers. Unless balance of power is restored, UN can have a better future. Like most critics see, UN is nothing but the sum total of members and thus cannot be blamed as much.
- Carlein: Individual Countries and the UN, US, EU, Russia, UK, France Official Positions and Internal Challenges
. Scenario 1: The Future of the UN
- US leaves (officially or in practise) the UN; the UN then becomes as irrelevant as the League of Nations once was
- Nothing changes: long live the status quo
- UN reforms and becomes stronger than before
. Scenario 2: Reform of the Security Council
- It becomes irrelevant: the General Assembly gets all the power
- nothing changes: long live the status quo
- abolish the veto power (alternatives)
- add countries with veto powers
. Question 1:
- The character of the UN - revision needed?
- For example reform of the agenda for peace needed or should the UN solely function as a humanitarian and cultural institution?
. Question 2:
- The toothless tiger: the future of UN sanctions and do they show the real weakness of the UN?
. Question 3:
- Are the advantages of the UN more important than the disadvantages?
- Should this mean that the status quo is more important and successful than any future reform in the UN?
. Question 4:
- The future of transatlantic relations, will they worsen if the current situation (and without reform in the UN) does not change?
- Should NATO become more relevant / important than UN, should NATO (with more effective measurements than UN) be incorporated in the UN?
. Question 5:
- What happens if the US breaks away from UN?
. Question 6 (or scenario?):
- The UN works best as it works today
- Change is too difficult and creates more problems then there are now
- There should always be reform because the world doesn't stop from changing either
- It will work as long as all countries put their own ego aside and work again for the better good of the common world.
- US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS
Lecturer: Prof. dr. Ruud Janssens
Political Relations: UN and Bilateral Relations. Presentation by Rhonda, Liang Xin & Carlein.
Very good presentation today (I'll post it shortly.) Rhonda exuded tranquility as she discussed the history and the functioning of the UN. Liang Xin did a great job at describing the inherent weaknesses of the institution, and Carlein made some useful and interesting remarks about the problem of sovereignty and -last but not least- about the role of the UN (or lack thereof) in the war on terror.
Comments by Prof. Janssens. The Original Mission of the UN. If we take into account its original mission (to prevent a new world war), then the UN has been rather successful. As a matter of fact, most conflicts have been internal conflicts -- "ethnic cleansing", revolutions, etc.-- about which the UN was not meant to interfere.
Intervention & the UN Dilemma. After Somalia and Rwanda, the UN dilemma can be stated like this: if it does intervene, it risks a Somalia-style fiasco; but if it does not, then the risk is a new Rwanda. Not an easy one!
The Role of the People's Republic of China. Although a member of the UN Security Council, the People's Republic of China does not seem willing to actively participate in UN-led initiatives. It often uses its veto power and it does not contribute to peace-keeping operations. This is bad news for the UN, because it depends on the participation of its members.
Lecturer: Prof. dr. Ruud Janssens
Political Relations: UN and Bilateral Relations. Presentation by Rhonda, Liang Xin & Carlein.
Very good presentation today (I'll post it shortly.) Rhonda exuded tranquility as she discussed the history and the functioning of the UN. Liang Xin did a great job at describing the inherent weaknesses of the institution, and Carlein made some useful and interesting remarks about the problem of sovereignty and -last but not least- about the role of the UN (or lack thereof) in the war on terror.
Comments by Prof. Janssens. The Original Mission of the UN. If we take into account its original mission (to prevent a new world war), then the UN has been rather successful. As a matter of fact, most conflicts have been internal conflicts -- "ethnic cleansing", revolutions, etc.-- about which the UN was not meant to interfere.
Intervention & the UN Dilemma. After Somalia and Rwanda, the UN dilemma can be stated like this: if it does intervene, it risks a Somalia-style fiasco; but if it does not, then the risk is a new Rwanda. Not an easy one!
The Role of the People's Republic of China. Although a member of the UN Security Council, the People's Republic of China does not seem willing to actively participate in UN-led initiatives. It often uses its veto power and it does not contribute to peace-keeping operations. This is bad news for the UN, because it depends on the participation of its members.
Monday, November 08, 2004
- MAJOR ISSUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY
Lecturer: E.F van de Bilt
Stanley Elkins. Slavery. A Problem in American Institutional Life and Intellectual Life. (Third edition revised, University of Chicago Press, 1976).
Reviewed by Jeniffer, Martijn and Gejo.
(See an excerpt of the book here and a comment here.)
Lecturer: E.F van de Bilt
Stanley Elkins. Slavery. A Problem in American Institutional Life and Intellectual Life. (Third edition revised, University of Chicago Press, 1976).
Reviewed by Jeniffer, Martijn and Gejo.
(See an excerpt of the book here and a comment here.)
Thursday, November 04, 2004
- US - EUROPEAN RELATIONS
Lecturer: Prof. dr. Ruud Janssens
Economic Relations: WTO and Subsidies. Presentation by Jaime, William, Ivo, Jeroen & Otto. I admit I was a bit lazy this morning -- I didn't take notes! (I only made a brief comment: developing countries are too often seen as "victims" of free trade, when in reality they are all very badly run, with high levels of corruption, no judicial independence, and bad economic policies. Prof. Janssens agreed.)
Lecturer: Prof. dr. Ruud Janssens
Economic Relations: WTO and Subsidies. Presentation by Jaime, William, Ivo, Jeroen & Otto. I admit I was a bit lazy this morning -- I didn't take notes! (I only made a brief comment: developing countries are too often seen as "victims" of free trade, when in reality they are all very badly run, with high levels of corruption, no judicial independence, and bad economic policies. Prof. Janssens agreed.)
Tuesday, November 02, 2004
- US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS
Lecturer: Prof. dr. Ruud Janssens
National Interests: US, EU, European nations. Text of Gejo's Presentation: "Germany and the European Union"
- Main source: Christian Hacke, Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Von Konrad Adenauer bis Gerhard Schöder. Berlin: Ullstein, 2003.
. History: 1945 - 1990. German foreign minister Joschka Fischer noted two "historic decisions" that made the new Europe possible: The US's decision to stay in Europe and France's and Germany's commitment to the principle of integration, beginning with economic links.
(Source: "Power and Weakness" by Robert Kagan, Policy Review, June 2002.)
. History: 1990-2004. Germany has 82 million inhabitants, of whom 8 million are foreigners. In total there are two million people from Turkey (a new major candidate for the European Union).
Almost 9% of the German workforce is jobless (over 4 million people). The United Nations calculated that if it wants to keep the retiring system working, Germany should let in 200,000 to 300,000 immigrants every year.
Furthermore, there is a lack of computer- and software specialists, which means that even though there is are a lots of unemployed people, still several hundred thousand of jobs cannot be filled.
The complete debt burden of the German state, including debts from the 16 federal states and cities, currently amounts to more than 1200 billion Euro. This costs every year 40 billion Euro in interest and amortization, which is 25 % of the estimate.
(Source: Michèle de Waard: Duitsland achter de schermen: het wonder van de Berlijnse Republiek. Amsterdam: Prometheus, 2002)
The enormous economical problem of Germany is a factor that influences all politics. The reunification of the two Germanys is the main cause of this. Building up the former DDR to the standards of the former West Germany has and will cost a lot of money.
That is why I picked the year 1990 (reunification) as the new starting point of Germany as a part of the European Union.
Future predictions:
1) With the help of the US, Germany takes a central role in building up the European Union, which will involve the new members of the eastern part of Europe.
The Ostvertragen (treaties between East and West Germany made at the time of the Cold War) teached Germany how to deal with the former Eastern European countries who want to join, or recently joined the European Union. This gives Germany a central position within the European Union, not only geographically.
2) Europe will be divided, which means economic problems will hold on much longer.
Germany needs partners to build up a strong economy. More labourers (immigrants) are needed. If Europe will be divided, getting rid of the debt will take much longer. This will probably make Germany a strong leader within the Eastern part of Europe, especially because the United States supports Germany in being the main player in connection with the countries in Eastern Europe.
Relations Germany-US: 700,000 labourers in Germany work directly for American companies. The same number of workers are employed in the US by German companies. More direct connections with the United States can be made. So even when Europe will be divided, Germany will stay an important partner for the US.
How good the relationship is, can be taken from the words of president Bush when he visited Berlin in 2002, where he said: "I'm here to let the German people know how proud I am of our relationship, our personal relationship, and how proud I am of the relationship between our two countries."
And on February 27, 2004 president George W. Bush and Chancellor Gerhard Schröder made a Joint Statement on the German-American alliance for the 21st century. (See also Prof. Janssens' comments below.)
Lecturer: Prof. dr. Ruud Janssens
National Interests: US, EU, European nations. Text of Gejo's Presentation: "Germany and the European Union"
- Main source: Christian Hacke, Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Von Konrad Adenauer bis Gerhard Schöder. Berlin: Ullstein, 2003.
. History: 1945 - 1990. German foreign minister Joschka Fischer noted two "historic decisions" that made the new Europe possible: The US's decision to stay in Europe and France's and Germany's commitment to the principle of integration, beginning with economic links.
(Source: "Power and Weakness" by Robert Kagan, Policy Review, June 2002.)
. History: 1990-2004. Germany has 82 million inhabitants, of whom 8 million are foreigners. In total there are two million people from Turkey (a new major candidate for the European Union).
Almost 9% of the German workforce is jobless (over 4 million people). The United Nations calculated that if it wants to keep the retiring system working, Germany should let in 200,000 to 300,000 immigrants every year.
Furthermore, there is a lack of computer- and software specialists, which means that even though there is are a lots of unemployed people, still several hundred thousand of jobs cannot be filled.
The complete debt burden of the German state, including debts from the 16 federal states and cities, currently amounts to more than 1200 billion Euro. This costs every year 40 billion Euro in interest and amortization, which is 25 % of the estimate.
(Source: Michèle de Waard: Duitsland achter de schermen: het wonder van de Berlijnse Republiek. Amsterdam: Prometheus, 2002)
The enormous economical problem of Germany is a factor that influences all politics. The reunification of the two Germanys is the main cause of this. Building up the former DDR to the standards of the former West Germany has and will cost a lot of money.
That is why I picked the year 1990 (reunification) as the new starting point of Germany as a part of the European Union.
Future predictions:
1) With the help of the US, Germany takes a central role in building up the European Union, which will involve the new members of the eastern part of Europe.
The Ostvertragen (treaties between East and West Germany made at the time of the Cold War) teached Germany how to deal with the former Eastern European countries who want to join, or recently joined the European Union. This gives Germany a central position within the European Union, not only geographically.
2) Europe will be divided, which means economic problems will hold on much longer.
Germany needs partners to build up a strong economy. More labourers (immigrants) are needed. If Europe will be divided, getting rid of the debt will take much longer. This will probably make Germany a strong leader within the Eastern part of Europe, especially because the United States supports Germany in being the main player in connection with the countries in Eastern Europe.
Relations Germany-US: 700,000 labourers in Germany work directly for American companies. The same number of workers are employed in the US by German companies. More direct connections with the United States can be made. So even when Europe will be divided, Germany will stay an important partner for the US.
How good the relationship is, can be taken from the words of president Bush when he visited Berlin in 2002, where he said: "I'm here to let the German people know how proud I am of our relationship, our personal relationship, and how proud I am of the relationship between our two countries."
And on February 27, 2004 president George W. Bush and Chancellor Gerhard Schröder made a Joint Statement on the German-American alliance for the 21st century. (See also Prof. Janssens' comments below.)
- US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS
Lecturer: Prof. dr. Ruud Janssens
National Interests: US, EU, European nations. Presentation by Harry, Marc, Jurjen & Gejo.
(These are my notes from this very good presentation.)
. United States (Harry). There are two scenarios for the United States: a conservative one, and a more liberal one. Under the conservative scenario, the US would benefit from a fragmented Europe. In the short run, a strong Europe would not be a welcome phenomenon.
Thus, America could follow a three-dimensional strategy. Politically, it could seek to promote bilateral relations with European countries. Militarily, it could accelerate its planned pullback from Europe. And from a economic viewpoint, it could try to establish free-trade agreements with different European partners.
Risks associated with the "conservative" scenario: (a) the long-term stability of the European Union would perhaps come under threat; (b) or, surprisingly, "core" Europe could become even more united; (c) an important global ally would be lost.
Harry went on to outline the more "liberal" scenario. It is based on ackowledging what unites Europe and the US, rather than what separates them. Europe is an ally with the same core values (democracy, the rule of law, etc.) Together, they could counter upcoming superpowers such as China.
Under this scenario, US unilateralism is to be avoided. America cannot do everything on its own. The challenge: it takes a dose of political courage to identify common long-term interests. The risk: this position can cost some influence in the short run.
Harry decidedly embraces the more "liberal" strategic option; he argues that it's the most realistic one.
. France (Jurjen). Key issues: the legacy of De Gaulle's grandeur policy; the heavy burden of the state, the biggest employer in France; the lack of trust in market-based economic solutions.
A realist French perspective seeks to curb German power within the EU and to counterbalance the United States in the global scene. France wants to "civilize" globalisation -- knowing well that it cannot control it. The French impulse for a balance of power is triggered by: (a) US unilateralism; (b) the influence of the French-Arab minority.
This scenario depends on the acceptance of the European constitution and on more defense cooperation within Europe. Within five years, one should expect more trade disputes with the US (which would make the headlines, but with only peripheral damage), and less influence within the WTO.
Risks: a multipolar world could be a more dangerous world; less trade could lead to economic stagnation; more European integration could diminish sovereignty.
Jurjen also presented a scenario where France decides to go it alone, as the EU disintegrates. The European constitution -seen as too "anti-social"- is rejected. From an economic perspective, France focuses on Asia, and less on Eastern Europe (now dominated by Germany.) Conceivably, the country could promote more relations with the rest of the French-speaking world.
. Germany (Gejo.) Very briefly, Gejo sketched the German problem mostly in economic terms. The country is heavily indebted and suffers from chronic unemployment. With the help of the US, Germany could play a key role in the EU. It could turn to the new Eastern European countries from an economic point of view. Risks: Germany needs more immigrants.
. United Kingdom (Marc.) The UK finds itself in a very awkward position: will it leave the EU and join NAFTA? Will it embrace Europe and its new currency? After reviewing "how it got there in the first place" (De Gaulle, Suez, Vietnam, etc.), Marc singled out the four strategic issues faced by the UK: sovereignty, the euro, the free markets philosophy, defense policy.
- Sovereignty. It is very, very important to the British. The last time they were invaded, it was back in ... 1066! In other words, the Brits are very reluctant to transfer power to European institutions they perceive as unaccountable.
- The Euro. Public opinion is against giving up the British pound. The pound was forced out from the Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1992 -- a bitter experience.
Marc favors a solution where the United Kingdom stays in the European Union, but with enough influence to promote an economic agenda based on free trade. Eventually, a transatlantic free market could emerge.
Comments from Prof. Janssens. Very interesting presentation, which will prove useful as we move forward and deal with more specific issues. Perhaps greater emphasis should have been put on the role played by domestic politics. Leaders may disregard long term goals in their pursuit of immediate electoral gains.
Thus, Gerhard Schröder took a very strong anti-US position in 2003, mostly because he was in real danger of losing the general election. Also, one should take into account the fact that the EU may start to "create" its own interests -- as all bureaucraties do.
Lecturer: Prof. dr. Ruud Janssens
National Interests: US, EU, European nations. Presentation by Harry, Marc, Jurjen & Gejo.
(These are my notes from this very good presentation.)
. United States (Harry). There are two scenarios for the United States: a conservative one, and a more liberal one. Under the conservative scenario, the US would benefit from a fragmented Europe. In the short run, a strong Europe would not be a welcome phenomenon.
Thus, America could follow a three-dimensional strategy. Politically, it could seek to promote bilateral relations with European countries. Militarily, it could accelerate its planned pullback from Europe. And from a economic viewpoint, it could try to establish free-trade agreements with different European partners.
Risks associated with the "conservative" scenario: (a) the long-term stability of the European Union would perhaps come under threat; (b) or, surprisingly, "core" Europe could become even more united; (c) an important global ally would be lost.
Harry went on to outline the more "liberal" scenario. It is based on ackowledging what unites Europe and the US, rather than what separates them. Europe is an ally with the same core values (democracy, the rule of law, etc.) Together, they could counter upcoming superpowers such as China.
Under this scenario, US unilateralism is to be avoided. America cannot do everything on its own. The challenge: it takes a dose of political courage to identify common long-term interests. The risk: this position can cost some influence in the short run.
Harry decidedly embraces the more "liberal" strategic option; he argues that it's the most realistic one.
. France (Jurjen). Key issues: the legacy of De Gaulle's grandeur policy; the heavy burden of the state, the biggest employer in France; the lack of trust in market-based economic solutions.
A realist French perspective seeks to curb German power within the EU and to counterbalance the United States in the global scene. France wants to "civilize" globalisation -- knowing well that it cannot control it. The French impulse for a balance of power is triggered by: (a) US unilateralism; (b) the influence of the French-Arab minority.
This scenario depends on the acceptance of the European constitution and on more defense cooperation within Europe. Within five years, one should expect more trade disputes with the US (which would make the headlines, but with only peripheral damage), and less influence within the WTO.
Risks: a multipolar world could be a more dangerous world; less trade could lead to economic stagnation; more European integration could diminish sovereignty.
Jurjen also presented a scenario where France decides to go it alone, as the EU disintegrates. The European constitution -seen as too "anti-social"- is rejected. From an economic perspective, France focuses on Asia, and less on Eastern Europe (now dominated by Germany.) Conceivably, the country could promote more relations with the rest of the French-speaking world.
. Germany (Gejo.) Very briefly, Gejo sketched the German problem mostly in economic terms. The country is heavily indebted and suffers from chronic unemployment. With the help of the US, Germany could play a key role in the EU. It could turn to the new Eastern European countries from an economic point of view. Risks: Germany needs more immigrants.
. United Kingdom (Marc.) The UK finds itself in a very awkward position: will it leave the EU and join NAFTA? Will it embrace Europe and its new currency? After reviewing "how it got there in the first place" (De Gaulle, Suez, Vietnam, etc.), Marc singled out the four strategic issues faced by the UK: sovereignty, the euro, the free markets philosophy, defense policy.
- Sovereignty. It is very, very important to the British. The last time they were invaded, it was back in ... 1066! In other words, the Brits are very reluctant to transfer power to European institutions they perceive as unaccountable.
- The Euro. Public opinion is against giving up the British pound. The pound was forced out from the Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1992 -- a bitter experience.
Marc favors a solution where the United Kingdom stays in the European Union, but with enough influence to promote an economic agenda based on free trade. Eventually, a transatlantic free market could emerge.
Comments from Prof. Janssens. Very interesting presentation, which will prove useful as we move forward and deal with more specific issues. Perhaps greater emphasis should have been put on the role played by domestic politics. Leaders may disregard long term goals in their pursuit of immediate electoral gains.
Thus, Gerhard Schröder took a very strong anti-US position in 2003, mostly because he was in real danger of losing the general election. Also, one should take into account the fact that the EU may start to "create" its own interests -- as all bureaucraties do.
Monday, November 01, 2004
- MAJOR ISSUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY
Lecturer: E.F van de Bilt
Stephen Skowronek: The Politics Presidents Make. Leadership From John Adams to Bill Clinton (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 1997).
Reviewed by Carlein, Diederik & Marc
Sadly, I missed most of the presentation -- I had an appointment at the Foreign Police to pick up my new verblijfsdocument! Here are some comments by Prof. van de Bilt:
. Schlesinger v. Skowronek. What differences can one find between these two analysts of the presidency? How do their chronologies differ? (Clue: Schlesinger's is simpler, as it focuses solely on the issue of the imperial presidency. Skowronek starts with a similar chronology, but he then tries to introduce a degree of sophistication.)
. The increasing power of US presidents. Skowronek is not as concerned as Schlesinger is. Presidents, even if they seem to have ever more and more power, may be constrained by the fact that they lack a clear mandate from the electorate (see the issue of power v. authority).
. The problem of originality. Every president wants to become a disruptive president; he wants to build his legacy. To experiment radically. To attack predecessors. That in itself is a very interesting idea. It tends to create "victims", like Andrew Johnson after Lincoln, or Harry Truman after FDR. This is what litterary critic Harold Bloom called the "Anxiety of Influence": you cannot allow yourself to be seen as a mere apostle, as a follower.
Lecturer: E.F van de Bilt
Stephen Skowronek: The Politics Presidents Make. Leadership From John Adams to Bill Clinton (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 1997).
Reviewed by Carlein, Diederik & Marc
Sadly, I missed most of the presentation -- I had an appointment at the Foreign Police to pick up my new verblijfsdocument! Here are some comments by Prof. van de Bilt:
. Schlesinger v. Skowronek. What differences can one find between these two analysts of the presidency? How do their chronologies differ? (Clue: Schlesinger's is simpler, as it focuses solely on the issue of the imperial presidency. Skowronek starts with a similar chronology, but he then tries to introduce a degree of sophistication.)
. The increasing power of US presidents. Skowronek is not as concerned as Schlesinger is. Presidents, even if they seem to have ever more and more power, may be constrained by the fact that they lack a clear mandate from the electorate (see the issue of power v. authority).
. The problem of originality. Every president wants to become a disruptive president; he wants to build his legacy. To experiment radically. To attack predecessors. That in itself is a very interesting idea. It tends to create "victims", like Andrew Johnson after Lincoln, or Harry Truman after FDR. This is what litterary critic Harold Bloom called the "Anxiety of Influence": you cannot allow yourself to be seen as a mere apostle, as a follower.
