Tuesday, November 23, 2004
- US - EUROPEAN RELATIONS
Lecturer: Prof. dr. Ruud Janssens
War on Terror: Options. Presentation by Jeniffer, Theresa, Diederik & Agustin.
(This is a version of my own comments.)
I will present the current US administration's view on the war on terror in a way that (I hope) many among you will find surprising, and in a way that illustrates one possible outcome of the war -- at least according to some writers.
The US administration's view is based on two types of assumptions. First, there is a heavy reliance on analogies. This is both a risky and a (potentially) rewarding methodology. We can discuss the risks later on, but the rewards are pretty clear: with the help of analogies, we can put current events into a framework that will be familiar to anyone who reads history.
The second assumption is that we are --right here, right now-- at war. Some even talk about World War IV, World War III being the Cold War (1). This war is fought between islamo-fascists (or global jihad, or militant Islam), on the one hand, and primarily the West, on the other hand. And within the West, the United States and Israel are the No.1 targets. But countries such as Russia, Thailand, and even China are involved as well.
The use of analogies in war provides a surprising perspective on the following issues: the war in Iraq, unilateralism v. multilateralism, and regime change in the Middle East. Let me tackle first the crucial issue of uni- and multilateralism.
Winston's Early Unilateral Stance
Here's our first analogy. Imagine that we are in 1939; there is a staunch, a fierce unilateralist out there. His name is Winston Spencer Churchill. Winston's unilateral stance is based upon the need to check the growth of the Nazi war machine. But what are the multilateralists doing? They are busy plotting the destruction of Central Europe!
On the one hand, the British are making deals with Hitler (with the approval of the French) about the Sudetenland, Austria, Checoslovakia, etc. One the other hand, Stalin is making deals with Hitler about the rape of Poland. And if this wasn't enough, the French are making their own deals with the Japanese about some possessions in East Asia (2).
In other words, ladies and gentlemen: multilateralists can be the bad guys; unilateralists can be the good guys, as was amply demonstrated in 1939. This is a key idea for the current US administration (3). But how did the situation evolve? By 1943, Winston's early unilateralism had shifted, had mutated, had been transformed into a new multilateral consensus.
This time, however, the consensus was not based on the appeasement of totalitarian regimes, but on their utter destruction. The appeasement of totalitarian regimes is sometimes referred to as dysfunctional multilateralism by people close to the current administration (4).
The Current War on Terror
How does the current war on terror fit into this scheme? The key event here is Belsan, in early September 2004, when jihadists killed more than 300 Russian children. This will likely be seen in the future as the turning point in the war on terror. After Beslan, Russia decidedly embraced the Bush doctrine. Beslan was Russia's September 11; it might become the jihadists' Stalingrad (5).
A couple of days after Beslan, jihadists bombed the Australian embassy in Jakarta, killing 8 people. It was another colossal blunder. That week saw a flurry of diplomatic activity, with Pakistan announcing a security deal with Russia, and Australia offering to cooperate with ... Russia.
Now, Australia cooperates -in security matters- with America, which cooperates with Pakistan. In other words, we've come full circle! It doesn't make any sense to talk about a unilateral approach anymore. If we add the situation in Thailand (with its ongoing war in the south against Islamic militants) and the recent events in China (the state of emergency in a westward, mostly Muslim province), things could soon change in a dramatic way.
In fact, we may be about to witness -- not tomorrow, not next week, but perhaps in the next couple of months or years-- the birth of a new gigantic multilateral animal, much like the one that emerged in 1943. This, by the way, would fit nicely into Thomas Barnett's view on the war on terror.
Barnett, the author of The Pentagon's New Map, envisages a situation in which the US cooperates with Russia, China, Australia and with many other players to provide both security and economic development to the Middle East (6).
The War in Iraq
Let me finish my comments with some analogies that may help place the war in Iraq in a surprising context. What was the first country invaded by Franklin Delano Roosevelt after Pearl Harbor? It was Tunisia. The invasion of Tunisia was carried out against international law (7). And Tunisia had nothing to do with Pearl Harbor, or with Japan.
However, Roosevelt thought that the occupation of North Africa was very important from a strategic point of view, because it would ultimately weaken the position of totalitarian regimes in Italy, Germany and eventually Japan. A similar approach was taken with Iraq in 2003. By occupying Iraq --and by turning it into a successful, normal country-- the appeal of jihadists in the Middle East will be fatally weakened.
One more comment, this time about the issue of weapons of mass destruction. Here's another World War II analogy: in December 1945, a massive intelligence failure was uncovered in the US. As it turned out, Hitler was far from being in a position to produce the atomic bomb.
In early 1945, however, Roosevelt faced the following dilemma: should he bomb a quarter of Germany --killing thousands of innocent German citizens-- in order to avoid even a slight risk of letting a mad man play with an atomic bomb? Roosevelt's decision was: yes. And George W. Bush made a similar decision (8).
Finally, let me anticipate a question that will surely come up in the discussion. People tell me that a muscular approach to the war on terror creates more, not less, terrorists. My answer is: yes, probably so. But again, what happened in 1939-1940 when the first SS soldiers were being killed? Did that create more imitators throughout the Western world? Quite possibly. Was it wrong to target them anyway? I don't think so.
_________________
(1) Norman Podhoretz: "World War IV: How It Started, What It Means, And Why We Have to Win", Commentary, September 2004.
(2) See Paul-Marie de la Gorce. De Gaulle. Paris: Perrin, 1999.
(3) See Lawrence F. Kaplan & William Kristol. The War in Iraq. Saddam's Tyranny and America's Mission. San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2003.
(4) See John van Oudenaden: "What is Multilateral?", Policy Review, February 2003, and: "Unipolar Versus Unilateral", Policy Review, April 2004.
(5) Barbara Lerner: "Beslan changed Russia ... and the world", NationalReviewOnline, September 7, 2004.
(6) On October 14, 2004, presidents Putin of Russia and Hu Jintao of China issued a communiqué in Beijing in which they "declared each other's rebels -in Chechnya and in China's mostly Muslim region of Xinjang- to be part of international terrorism" ("Courtship in Beijing", Financial Times, October 15, 2004.)
(7) David Kopel: "The Torch of Freedom", NationalReviewOnline, October 7, 2004.
(8) See Mike Steinberger's interview with Robert Kagan ("The pros and neocons of the Iraq war", Financial Times, October 10, 2004). Kagan reiterates the view that "Saddam was deposed because of the weapons he was believed to possess and the danger he was thought to pose to other countries, not least the US." The argument about the spread of democracy in the Middle East is "an ex post facto rationalisation - a correct one, in my opinion."
Lecturer: Prof. dr. Ruud Janssens
War on Terror: Options. Presentation by Jeniffer, Theresa, Diederik & Agustin.
(This is a version of my own comments.)
I will present the current US administration's view on the war on terror in a way that (I hope) many among you will find surprising, and in a way that illustrates one possible outcome of the war -- at least according to some writers.
The US administration's view is based on two types of assumptions. First, there is a heavy reliance on analogies. This is both a risky and a (potentially) rewarding methodology. We can discuss the risks later on, but the rewards are pretty clear: with the help of analogies, we can put current events into a framework that will be familiar to anyone who reads history.
The second assumption is that we are --right here, right now-- at war. Some even talk about World War IV, World War III being the Cold War (1). This war is fought between islamo-fascists (or global jihad, or militant Islam), on the one hand, and primarily the West, on the other hand. And within the West, the United States and Israel are the No.1 targets. But countries such as Russia, Thailand, and even China are involved as well.
The use of analogies in war provides a surprising perspective on the following issues: the war in Iraq, unilateralism v. multilateralism, and regime change in the Middle East. Let me tackle first the crucial issue of uni- and multilateralism.
Winston's Early Unilateral Stance
Here's our first analogy. Imagine that we are in 1939; there is a staunch, a fierce unilateralist out there. His name is Winston Spencer Churchill. Winston's unilateral stance is based upon the need to check the growth of the Nazi war machine. But what are the multilateralists doing? They are busy plotting the destruction of Central Europe!
On the one hand, the British are making deals with Hitler (with the approval of the French) about the Sudetenland, Austria, Checoslovakia, etc. One the other hand, Stalin is making deals with Hitler about the rape of Poland. And if this wasn't enough, the French are making their own deals with the Japanese about some possessions in East Asia (2).
In other words, ladies and gentlemen: multilateralists can be the bad guys; unilateralists can be the good guys, as was amply demonstrated in 1939. This is a key idea for the current US administration (3). But how did the situation evolve? By 1943, Winston's early unilateralism had shifted, had mutated, had been transformed into a new multilateral consensus.
This time, however, the consensus was not based on the appeasement of totalitarian regimes, but on their utter destruction. The appeasement of totalitarian regimes is sometimes referred to as dysfunctional multilateralism by people close to the current administration (4).
The Current War on Terror
How does the current war on terror fit into this scheme? The key event here is Belsan, in early September 2004, when jihadists killed more than 300 Russian children. This will likely be seen in the future as the turning point in the war on terror. After Beslan, Russia decidedly embraced the Bush doctrine. Beslan was Russia's September 11; it might become the jihadists' Stalingrad (5).
A couple of days after Beslan, jihadists bombed the Australian embassy in Jakarta, killing 8 people. It was another colossal blunder. That week saw a flurry of diplomatic activity, with Pakistan announcing a security deal with Russia, and Australia offering to cooperate with ... Russia.
Now, Australia cooperates -in security matters- with America, which cooperates with Pakistan. In other words, we've come full circle! It doesn't make any sense to talk about a unilateral approach anymore. If we add the situation in Thailand (with its ongoing war in the south against Islamic militants) and the recent events in China (the state of emergency in a westward, mostly Muslim province), things could soon change in a dramatic way.
In fact, we may be about to witness -- not tomorrow, not next week, but perhaps in the next couple of months or years-- the birth of a new gigantic multilateral animal, much like the one that emerged in 1943. This, by the way, would fit nicely into Thomas Barnett's view on the war on terror.
Barnett, the author of The Pentagon's New Map, envisages a situation in which the US cooperates with Russia, China, Australia and with many other players to provide both security and economic development to the Middle East (6).
The War in Iraq
Let me finish my comments with some analogies that may help place the war in Iraq in a surprising context. What was the first country invaded by Franklin Delano Roosevelt after Pearl Harbor? It was Tunisia. The invasion of Tunisia was carried out against international law (7). And Tunisia had nothing to do with Pearl Harbor, or with Japan.
However, Roosevelt thought that the occupation of North Africa was very important from a strategic point of view, because it would ultimately weaken the position of totalitarian regimes in Italy, Germany and eventually Japan. A similar approach was taken with Iraq in 2003. By occupying Iraq --and by turning it into a successful, normal country-- the appeal of jihadists in the Middle East will be fatally weakened.
One more comment, this time about the issue of weapons of mass destruction. Here's another World War II analogy: in December 1945, a massive intelligence failure was uncovered in the US. As it turned out, Hitler was far from being in a position to produce the atomic bomb.
In early 1945, however, Roosevelt faced the following dilemma: should he bomb a quarter of Germany --killing thousands of innocent German citizens-- in order to avoid even a slight risk of letting a mad man play with an atomic bomb? Roosevelt's decision was: yes. And George W. Bush made a similar decision (8).
Finally, let me anticipate a question that will surely come up in the discussion. People tell me that a muscular approach to the war on terror creates more, not less, terrorists. My answer is: yes, probably so. But again, what happened in 1939-1940 when the first SS soldiers were being killed? Did that create more imitators throughout the Western world? Quite possibly. Was it wrong to target them anyway? I don't think so.
_________________
(1) Norman Podhoretz: "World War IV: How It Started, What It Means, And Why We Have to Win", Commentary, September 2004.
(2) See Paul-Marie de la Gorce. De Gaulle. Paris: Perrin, 1999.
(3) See Lawrence F. Kaplan & William Kristol. The War in Iraq. Saddam's Tyranny and America's Mission. San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2003.
(4) See John van Oudenaden: "What is Multilateral?", Policy Review, February 2003, and: "Unipolar Versus Unilateral", Policy Review, April 2004.
(5) Barbara Lerner: "Beslan changed Russia ... and the world", NationalReviewOnline, September 7, 2004.
(6) On October 14, 2004, presidents Putin of Russia and Hu Jintao of China issued a communiqué in Beijing in which they "declared each other's rebels -in Chechnya and in China's mostly Muslim region of Xinjang- to be part of international terrorism" ("Courtship in Beijing", Financial Times, October 15, 2004.)
(7) David Kopel: "The Torch of Freedom", NationalReviewOnline, October 7, 2004.
(8) See Mike Steinberger's interview with Robert Kagan ("The pros and neocons of the Iraq war", Financial Times, October 10, 2004). Kagan reiterates the view that "Saddam was deposed because of the weapons he was believed to possess and the danger he was thought to pose to other countries, not least the US." The argument about the spread of democracy in the Middle East is "an ex post facto rationalisation - a correct one, in my opinion."
# posted by Agustin @ 6:34 PM 
